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## CORRECTION

In the printed and electronic versions of the journal *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2017, the authors of the article "The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy in the Eurasian Economic Union" (pp. 100-108) were, in fact, Zhanna Golodova, Lora Fedyakina, and Yulia Ranchinskaya. The mistake occurred for reasons beyond the Editorial Board's control.

**FOR YOUR INFORMATION**

***The Special Feature section  
in the next three issues will discuss:***

- ***Central Eurasia: Politics Today***
- ***Central Eurasia:  
Religion in the Sociopolitical Context***
- ***Central Eurasia: Integration Processes***

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with the staff on an individual basis.***

## MIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

### ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS TODAY

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## A B S T R A C T

**P**olitical science, history, economics, linguistics, sociology, literary studies, social psychology and social philosophy, ethics and aesthetics, philosophy of language and logic offer their own, and highly specific reconstruction, and formalization of communication between people.

Today, we need common frames of conceptual formalization of an ethnopolitical conflict as a phenomenon; it is a theoretical and cognitive task of Caucasian realities. In the context of the world political process, the region is gradually acquiring the status of the key component of the world's political and social organization; it is gaining consequence as an element of horizontal structuring of society.

Regional conflicts and the ways they can and should be settled have become a permanent element of the agenda of all international organizations, including the OSCE, the U.N., its General Assembly, and the Security Council, and also of the activities of the U.N. Secretary-General, etc. In recent years, the Northern Caucasus has become a zone of vehement ethnic conflicts which, as could be expected, negatively af-

fect its social and political context.<sup>1</sup> Sovereignization of the republics of the South of Russia fragmented the region's social and political space, increased both latent and apparent national and ethnic tension and led to armed clashes. The events of the recent past and those that are unfolding today have done nothing good for the North Caucasian social and political situation and moved to the forefront the security problems of local people and vacationers. For objective reasons, the region is involved in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems and the system of trans-regional ethnic and political relationships.<sup>2</sup> Today, the region is facing a real danger of sliding into an abyss of international terrorism and extremism against the background of tension, created by migration and social upheavals.

<sup>1</sup> See: A. Shadzhe, I. Karabulatova, R. Khunagov, Z. Zhade, "Ethnopolitical Influence in Regulating National Security in Border Territories of the Countries in the Caucasian-Caspian Region," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 66-75.

<sup>2</sup> See: S. Lyausheva, R. Khunagov, Z. Zhade, A. Shadzhe, "Ethnic Tensions in the South of Russia in the Opinions of Experts," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 96-105.

**KEYWORDS:** *the Northern Caucasus, ethnopolitical conflicts, regional conflictology, ethnic tension.*

### *Introduction*

Conflicts in the Caucasus are rooted in the far from simple relationships between the local peoples and are fanned by a variety of factors: political (struggle for national identity, rehabilitation of the repressed peoples, territorial disputes, etc.), and ethnic factors that escalate the conflicts by slogans and demands, formulated by the conflicting sides. These factors are intertwined, the correlation between them changes from one conflict to another, until it becomes hard or even impossible to separate them.

In the post-Soviet period, the geopolitical processes in the Northern Caucasus have become spontaneous and cyclic; today they are drawn into transborder international relations, in which the

institutionalized presence of foreign actors (the U.S. the EU, Middle Eastern countries and Islamist radical organizations) is strongly felt and is increasing.

Liquidation of the genesis of separatism and terrorism and ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation should be treated as the most urgent tasks; in the long-term perspective the sources of separatism in Chechnia that has been smoldering for a long time now should be finally extinguished to prevent the conflict's internationalization and stem religious radicalism. Time has come to restore law and order in the republic, bordering on the edge of separatism, and improve living standards; the borders should be guarded to exclude transborder traffic of terrorists from the enclaves of the Pankissi Gorge at the border between Eastern Georgia and Chechnia, etc.

In the foreign policy context, which is a logical continuation of Russia's domestic policy, the federal structures of power should insist, despite Turkey's ambitions, on a favorable regime of the Black Sea Straits; they should lobby the routes of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, the Baku-Grozny-Tuapse oil pipeline, the Blue Stream gas pipeline and other fuel and energy routes within the Russian Federation. The Center should rely on international agreements to consolidate Russia's positions in settling the Karabakh conflict and the conflicts between Georgia, on the one side, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other; it should use the possibilities, offered by the fairly narrow "corridor of possibilities," to preserve its influence in Transcaucasia; the Transcaucasian Railway should be revived to invigorate Russia's partnership with Armenia, Iran and the Central Asian countries.

We should balance out the interests of the conflicting sides in the Caucasus and abandon the habit of demonstrating force at inappropriate moments. The new international legal status of the Caspian should be legitimized to exclude extra-regional military presence in the region: today it looks like a center of geopolitical opposition or even confrontation.<sup>3</sup>

## Methods and Materials

The sources include the following types of documents:

- (1) legislative acts of the Russian Federation and foreign countries, related to geopolitics and national security;
- (2) documents of political parties (programs, election statements and resolutions), related to the geopolitical problems of the Northern Caucasus;
- (3) materials of the media (newspaper and magazine items, information found in electronic media);
- (4) public statements of political figures (speeches, interviews, articles);
- (5) statistical materials, related to the economic potential of the North Caucasian republics, demography, migration and violent crimes;
- (6) documents of religious political organizations and public figures of the Northern Caucasus;
- (7) reminiscences and other personal documents;
- (8) opinion polls.

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<sup>3</sup> See: B. Akhmetova, I. Karabulatova, P. Dudin, Zh. Dorzhiev, "Tension around the Problem of the South China Sea as a Factor of Geopolitical Confrontation and Transformation of the Present World Order," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 49-58.

The theoretical and methodological basis includes the following methods:

- (1) general scientific: logical-heuristic (induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis); descriptive-specific and abstract-definitive; definition and classification;
- (2) social-humanitarian: analysis of documents, method of comparison;
- (3) special scientific: geopolitical analysis, methods of cartography of political phenomena.

The methodology of geopolitical studies of the processes unfolding in the Northern Caucasus was created by E. Pozdniakov, V. Tsymburskiy, A. Dugin and E. Ozhiganov. The present authors side with the neo-Eurasian variant of interpretations of Russia's geopolitics in the region.

The following territories are covered by the term "the Northern Caucasus": the piedmont areas (including the northern slopes of the Greater Caucasus with the exception of its eastern part that belongs to Azerbaijan); the Black Sea coast of the Krasnodar Territory to the south of the Greater Caucasus. We are convinced that a coordinated opinion about the boundaries of the Northern Caucasus is hardly possible. Earlier, it included not only the piedmont areas but also the neighboring territories. As part of Russia, it includes thirteen administrative and national-territorial units: two territories (Stavropol and Krasnodar territories); three regions (Rostov, Astrakhan, Volgograd), eight republics (Adyghea, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Chechnia). The area is a unique ethnocultural, polyconfessional, social and economic phenomenon of special importance for Russia.

## Results

The following factors determine the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts in the Northern Caucasus:

1. *Polyethnoconfessional population.* There are Christians among the local peoples and Muslims of different Islamic persuasions closely intertwined with paganism.<sup>4</sup> Despite a very long period and very determined efforts to squeeze religion out of everyday life of the Soviet people by limiting or even banning propaganda of the fundamentals of Islam, the religious factor in the Caucasus was revived and strengthened to become a highly important element of ethnopolitical processes in the traditionally Islamic regions.<sup>5</sup> Positions of Islam, as an important factor of everyday life, are especially strong in Chechnia, Ingushetia and Daghestan.<sup>6</sup> Barely discernible under common circumstances, the religious factor invariably crops up, in one way or another, in most of the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus (it is present, for example, in the confrontation between Russia and Chechnia and between Ossetia and Ingushetia).

The conflicts, however, are mostly ethnopolitical rather than religious:<sup>7</sup> religious slogans are the favorite instrument of certain political elites that use them to unite their supporters or to camouflage their political aims.

<sup>4</sup> See: R. Khunagov, A. Shaov, S. Lyausheva, V. Nekhai, "Traditional Adyghe Stereotypes within the Ethnic Tolerance/Intolerance Dichotomy as a Factor of Ethnic Evolution in the Northern Caucasus," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 105-113.

