ИСТИНА

The idea of close relationship of simulation mirror resonance mechanisms and Aristotelian paradeigma (see e.g. [G & C 2014]), which served as motive for this presentation, was suggested by Vittorio Gallese, a prominent cognitive neuroscientist and neuropsychologist, one of discoverers of mirror neurons. Surprisingly, while developing ideas of embodied simulation , Gallese directly refers to Husserlian phenomenology and at the same time passes over an obvious cognitive phenomenological interpretation of rhetoric example via a concept of analogizing apprehension (apperseption). In our talk, we attempt to explore the cognitive role of analogizing apperseption thereby closing the gap to offer our novel reconstruction of paradeigma. The plan of our presentation is as follows. First I am going to briefly outline the main principles of our approach. Then, I will try, again in a nutshell, to clarify our interpretation of the phenomenological concept of appresentation. And finally, I plan to illustrate the fundamental role of appresentation in cognitive activity with two examples: (1) Aristotelian APo B19 (first principles) in the light of APr B24 (paradeigma) and (2) argumentative fallacy Argumentum ad Populum.