ИСТИНА

he recent rapid growth of empirical results in neuroscience has widened a proverbial explanatory gap between a first-person introspective experience and objective third-person data. Given different competing approaches, phenomenological framework proved an adequate methodological tool to bridge this gap. The present paper aims at a phenomenological representation of categorization by means of a modified functional theory of concept, termed Intentional Theory of Concept. The 1st section hereof serves as an introduction into the subject matter. In the 2nd section, we will focus on key phenomenological ideas of intentionality and analogous apperception (appresentation) and briefly describe our approach. The 3rd section contains a short summary of the modern version of the classical theory of concepts and its functional variant. Integrating the substance of the previous sections, the 4th one will offer an interpretation of categorization by means of a functional theory of concepts formally presented by typed lambda calculus. The final section provides a summary of findings and prospects for a follow-up study.