<sup>5</sup> See: I. Karabulatova, "Ethnocultural Communication Systems in the Northern Caucasus and the Problem of Radical Islam," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 71-79.

<sup>6</sup> See: M. Betilmerzaeva, A. Akhtaev, B. Sadulaev, A. Salgiriev, "Religion and State: Interaction and Sociocultural Transformations (The Chechen Republic Case Study)," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 124-132.

<sup>7</sup> See: "Okazyvaetsia, nepravilno verily?" available at [<http://maxpark.com/community/6696/content/5019450>], 6 June, 2017.

2. *Territorial claims.* Frequent changes of administrative territorial borders in the region that ignore the real settlement pattern of the local population, as well as mass deportations of peoples that returned to their native lands after years in exile, deprived the region's administrative division of ethnic logic.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union's disintegration and the revived national aspirations of sovereignty and independence added urgency to the already acute territorial disagreements. What had begun as disagreements over territories claimed by the Ossetians and Ingushes, later developed into an ethnic conflict.
3. *The rigid national-state hierarchy of Soviet times.* The division of peoples into "titular" and "non-titular," with different rights and constitutional statuses, accumulated contradictions in the ethnopolitical sphere.<sup>9</sup>

The very desired national self-identification is clearly seen in what is said about internal federalization in polyethnic republics (Daghestan);<sup>10</sup> possible separation of bi-national republics (Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia); self-identification outside sovereign states (Chechnia)<sup>11</sup> or reunification of the divided peoples (the Lezgians in Daghestan and Azerbaijan).

4. *Negative repercussions of unjustified deportations and repressions.* Starting in the 1860s, the czarist government was consistently moving numerous tribes of Circassians, part of the Chechens, Nogais and other peoples to Turkey. In the nineteenth century, about three million were moved from the Northern and Northwestern Caucasus to Turkey, which radically changed the region's ethnodemographic composition.<sup>12</sup>

In Soviet times, people were moved out of the region and inside it on a much greater scale. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars, falsely accused of treason, were moved to Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East and abandoned without money or shelter. Many of them died; for many years they were deprived of their national culture, their native tongues, etc., while other people were moved to their vacated lands. The region's indigenous population thinks of this time as "darkness."<sup>13</sup>

In the bi-national republics (Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia), the land (vacated by the repressed peoples) and its use became a source of potential conflicts, when the repressed peoples were allowed to return; in addition, there is a strong desire to divide the bi-national republics into national republics, etc.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See: G.B. Vok, "Strategicheskie interesy SShA na Kavkaze," in: *Istoricheskie svyazi narodov Dagestana i Chechni. Tezisy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii*, Institute of History, Archeology, Ethnography DNTs RAN, Makhachkala, 2005, pp. 95-99.

<sup>9</sup> See: G. Osipov, I. Karabulatova, G. Shafranov-Kutsev, L. Kononova, B. Akhmetova, E. Loskutova, G. Niyazova, "Ethnic Trauma and Its Echo in Today's Mental Picture of the World among the Peoples of the Post-Soviet States: An Inter-ethnic Conflicting Discourse Unfolding in Russia's Ethnolinguistic Information Space," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 87-94.

<sup>10</sup> See: Z.A. Makhulova, *Regionalny faktor geopoliticheskikh protsessov v sovremennoy Rossii (na primere Respubliki Dagestan)*, Author's abstract of Ph.D. thesis, Makhachkala, 2006.

<sup>11</sup> See: E.V. Sharapova, "Nepriznannyye gosudarstva postsovetского prostranstva i problema identichnosti: Abkhazia," in: *Kavkazskiy region: puti stabilizatsii*, Rostov State University Press, Rostov-on-Don, 2004, pp. 237-282.

<sup>12</sup> See: A.Iu. Shadzhe, E.A. Sheodzen, *Severokavkazskoe obshchestvo: opyt sistemnogo analiza*, Adyghea State University Press, Maikop, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> I.S. Karabulatova, Y.N. Ebzeeva, "Tolerance Problems in the Context of the Repressed Caucasians' Ethno-trauma Transformation as 'LIGHT' AND 'DARKNESS'," *Terra Sebv's*, No. 9, 2017, pp. 270-278.

<sup>14</sup> See: Yu. Ebzeeva, N. Dubinina, "Discursive Practices of Contemporary Radical Islam in the Countries of the European Union and Eurasian Customs Union," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2017, pp. 109-116.

In this way, contradictions in the ethnopolitical sphere were gradually piling up to develop into open conflicts—the results of catastrophic disintegration and the falling apart of the Soviet Union.

5. *Ethnopolitical repercussions of migration.* Migration added tension to the already tense situation in the Caucasus: ethnopolitical relationships became even more strained; the same fully applies to the competition on the labor market.<sup>15</sup>

Before the early 1990s, people were leaving Daghestan for other parts of the Soviet Union; recently, the relatively quiet republic has been attracting tens of thousands of people from the “hot spots” on the map of the former Soviet Union: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechnia and Tajikistan.<sup>16</sup> Today, greater tension should be expected.

People are very much concerned about the highly tangible tension and the explosive ethnopolitical situation. There is ample reason to perceive it as one of the greatest threats to Russia’s further existence.

Table 1

**Assessment of the Importance of Ethnopolitical Conflicts for the Russian State  
(in % of the total number of polled)**

Position	Share of the Polled		
	Agree	Disagree	Undecided
Ethnopolitical conflicts are not very dangerous for Russia	13.5	55.6	12.4
Ethnopolitical conflicts might disintegrate the Russian state	62.6	14.2	14.2

Nearly 63% (or two-thirds of the polled) agreed that ethnopolitical conflicts might cause the disintegration of the Russian state; their opponents comprised the meager 14%. Analysts should pay more attention to this minority: strange as it may seem, its opinion is much more balanced from the analytical point of view. We can surmise that the bigger part of the minority meant to say that national conflicts were not that important: they were used as instruments, when dealing with other, less obvious problems.

The public opinion polls revealed that a bigger part of the local people believes that the ethnopolitical conflicts are stirred up by the local and central political elites for the purposes of their own.<sup>17</sup>

On the whole, the current situation in the Northern Caucasus testifies that the conflicts are rooted in objective contradictions, caused by the course of history and the region’s ethnic development, and that they can be settled only if and when these contradictions are resolved.

<sup>15</sup> See: M. Seidina, I. Karabulatova, Z. Polivara, A. Zinchenko, “A Publicist Discourse of the Islamic Organizations of the Central Federal District of Russia and the Issue of Tolerance,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 109-117.

<sup>16</sup> See: I. Karabulatova, “The Islamic Factor and the Political Processes in Tajikistan,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 118-123; M. Troulis, “The Caucasus in the Post-Cold War Era: From the Soviet Republics to a Crucial Buffer Zone,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 14-24; V.Kh. Akaev, G.B. Vok, *Kavkaz v kontekste geopolitiki*, Glozny, 2006.

<sup>17</sup> See: T.A. Ostrovskaya, I.S. Karabulatova, Z.R. Khachmaytova, S.A. Lyaucheva, G.V. Osipov, “The Discourse of the Russian Elite in the ERA ‘Liquid’ Modernity as a Problem of Ethnic, Social and Cultural Security,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3, S4, 2015, pp. 147-154.

## Discussion

In the last ten years, the number of scholars, interested in the specifics and meaningful features of regional conflicts, has increased. The interest, with which the academic community responded to the conflict-prone situations at the regional level, is explained by the fact that the processes and phenomena that caused conflicts in one region reappear in other regions with similar results. An analysis of scholarly publications has revealed the fact that such scholars as V. Chagilov, I. Kalinkina, A. Doeva, A. Glukhova, D. Dolenko and others,<sup>18</sup> are especially interested in analyzing the essential features, specifics and variants of regional conflicts.

An analysis of an interconnection between the state, territory and population (undertaken by Rudolf Kjellén and others), serves as the foundation for the geopolitical approach, as an essential description of many studies of world-systems. Kjellén invariably pointed out that geopolitics is concentrated on the unity of the state, which helps understand its essence; political geography, on the other hand, studies the way objective natural qualities of a territory influence politics.<sup>19</sup> Geopolitics was interpreted as scholarly analysis of spatial interests and actions of the state. Political geography studied the spatial conditions, in which states existed: sizes, respective location, territorial disagreements, etc. In the mid-twentieth century, political science of the West admitted that the non-state political actors (actors outside sovereignties—corporations, elites, parties and leaders, according to James Rosenau), were playing an increasingly greater role. From that time on, territorial politics was no longer the monopoly of states and interstate unions: it became a fairly complicated interaction of varied actors of different levels. Methodologically, the revised meaning of politics removed the barriers that separated geopolitics from political geography, stirred up a lot of interest in sub-national and local geopolitical factors. An interest in the resource potentials of states that make it influential and powerful (in the military sense, among other things), moved geopolitics outside the frame of political geography and strengthened the economic component of its methodological matrix (N. Kondratiev, F. Braudel and I. Wallerstein). The disintegration of the Soviet Union that buried the bipolar world, reoriented geopolitics toward civilizational factors (R. Collins,<sup>20</sup> A. Panarin,<sup>21</sup> N. Rozov, S. Huntington, and V. Tsimburskiy).

## Conclusion

Today, in Russia, we should discuss not only economic and political but also sociocultural, confessional and axiological pluralisms. It seems that the following measures may help us smooth down or remove these contradictions:

- (1) We should accept the fact that there is spatial pluralism and different lifestyles; we should overcome our fear of the ghost of separatism when people talk about federalization. From this point of view, we should bear in mind that democracy lies in accepting not only the

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<sup>18</sup> See: V.R. Chagilov, "Politicheskie determinanty ethnoregionalnogo konflikta: teoretiko-metodologicheskie aspekty," in: *Regionalnye konflikty v kontekste globalizatsii i stanovleniia kultury mira*, Collection of scholarly articles, Stavropol State University Press, Moscow, Stavropol, 2006; I.V. Kalinkina, A.N. Doeva, *Regionalnaia konfliktologiya*, Yaroslavl, 2009; A.V. Glukhova, "Politicheskie faktory regionalnoy konfliktologii," in: *Sotsialnye konflikty: ekspertiza, prognozirovaniye, tekhnologiya razresheniya*, Issue 19, *Regionalnaia konfliktologiya. Konfliktogennyye faktory i ikh vzaimodeystvie*, Moscow, 2004; D.V. Dolenko, "Regionalnye konflikty v sovremennoy mirovoy politike," *Sotsialno-politicheskie nauki*, No. 1, 2011.

<sup>19</sup> See: J.R. Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, Leipzig, 1917.

<sup>20</sup> See: R. Collins, *Macrohistory: Essays in Sociology of the Long Run*, Stanford University Press, 1999, 312 pp.

<sup>21</sup> See: A.S. Panarin, *Politologia. O mire politiki na Vostoke i na Zapade*, Universitet, Moscow, 2000.

equality of possibilities but also the chosen methods of life, therefore we should accept the right of the territories, regions, republics and peoples to rely on different methods of production and self-realization.

- (2) The use of force for conflict resolution means that Russia's policies and its politicians are short-sighted: they proved unable to learn the most important lessons of the twentieth century, i.e. that war is no longer an efficient political instrument. The aims that could be achieved by force have become much more easily achieved through economic, technological, scientific and other peaceful methods. The events in Chechnia confirmed that war and military power should not be treated lightly.
- (3) The culture of inter-national communication should be created as the "ethics of inter-national communication."

Differentiated geopolitical methods should be used to settle regional conflicts (in Chechnia, Daghestan and between the Ossetians and Ingushes). In Daghestan, it will be useful to rely on the experience of consociational democracy and territorial cantonization.

In Chechnia, a post-conflict settlement of all aspects of life should be achieved, along with the creation of a new civilian identity. The state should interfere in the conflict between the Ossetians and Ingushes to settle it in the shortest amount of time possible. At the same time, the North Caucasian regional conflicts share the logic of "communicating vessels." To settle them, the state should arrive at a geopolitical strategy at the federal level of decision-making.

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## ETHNOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA

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### A B S T R A C T

**T**he author has undertaken the challenging task of looking at the complex set of issues that invariably arise when two highly sensitive social aspects are discussed in tandem: the nation's ethno-political development and the national security strat-

egy. To achieve this he has probed into various approaches to the problem and analyzed the challenges and threats caused by globalization in the ethnopolitical sphere at all security levels (global, regional, and national). The author has managed to trace the evolution of ideas about the ethnopolitical dimension both in political science and practical politics. These ideas have developed

from the original view that the ethnic issue has completely blended with the social sector of the security system to the scientifically substantiated acceptance of security's ethnic dimension and, consequently, to the recognition that the ethnopolitical aspect of the security issue needs a theoretical and methodological foundation as well as political-legal institutionalization.

**KEYWORDS:** *ethnopolitics, ethnopolitical processes, national security, globalization.*

### *Introduction*

The events of the turn of the 21st century have already raised a wave of in-depth discussions about the nature of the current transformations in the main strategic principles of national security. V. Baranovskiy of Russia has offered three major considerations:

- “First,” writes he, “national security is an issue that can be used in numerous and varied contexts.
- Second, it is an inalienable part of the political context and is widely used in professional and public discussions as well as in official documents...
- Third, this issue is directly related to various social spheres. It is connected, in one way or another, with the military and foreign policy spheres and the economy. It is related to democracy and human rights issues because both can be easily discarded under the pretext of national security needs.”<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, the globalization imperative of the 21st century has been incessantly offering food for thought in the form of new questions and problems to be discussed: we need to analyze the ties among different types and levels of national, regional, and international security, which make them mutually dependent; the transformation of the meaningful foundation of national security in the context of the incessantly emerging new challenges and threats; and the impact of the national security's new dimensions on the nature and formation of the newly independent states' domestic and foreign policies.

These issues are discussed through the prism of their ethnopolitical dimension and actualized within the following issues: the nature of the contemporary ethnopolitical processes in the context of the contemporary threats to national security; discussion of the ethnopolitical aspects of national security; the key ethnopolitical contradictions and the most pertinent problems of ensuring ethnopolitical security; the set of challenges and threats to ethnopolitical security in the transit states; and the formation of ethnic policy there.

<sup>1</sup> V. Baranovskiy, “Natsional’naia bezopasnost: kontseptual’nye i prakticheskie aspekty,” *Materialy seminara “Strategia razvitiia,”* 22 April, 2002, Moscow, 2002, p. 7.

## Ethnopolitical Processes and National Security

To clarify this and many other aspects of the same issue, we should primarily identify the main thing: can two, conceptually very complicated notions—ethnopolitical processes and national security—be discussed within the same context? Wouldn't it be more productive to discuss them as individual and unrelated issues?

We all know that national security is a very complicated functional system with numerous levels teeming with never-ending processes of interaction of the vital interests of the state, society, and individual, and their opposition to domestic and foreign threats. This means that security cannot be described as an isolated topic of study; it is a systemic and integral phenomenon that makes it possible to study society and its interests as a dynamic process.

In the 21st century, the very idea of security moved away from the traditional interpretation of

- first, the state's physical survival and its right and ability to realize itself within the international system; and
- second, guaranteed peace within certain territories and political expanses.

Today, national security has been placed in a wider context and acquired additional dimensions: no longer limited to military-political dimensions, it has acquired new, no less important, ones: political-economic, socio-ecological, and other socially important dimensions without which national security can no longer remain stable. The social environment in which these tasks were resolved has changed, too: in the past the state operated in two strictly mutually independent (internal and external) spheres; today, globalization has made the division less clear.

It has been written<sup>2</sup> that the mounting globalization and regionalization, as well as internationalization of all aspects of social life brought about by integration, are gradually removing the line (which becomes provisional) that separates internal and external security, while many of the threats (international terrorism, drug trafficking, information and technogenic catastrophes) cannot be traced back to only one source. An academic analysis of the trends obvious in the security sphere and the related forecasts for the 21st century have already demonstrated that the threats, challenges, dangers, and risks are becoming more interrelated; more likely than not, one threat is nothing more than a link in a long chain of threats.

The question of the nature of contemporary threats, challenges, dangers, and risks holds a special place in the security-related range of problems.<sup>3</sup> The academic community has so far not been profound enough when dealing with these concepts. There is the tendency to substitute an analysis of the risks for an analysis of the threats to national security; potential and real threats are not distinguished, while the etymology of "threat" and "danger"—two key concepts—remains vague. Art 3 of the 1992 Law of the Russian Federation on Security says for example: "The threat to security is a sum-total of the conditions and factors that endanger the vitally important interests of the individual, society, and the state." The Law obviously regards threat not only as close to the concept of danger, but also revealed through it. The Law on the National Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan offers

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<sup>2</sup> See: A.V. Vozzhennikov, *Natsional'naiia bezopasnost Rossii*, Moscow, 2002; *Obshchaia teoriia natsional'noi bezopasnosti*, ed. by A.A. Prokhozhev, Moscow, 2002; B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Colorado, 1999, and others.

<sup>3</sup> For more details, see: A.L. Ross, *Theory and Practice of International Relations: Analytical Approaches*, Newport, 1997; P.A. Tsygankov, *Mezhdunarodnyye otnoshenia*, Moscow, 1996; B.L. Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities*, 1992; T. Terriff, S. Groft, L. James, P. Morgan, *Security Studies Today*, Cambridge UK, 1999, and others.

a somewhat different interpretation: threat is treated as a sum-total of conditions, factors, and processes. The security-related conceptual documents of other countries (the U.S., France, China, etc.) add to the variety of the concept's definitions.

In fact, complete unification of the theoretical and methodological foundation of security-related research is hardly needed. Comparative analysis reveals that unification is desirable at the terminology level; it should not extend to the empirical level, which should preserve its specificities and original academic and practical-political approaches. This will help us preserve regional specifics and reflect the endemic nature of the real national requirements and interests.

The above considerations have not prevented individual attempts to generalize universal threats to vast continental expanses. A. Tsyganok of Russia describes the following as Europe's main threats in the context of 21st-century globalization:

- First, today so-called international terrorism remains the obvious and main threat.
- Second, the frozen conflicts in Transdnestrria and the Southern Caucasus, as well as the unresolved Balkan and Arab-Israeli conflicts, the still pending territorial issues in Europe (Denmark-Luxemburg), Kosovo, and Europe's outlying areas (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan).
- Third, proliferation of WMD, failed states, and organized crime are as dangerous for Europe.
- Fourth, the mounting Chinese threat, porous borders, and the still controversial border stretches of Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Taiwan, and China.
- Fifth, seats of tension in the Middle East created by potential unsanctioned missile launchings (probably with nuclear warheads) from the territories of North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.
- Sixth, the threat of foreign military intervention of the neighboring states in violation of the U.N. Charter.
- Seventh, the threats created by the totalitarian regimes the unpredictable behavior of which will preserve tension for many years to come.

The Russian author believes that the new cross-border threats (drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc.), the threats to pipeline and energy systems, and the threats in the information sphere are the worst non-military threats for Europe.<sup>4</sup>

A. Utkin has demonstrated a wider approach. He believes that there are five powerful forces that are acting as globalization challenges today and pushing the world community to a new state of being: fixed unipolarity; globalization of the world economy; the weakening of nation-states; the quest for a civilizational identity; and the mutiny of the world community's poor majority.<sup>5</sup>

Other authors might point to different combinations of strategic threats and their modifications in the sub-continental, regional, and nation-state contexts. The constants connected with the ethnic (national) differentiation of the planet's and individual countries' population are very important geopolitically because in geopolitics (and in the general security theory) the states (which exist either *de jure* or *de facto* or are just developing into states) play the key role. They are integral and relatively independent (or even self-sufficient) organisms with interests, values, and aims of their own.

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<sup>4</sup> See: A.D. Tsyganok, *Novye ugrozy dlia Evroaziatskogo kontinenta v usloviakh globalizatsii*, Institut razvitiia grazhdanskogo obshchestva i mestnogo samoupravleniia, available at [<http://c-society.ru/main.php?ID=234053&ar2=30&ar3=14>]; idem, *Novye ugrozy i opasnosti XXI veka dlia Evroaziatskogo kontinenta*, Moscow, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> See: A.I. Utkin, "Geostruktura XXI veka," *Nezavisimaa gazeta*, 1 September, 2000.

Meanwhile, national and ethnic factors are largely responsible for not only the strength and content of the states' interests and ambitions, but also for their very emergence, development, and destruction. For this reason the development of ethnic (national) communities into states is seen as a general trend of the emergence and functioning of a sovereign nation-state, that is, a systemic ethnopolitical process.

An ethnopolitical process should be interpreted as the interaction of fairly large population groups, each possessing a clear ethnic identity, on the one hand, and definite (real or desired) sovereignty institutes, on the other. In this way, the demands these ethnic groups put forward immediately develop into political demands (broader sovereignty), while political, economic, or humanitarian demands acquire ethnic hues and are realized through the mechanisms of ethnic mobilization, etc.<sup>6</sup>

No general discussion of the contemporary state of ethnopolitical processes can be complete without a discussion of certain trends of their strategic development. Today, we can clearly discern three variants of ethnopolitical development of the formerly Soviet nations.

- First, the hypertrophied omnipresent ethnic factor discerned in the social and political development of contemporary nations. It is commonly accepted that an excessive ethnic bias in public and political life (without any extremist trends) cannot be accepted either by nation-states or by multi-national states.
- The second variant reveals a trend toward the unified life-style of all peoples, their maximum assimilation, and blending with the titular ethnocultural expanse. Not so long ago, this was the acceptable or even desirable variant (the attempt to create a Soviet super-ethnos can serve as an example). As a result, the national self-awareness of ethnoes and individuals becomes politicized and conflict-prone.
- The third variant looks preferable for the post-Soviet nations under the conditions shaped by their past: ethnopolitical integration of nations during multi-national development in the newly independent states.

This means that the issues related to the political nature of ethnicity (and the role of ethnic factors in the national security issues) are not only of theoretical, but also of purely practical interest. The last decade has seen the increasingly frequent use of new definitions of security: economic, ecological, social, technological, information, foodstuffs, fuel, communication, sanitary and other types of security defined by corresponding branches (spheres) of activity. This has already raised the question of how the role of the ethnic factor in the national security system should be described and which definitions should be used for this purpose: ethnopolitical aspects of national security, security in the ethnic sphere, or ethnopolitical security.

## **Security and Ethnopolitics: the Models of Measurement**

There is no shortage of forecasts in the media supplied by the leading research centers that in the 21st century national states will be divided into ethnic micro-states. On the other hand, in the globalization era there is no shortage of signs that statehoods reduced to ethnic dust will be replaced

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<sup>6</sup> See: D.V. Dragunskiy, "Etnopoliticheskie protsessy na postsovetском prostranstve i rekonstruktsia Severnoy Evrazii," *Polis*, No. 3, 1995, p. 40.

by invisible global governance. America, Russia, the European and all the other states will be involved in the process.

This inevitably adds “combustible material” to the bloody conflicts all of us can watch with our own eyes: ethnic conflicts have developed into the key national security problem in many countries. It was not without a great amount of concern that American analysts pointed out in the National Security Strategy for the New Century that: “Globalization, however, also brings risks. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and progress in many important areas of the world.”<sup>7</sup>

Should these outbursts of ethnic activity be dismissed as side-effects of globalization? Globalization is a catalyst, nothing more and nothing less: it does not primarily breed ethnic conflicts.

There are at least two levels—internal and external—behind all ethnopolitical conflicts. The internal dimension consists of the actors’ (ethnoses’) active involvement in the political process, which from that time on can be described as an ethnopolitical process.

The external dimension of ethnic conflicts gradually develops into a geopolitical problem (the Kosovo conflict, which can be described as an international legal precedent, may serve as an example). No wonder the majority of the governments drawn into such conflicts tend to explain them by international interference (either real or imaginary) in their domestic affairs.

History has taught us that the line between the non-violent ethnopolitical conflict and its armed stage is easily crossed. According to British sociologist and expert in international relations E. Luard, between 1400 and the present about half of the armed conflicts in the world were international conflicts that involved states. In the four post-World War II decades, only 37 of the total number of 127 large-scale wars were international conflicts. According to the Diplomatic Academy of the RF Foreign Ministry, the share of international conflicts between 1945 and 1989 was even smaller: 22 of 147 of the large-scale armed conflicts were of an obviously international nature, while the others were mostly domestic conflicts.<sup>8</sup>

Ethnopolitical conflicts are rooted in the nature and objective circumstances in which ethnopolitical communities live and function: the natural geographic boundaries of ethnic community distribution do not coincide with the political map of the world. In this way, the territories occupied by states become an arena of struggle for national (ethnic) states; this gives rise to ethnic movements and breeds ethnic conflicts.

Today, the world is populated by 3 to 5 thousand ethnic groups; the total number of ethnic minorities is much larger because many of the ethnoses are separated by state borders. Two hundred and sixty-nine ethnoses are more than 1 million strong; 90 percent of nations and nationalities live in multinational states. This does not add stability to the world. We all know that 99 countries of the world have 291 ethnic minorities “with a risk factor” living in their territories. Here is information about the states involved in armed conflicts in 1988: 63 of 111 such conflicts can be described as domestic, while 36 were described as “wars connected with state order,” which means conflicts between the government and the opposition that demanded autonomy for an ethnic community or region. State-organized acts of annihilation of members of ethnic or political groups cause many more losses than all other forms of conflicts taken together.<sup>9</sup> Errol A. Henderson, who studies conflicts, has described ethnic conflicts as “one of the world’s greatest killers.” According to his information, over 26 million forced migrants had to flee for their lives from 50 large ethnic conflicts in 1993 and 1994;

<sup>7</sup> *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Introduction, The White House, December 1999, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> See: *Obshchaia i prikladnaia politologia*, ed. by V.I. Zhukov, B.I. Krasnov, MSCY, Souyz Publishers, Moscow, 1997, p. 195.

<sup>9</sup> See: M.A. Medvedeva, “Etnopoliticheskiy konflikt kak faktor ugrozy mezhdunarodnoy bezopasnosti,” in: *Filosofia XX veka: shkoly i kontseptsii. Nauchnaia konferentsia k 60-letiu filosofskogo fakul'teta SPbGU, 21 noiabria 2000 g.*, St. Petersburg, 2001, p. 156.

each of these conflicts claimed about 80 thousand lives. Between 1918 and 1988, 32 percent of the international conflicts had ethnopolitical dimensions to them.<sup>10</sup>

The above suggests that “classical multinational states complete with the attributes of ethnic policy (economically justified borders, ethnicity as a status, etc.) call to life another objective socio-historical requirement: planetary uniformity designed to overcome these attributes. On the other hand, globalization has great potential for self-destruction—it accelerates powerful migration flows that add to the world’s ethnic diversity; this is happening everywhere, including in the previously more or less homogenous countries, and is creating numerous ethnopolitical problems:

- Sharpened contradictions between the titular and non-titular nations, as well as between the so-called center and ethnic fringes (enclaves);
- Pronounced ethnic reductionism, which looks at the political, social, economic, and cultural processes through the prism of ethnic self-identity;
- Deepened ethnonationalism and ethnoregionalism;
- More emphasis on the rights and status of ethnic minorities;
- Accents shifted from political-civil to ethnic identification, etc.”<sup>11</sup>

Ethnic conflicts and wars have neither territorial nor sociopolitical localization; they are not the product of any historical period or a geopolitical organism. One tends to agree with those who say that so far the general security conception has failed to take due account of the ethnopolitical dimension.<sup>12</sup>

This raises the question of how the ethnopolitical dimension of national security can be defined: either as ensuring security in the ethnic sphere, or as security in the ethnopolitical sphere?

There is no straightforward answer to this question. All issues found at the crossroads of ethnic politics and national security are very complicated per se; they are complicated because they are involved in various spheres of public life and academic studies (terminological, methodological, etc.).

According to those who profess a constructivist (post-modernist) approach, ethnicity is a specific description of the main spheres of public life (political, economic, spiritual, etc.). Ethnicity is functioning in these spheres and manifests itself through them, and therefore it is not an independent subjective-objective sphere. The following can be described as the cornerstone: “Nature does not know the ethnic per se, which means that the ethnic can be described either as an artificial artifact or an artifact formed by each individual creating his own cognitive picture of the social world.”<sup>13</sup> This context reduced even the acutest forms of ethnopolitical conflicts to all sorts of combinations of “habitual” sociopolitical, economic, and other causes. In its extreme form this approach crops up as an unconditional rejection of the ethnic factor as one of the national security determinants. “Military, economic, social, ecological, and information security are the basic components of national security.”<sup>14</sup> This means that we should discuss the ethnopolitical (ethnic) aspects and factors and the way security issues betray themselves in the traditional social institutions and spheres of social activity.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See: M.A. Medvedeva, op. cit.

<sup>11</sup> K. Allakhverdiev, “Globalization and Ethnic Policy in the Caucasus: Between the Beetle and the Block,” *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 1 (2), 2007, pp. 10-11.

<sup>12</sup> See: S. Panarin, “Bezopasnost i etnicheskaia migratsia v Rossii,” *Pro et Contra*, Vol. 3, No. 4, *Problemy bezopasnosti*, Moscow Carnegie Endowment, Moscow, 1998, p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> S.E. Rybakov, *Filosofia etnosa*, Moscow, 2001, p. 18.

<sup>14</sup> Z.A. Zhade, “Natsional’nye interesy i bezopasnost Rossii v kontekste geopolitiki,” *Politologicheskie, etnopoliticheskie i kulturologicheskie nauki*, 2005, p. 60, available at [[http://www.vestnik.adygnet.ru/files/2005.2/123/jade2005\\_2.pdf](http://www.vestnik.adygnet.ru/files/2005.2/123/jade2005_2.pdf)].

<sup>15</sup> See: M.A. Medvedeva, op. cit., pp. 156-158; N.A. Molchanov, “Terminy i opredelenia, ispol’zuemye spetsialistami zarubezhnykh stran pri razrabotke problem natsional’noy bezopasnosti,” *Strategicheskaya stabil’nost*, No. 3, 2000, available at [[http://www.sipria.ru/ss20\\_03.html](http://www.sipria.ru/ss20_03.html)]; *Obshchaia teoria natsional’noy bezopasnosti*; P.G. Belov, *Kategorii i metody natsio-*

Those who oppose the above approaches (reflected, first and foremost, in the theory of primordialism) proceed from what they see as the obvious, viz. the entire complex of ethnic relationships, as well as ethnic life as a whole, together with the related features (ethnic history, psychology, mentality, etc.), is functioning as a special social substance—the ethnic sphere. Since in this case we are dealing with the “real existence of the ethnic substance, which is active and which produces ethnically tinged phenomena,”<sup>16</sup> the extreme primordialists go as far as concluding that “it is the nation and the ethnos that exist as absolutes, while everything beyond them are relative.”<sup>17</sup> Since in the last few decades demonstrations of ethnic identity and politicization of the ethnic have become aggressive and dominant, those who side with the above approaches believe that the academic community should concentrate on studying security issues in the ethnic context. The most consistent of the supporters go as far as trying to identify a new segment in the national security structure—ethnopolitical security.

Significantly, the accents in the subject-range of academic discussions are being rapidly shifted. As distinct from the previous years, with the post-modernist approach dominating the discussions of the relations between ethnopolitics and security, the conference convened in Krasnodar in 2003 to discuss the issue was called “Ethnopolitical Aspects of Security in the Seats of Conflicts and Zones of Potential Tension in the Caucasus and Siberia.”<sup>18</sup> The trend toward shifting priorities in Russian political science was further demonstrated by the All-Russia Scholarly Conference dedicated to the 15th Anniversary of the Regional Center of Ethnopolitical Studies of the Daghestan Scientific Center of the RAS held in Makhachkala in October 2007. Announced as a conference designed to summarize the results of Ethnopolitical Stability in the South of Russia under the Globalization Conditions<sup>19</sup> project, it was carried out under the title of Ethnopolitical Security of the South of Russia in Globalization Conditions. This was more than a mere change of titles. The conference made an attempt to formulate a categorial definition of ethnopolitical security based on poly-paradigmatic synthesis and describing it as a system of measures designed to prevent and settle conflicts (ethnic, social, political, and those emerging between confessions or within one and the same confession) by balancing the interests of individuals, ethnonational and social communities, society, multinational peoples, and the state.<sup>20</sup>

It is too early so far to discuss which of the above approaches can be described as more correct: this calls for a detailed analysis of both approaches, which is impossible within the framework of one article. Here I shall limit myself to saying that because of the extremely complex and multi-dimensional nature of the object that forms the cornerstone of ethnopolitical security, it cannot be reduced to a set of relatively simple theses borrowed from ethnopolitical studies and the national security theory.

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*nal'noy bezopasnosti*, Moscow, 2002; K.Kh. Ippolitov, *Ideologia natsional'noy bezopasnosti*, RSPB, Moscow, 1997; V.I. Bovsh, *Natsional'naia bezopasnost i istoricheskoe soznaniie natsii*, Moscow, 2002; B. McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

<sup>16</sup> S.E. Rybakov, *Natsia i natsionalizm*, Moscow, 2001, p. 8.

<sup>17</sup> R.G. Abdulatipov, *Paradoksy suvereniteta. Perspektivy cheloveka, natsii, gosudarstva*, Slavianskiy dialog Publishers, Moscow, 1995, p. 31.

<sup>18</sup> “Etnopoliticheskie aspekty bezopasnosti v konfliktnykh ochagakh i zonakh potentsialnoy napriazhennosti na Kavkaze i v Sibiri. Konferentsia. Krasnodar, 23-26 oktiabria 2003,” *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. Zhurnal teorii mezhdunarodnykh otmosheniy i mirovoy politiki*, available at [<http://www.intertrends.ru/three/o14.htm>].

<sup>19</sup> See: “Etnopoliticheskaia stabil'nost Yuga Rossii v usloviakh globalizatsii” (headed by D.Sc. (Philos.) A.-G.K. Aliev, Ph.D. (Philos.) G.I. Yusupova, RTsEI DagNTs RAN), available at [<http://adaptation.iea.ras.ru/report/2006/subprogramme.pdf>].

<sup>20</sup> See: *Etnopoliticheskaia bezopasnost Yuga Rossii v usloviakh globalizatsii. Vserossiiskaia nauchnaia konferentsia, Regional'ny tsentr etnopoliticheskikh issledovaniy (RTsEI) Daghestanskogo Nauchnogo Tsentra RAN (oktiabr 2007)*, available at [<http://kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1199967.html>].

The following presents, in concise form, the results of an analysis of academic writings on the subject.

- First, the terms used (including the above-mentioned “ethnopolitical aspects of national security,” “security in the ethnic sphere,” “ethnopolitical security,” etc.) are frequently devoid of strictly academic content where their logical and conceptual definitions are concerned. More likely than not they are used as attractive linguistic-semantic units. As such they call for more profound categorial approaches.
- Second, nation and nation-state formation is an undoubtedly deeply rooted historical process. It is equally clear that the nation-building process has been accelerating since the early 20th century. Indeed, only 15 states of the present 200 existed in 1910; every new period of geopolitical shifts (World Wars I and II, the collapse of the colonial system and world socialism) merely accelerated the process. Today, there are more dividing lines between the state-forming nations and ethnic minorities. We can hardly agree that “those who did not have and do not have a statehood of their own should not claim the status of a nation until another whim of history changes this. Rational national policy should avoid such whims to preserve the nations and prevent new nations coming to the fore.”<sup>21</sup>
- Third, anyone wishing to analyze the ethnopolitical processes in the globalization context should not concentrate on the conflictogenic factors and processes (one of which is the right of nations to self-determination). From the theoretical and especially practical points of view it is much more productive to concentrate on the means and methods for preventing such developments and creating new transnational multi-ethnic units. This approach becomes crystal clear if we take into account that globalization is weaving a web of mutual dependencies and mutual penetrations not only, and not so much, between national states. It is uniting different ethnic identities into a global unit at a new civilizational level above the borders and barriers that separate nations. I should say that many of the futurological scripts of the future of ethnoses take it for granted that the determining factors of nation-building and their specific features will weaken, while the principle of ethnic self-determination (especially the extreme forms of its realization) will lose its urgency.
- Fourth, the challenges and threats of globalization have already confronted all peoples (with and without their own states) with a dilemma—either to preserve their ethnic identity in its historically shaped form or look for a new formula for harmonizing their ethnosocial content. In the near future the choice will become even more urgent: the current trends of world development indicate that, in the final analysis, this choice will determine the nations’ historical fates and their ability to become an organic part of global civilization. Today ethnic conflicts are developing into an international geopolitical problem. Solutions will affect many countries and peoples, even those outside the states in which any given ethnopolitical conflict first appeared. This means that no country, especially a poly-ethnic one, can indulge in ignoring its ethnic problems and contradictions if it wants to preserve its national security.
- Fifth, none of the theoretical trends engaged in ethnic relations and ethnic policy studies dominates over all the others or is generally accepted. This methodological vagueness becomes even more pronounced when we try to apply methods and tools used by other sciences in the ethnic sphere. This is true, among other things, of the national security theory and inter-disciplinary novelties. One tends to agree with L. Despres, who wrote that differ-

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<sup>21</sup> “Natsional’nye menshinstva v sud’be gosudarstva,” available at [<http://www.vtk.interro.ru>].

ent theoretical paradigms may produce different descriptions of ethnic processes when applied to the sphere of ethnic relations, since they will ascribe their specific meanings to the same situations.<sup>22</sup>

- Sixth, the gap between the international legal norms that establish the framework of state sovereignty and the globalization processes that allow international and regional organizations to interfere in the domestic affairs of states (ethnic conflicts included) is widening. The world's leading states and the international supra-national actors are accused of neo-imperialism, "dual standards," intentions to redivide the world, etc. New multi-dimensional systemic processes are emerging at the crossroads where the ethnic and security meet; on the other hand, the same crossroads invite a revision of real national interests, a process that leads to a qualitatively new hierarchy of long- and medium-term aims in their realization.
- Seventh, throughout most of the 20th century those who wrote about the ethnic sphere were not inclined to use the term "security." In the West, "ethnos" meant "people" while the national-ethnic features of social-historical communities were revealed through the category of ethnicity. Soviet and post-Soviet academics had different paradigmatic priorities: ethnology helped the academic and political elites accept and use the term "ethnos." At the same time, in the West and the Soviet Union/Russia, ethnoses were diffused so to speak in the social-historical entities that dominated academic efforts in the 20th century: classes (Marxism), population groups (stratification theory), states (etatist ideology), and all sorts of totalitarian and ideological constructs. The report on the Human Development Index (HDI) published in 1994 by the U.N. Development Program fits perfectly into the contemporary background. It identified key human security aspects (economic, political, food-stuffs, ecological, personal, and health security) and mentioned the threat to *social and cultural security* that destroys traditional units (the family, community, organizations, and ethnic groups) and launches destructive trends in social life. They cannot be measured, however the results could be catastrophic.<sup>23</sup> The document says nothing about ethnopolitical security; it does not mention similar or identical concepts close to the idea of being protected against external and internal threats created by the totality of ethnic relations in territorial-political areas. In fact, this confirms once more that the bloody ethnopolitical conflicts of the late 20th century took the world community unawares: it was totally unprepared to deal with the processes of ethnic consolidation and mobilization and the related problems. These processes change the ideas about the philosophy of ethnic security in the globalization era. Eleven years later, in 2005, the report presented by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) admitted that the mounting threats remained underrated and raised the question about "redefining security and building collective security." It reads in part: "For much of the twentieth century violent conflict was the product of a breakdown in relations between states. Today, violent conflict is a product primarily of the failure of states to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts between groups."<sup>24</sup> The U.N. diplomats demonstrated no mean agility by maneuvering between Scylla of "territorial integrity" and Charybdis of the

<sup>22</sup> See: L. Despres, "K razrabotke teorii etnicheskogo fenomena," *Etnos i politika. Khrestomatia*, Moscow, 2000, pp. 27-28 (see also: L.A. Despres, "Toward a Theory of Ethnic Phenomena," in: *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies*, ed. by L. Despres, The Hague, 1975).

<sup>23</sup> Quoted from: Z.Z. Biktimirova, "Bezopasnost v kontseptsii razvitiia cheloveka," *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost*, No. 6, 2002, pp. 139-140 (for the complete text of the report see: *Human Development Report 1994*, available at [[http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr\\_1994\\_en.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en.pdf)]).

<sup>24</sup> *Human Development Report 2005*, UNDP, Chapter 5, pp. 179, 162, available at [[http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001522/7-HDR2005\\_chapter\\_5.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001522/7-HDR2005_chapter_5.pdf)].

“right of nations to self-determination,” but the very obvious security threats force them to support the conclusions of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: “In security terms, a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states ... than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.”<sup>25</sup>

Political science and political practice at the turn of the 21st century show that the ideas of the ethnopolitical dimension of the topic of study have changed:

- (1) efforts to diffuse the basic ethnopolitical problems in the social or cultural sectors of the security system by using academically neutral terms (ethnopolitical aspects of national security) failed.
- (2) they had to recognize that there were institutions that protected national interests in the ethnic sphere in the “security in the ethnic sphere” formula.
- (3) there is the awareness that the “ethnopolitical security” concept, as part of the national security system, calls for theoretical-methodological substantiation and political-legal institutionalization.

Today, in the era of globalization and the fears and hopes it is breeding, as well as transformation of the causal foundations of the world-shattering conflicts, the change in the theoretical-methodological paradigm as applied to the ethnopolitical processes has acquired special urgency. The same applies to the need to create a new research field. This paradigm can be revealed as a connecting link between the existential description of the ethnic sphere and the integrative nature of security. An investigation of the correlating ties between them will show us the ethnopolitical dimension of security (at all levels and in all structural types) expressed both quantitatively and qualitatively. From this point of view, ethnopolitical security is a multi-dimensional and multi-level functional system in which real national interests are translated through ethnopolitical aggregation and articulation; this system can be described as a necessary condition for optimizing the modernization of any poly-ethnic society.

## *Conclusion*

Now that a system of challenges and threats confronts globalization, it is increasingly important to ensure security in the ethnopolitical sphere, the key factor of the entire national security system. This should be done for the sake of better ethnic relations; this should be done to help ethnoses adapt themselves to the current socioeconomic and political changes. This is, in fact, one of the key conditions in which the individual, society, and the state can feel absolutely safe.

It should be said that the contemporary theoretical approaches to national security are too vague when it comes to security issues; they tend to underestimate some of the methodological aspects of shaping national security strategy. Indeed, there should be no uniformity when it comes to strategic decisions and their realization in the security sphere. The time has come to speak freely about the ethnopolitical issues relating to national security: so far political science has tended to avoid them. We can even say that political science and political practice have reached the point where they should start looking into the causes of the globalizing world’s conflict nature and follow their development from predominantly inter-state to predominantly domestic conflicts. The theoretical-methodological

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<sup>25</sup> *Human Development Report 2005*, UNDP, p. 162.

paradigms used to grasp the meaning of the ethnopolitical processes should be changed; what we need is a new research space that will bring together ethnopolitics and security.

This means that the theoretical-methodological and applied studies of the ethnopolitical dimensions of national security (ethnopolitical security) will lead to clear ethnic policies. It is vitally important, in this context, to neutralize all attempts to use ethnic identity for political aims. It is no less important to prevent ethnic conflicts as a tool for settling ethnopolitical confrontation. We should create all sorts of models and programs designed to overcome the negative results of such confrontation. The state and public institutions should step up their efforts in this sphere; we might need new structures designed to neutralize the threats to ethnopolitical security created by the unfolding ethno-social processes.

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## INSTRUMENTALIZATION AND IMAGINATION OF ETHNICITY: KARTVELISM AS AN INVENTED TRADITION

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### ABSTRACT

**T**he author analyzes the problems of Kartvelism as an invented political tradition in modern Georgia. This article is an attempt to use inventionist approaches for the analysis of the history and actual trends and tendencies in the developments of Georgian nationalism and Georgian identity. Methodologically, the article is based on the principles, proposed in 1983 by British historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in their classic book *The Invention of Traditions*. The present author presumes that Kartvelian myth has become an important and influential intellectual tradition, an element of cultural practices and social strat-

egies. The author analyzes various forms of Kartvelism as an invented political tradition, including the language and ideas of the national mission.

He states that the secondary school and the university humanitarian historical and philological education has become the important channel for development and actualization of Kartvelism as an invented tradition. The centralized system of studying, teaching and popularizing the Georgian language, history and literature, as the basis of ethnic identity, promotes the regular actualization of Kartvelism as an invented political tradition in contemporary Georgia. The

*Georgian language, history and literature and actualization of their Kartvelian character are important structural elements and parts in the development of invented political*

*traditions, which Georgian intellectual and political elites use to develop Georgian identity as both political Georgian and ethnic Kartvelian.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Georgia, Kartvelism, ethnicity, invented traditions, modernism, instrumentalism, instrumentalization of ethnicity.*

## *Introduction*

The modern political nations, which symbolize the states of Europe in particular and the Western world in general, are the products of an extremely brief history of social, political, economic and cultural transformations that embraced Europe in the 18th century and turned its traditional agrarian and predominantly rural groups into political and imagined communities of nations and nation-states. The processes of social and cultural transformations were universal, but their political rates and speeds in different regions and peripheries of Europe, including its geographical centers and edges, were too different and uneven. The countries of early modernizations co-existed with the states of secondary modernization, where the processes of transformations of traditional groups into the nations developed slower. Georgia was among those countries and it became visible on the political maps of Europe later than other nation-states.

## **The Relevance of the Article**

The political history of Georgia, on the one hand, is one of the topical problems in Russian historiography. However, the number of works dedicated to the modern history of Georgia, Georgian identity and nationalism, written by Russian authors, is extremely low. Historiographic failures and lacunas are filled with the translated texts from English and other European languages, but these attempts to popularize Georgia, Georgian history and culture do nothing to improve the situation radically. On the other hand, the actual political history of Georgia provides its historians with several examples of successful political reforms. The successes of the Georgian reforms make the Georgian experience relevant to other post-Soviet states. Therefore, Georgia will be at the center of the author's attention in this article.

## **Formulation of the Problem**

The development of Georgian political and ethnic nationalisms has significant features, therefore the history of Georgian nationalism provides its scholars with opportunities to single out this case of national construction and the development of the nation from other transformations of traditional rural and archaic communities into nation-states. The author presumes that it will be logical to analyze the main strategies and vectors of Georgian nationalistic transformations in the context of the modern-

ist and constructivist approaches, which form the most influential theories of nationalism in contemporary interdisciplinary Humanities.

The ethnic uniqueness and stable traditions of articulation of linguistic roots of the modern political nation are among the central features of the history of Georgian nationalism. On the one hand, Georgian nationalism, as other European nationalisms, which invented, imagined and constructed their own nations, made the Georgian nation a visible political fact and transformed Georgia from a traditional heterogeneous estate society into a modern nation-state. On the other hand, Georgian nationalism, such as Armenian, Greek or Jewish nationalisms, is one of the nationalisms with visual, visible and bright ethnic roots and backgrounds. The Georgian political nation as a modernist construct and imagined community has emerged in the politicized tradition of ethnicity, since the nationalist intellectuals have excluded ethnic features and attributes from the contexts of heterogeneous folk cultures, as well as revised and reinterpreted them and turned them into the invented traditions as formal or informal institutions of Kartvelian ethnicity.

## Aims and Objectives of the Article

The present author will try to analyze both tactics and strategies, which Georgian intellectuals use for the articulation of various forms of Kartvelian identity and collective ideas about it. He will examine how the invented tradition of Kartvelian ethnicity exists in various social, cultural and political discourses of contemporary Georgia. This article has several purposes, including an analysis of the articulation of Kartvelian ethnicity as the basis of Georgian identity in secondary and higher humanitarian education, the reproduction of folk and ethnic forms of culture, and the combination of secular and religious trends in the mechanism of the constant reproduction of ethnicity.

## Historiography

The problems of the history of Kartvelism in the context of the invention of traditions and the invented traditions, on the one hand, belong to the number of practically unexplored issues in the contemporary historiography of nationalism, in spite of the fact that some authors<sup>1</sup> try to analyze the history of Georgian nationalism and identity in the context of modernist and constructivist approach-

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<sup>1</sup> See: M.V. Kirchanov, “‘Politika proshlogo’ v sovremennoi Gruzii, ili kak SMI i publichnye politiki formiruiut kolektivnye predstavleniia o proshlom,” *Dialog so vremenem*, Issue 56, 2016, pp. 374-395; Idem, “‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ in Georgia’s Political Imagination and Nationalist Discourse,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 158-167; Idem, “The Main Development Vectors of Georgian Nationalism in the Context of Political Instability: Between the Traditions of the Political Nation and the Challenges of Radicalization,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 126-137; Idem, “Russia as a Subject of the Ideology of Georgian Nationalism,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 150-157; Idem, “The Church in Georgia’s Political Life: Problems, Contradictions, and Prospects,” *The Caucasus and Globalization*, Vol. 8, Issue 1-2, 2014, pp. 85-90; Idem, “The Caucasian and Russian in Contemporary Georgian Nationalism,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2013, pp. 101-109; Idem, “Religious Parties in Georgia: Political Platforms and Ideological Transformations,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 94-100; Idem, “Kartvelism as a Development Paradigm of Georgian Ethnic Nationalism,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 102-113; Idem, “Independence as an ‘Invented Tradition’ in Georgia’s Political Identity (2014-2016),” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 47-55.

es. On the other hand, the theory of the invention of traditions,<sup>2</sup> proposed in the first half of the 1980s,<sup>3</sup> has retained its influence, since it has become an intellectual stimulus that inspired inventionist and imaginalist practices as private cases of a constructivist turn in the interdisciplinary historiography of nationalism.

## Linguistic and Ethnic Imagination in the Invention of Traditions

The language and linguistic components of nationalistic imagination play one of the central roles in the development of modern Georgian Kartvelism, Georgian being one of the most vivid dimensions and forms of the ethnic uniqueness of the modern Georgian nation. Nationalists actively use the language in their attempts to imagine invented Georgian traditions, since the Georgian language does not belong either to Indo-European or Turkic language families unlike the neighboring Armenian and Turkish ones. Intellectuals,<sup>4</sup> imagining and inventing Georgian ethnicity as a Kartvelian one, actually instrumentalize it. The transformation of Georgian language into one of the pillars of identity and the invented tradition was inevitable, since academic studies of the language<sup>5</sup> inspired its development, strengthened language norms and transformed the language into one of the systemic foundations of national identity. This ideological fate of the political language in Georgia was also inevitable, since the language actualized ethnic and linguistic unique features of the Georgian nation.

The Georgian language in the nationalistic and romantic historiographies, which developed in the ethnocentric coordinate system, has become one of the central attributes of national identity.<sup>6</sup> Georgian nationalists confirmed the myth about the unique nature of the language as the main inspiring impetus for the preservation and development of identity despite numerous foreign aggressions and conquests. Using the unique national alphabet<sup>7</sup> also contribute to the transformation of the linguistic features of Georgian nation into the invented tradition. Active studies of the history and gram-

<sup>2</sup> See: A. Miller, "Izobretenie traditsii. Georgievskaja lentochka i drugie simvoly v kontekste istoricheskoi politiki," *Pro et Contra*, May-June 2012, pp. 94-100; N. Koliagina, "Izobretenie traditsii," *Uroki istorii. XX vek*, 14 October, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> See: *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. by E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; E. Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914," in: *Representing the Nation: A Reader*, ed. by D. Boswell, J. Evans, Routledge, London, New York, 2007, pp. 61-86.

<sup>4</sup> See: Z. Abashidze, *Georgia and Georgians*, Favorite Style, Tbilisi, 2015; N. Khaniashvili, *Georgians' Sumerian Ancestors*, Tbilisi, 2013; M. Kasabi, *Ottoman Georgians*, Istanbul, 2012 (all in Georgian).

<sup>5</sup> See: Th. Gamkrelidze, "A Typology of Common-Kartvelian," *Language*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1966, pp. 69-83; Th. Gamkrelidze, G. Machavariani, *Sonant System and Ablaut in Kartvelian Languages*, Tbilisi, 1965 (in Georgian); H. Fähnrich, Z. Sarveladze, *Etymological Dictionary of Kartvelian Languages*, Tbilisi, 2002 (in Georgian); O. Kageja, *Megrelian-Georgian Dictionary*, Vol. 1, Nakeri, Tbilisi, 2001 (in Georgian); G. Kartozia, *Lazetic Language and its Place in the Georgian Language System*, Nakeri, Tbilisi, 2005 (in Georgian).

<sup>6</sup> See: D. Kiziria, "The Georgian Language is the Eighth Wonder of the World...," available at [<http://www.georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=40&id=514>]; "Georgian Language is the Oldest Language in the World," available at [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABgpa4gveoc>]; G. Dzigauri, "Our Language is Georgian," *Georgian Sword*, April 1998, available at [<https://iberiana.wordpress.com/iberiana/jigauri/qartuli/>]; Idem, "Georgian Language Day," *Nathlavte*, April 1993, available at [<https://iberiana.wordpress.com/iberiana/jigauri/qartuli/>]; Idem, "Is It Again? No, Worse!" *NOW*, October 1996, available at [<https://iberiana.wordpress.com/iberiana/jigauri/qartuli/>]; "History of Georgian Language: Origin and Interesting Facts," available at [<http://qartuliarkhi.ge/History-of-the-Georgian-Language-history/>] (all in Georgian).

<sup>7</sup> See: T. Chkhenkeli, "The Georgian Alphabet and 'The Life of the Kings'," available at [<http://georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=40&id=1602>]; "The Georgian Alphabet in the Eyes of the Aliens," available at [<http://georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=40&id=1689>] (both in Georgian).

mar of Georgian language<sup>8</sup> and other Kartvelian languages by foreign scholars help actualize the linguistic component in the Georgian invented traditions, and foreign authors, in fact, have become popularizers of the linguistic dimension of the modern Kartvelian myth.

## From Language to Myth, from Myth to National Mission

Language components play one of the most important roles in the development of Georgian national identity and collective attempts of intellectuals to actualize its Kartvelian nature, but the language has transformed into one of the political myths of modern Georgian identity in the contexts of Georgian historical development and its political uniqueness. Soviet Georgian intellectuals<sup>9</sup> suggested the main ideas and principles of Kartvelian myth, but they could not realize its potential of the invented political tradition and actualize its instrumental character,<sup>10</sup> since Georgia did not have political independence and state sovereignty.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia's lecture "Spiritual Mission of Georgia" ("sak'art'velos sulieri missia"), read on 2 May, 1990,<sup>11</sup> became an important and determined attempt to systematize the spiritual, political and historical missions of Georgia and to map messianic ideas in Georgian intellectual history. Zviad Gamsakhurdia tried to generalize the main points of Kartvelism as a synthetic form of political and ethnic myth and to prove that Georgians were the most ancient nation and inhabited the vast territories of Europe. Instrumentalism of modern invented political traditions in Georgia manifests itself in the aspirations and attempts of intellectuals to prove the autochthonous nature of Georgians and the continuity of their historical and political existence and development in the regions populated by groups that speak Kartvelian languages. Georgian nationalists actualized the instrumental functions of the language<sup>12</sup> in the beginning of the 20th century, which sanctioned its transformation into a political tradition, as well as inspired ideologization and stimulated politicization of language discourse. The language became a form of political and ideological myth, which inspired politicization and radicalization of the Kartvelian idea and actualization of its messianic tendencies.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See: W. Boeder, "Speech and Thought Representation in the Kartvelian (South Caucasian) Languages," in: *Reported Discourse. A Meeting-Ground of Different Linguistic Domains. Typological Studies in Language*, Vol. 52, ed. by T. Güldemann, M. von Roncador, Benjamins, Amsterdam, Philadelphia, 2002, pp. 3-48; Idem, "The South Caucasian Languages," *Lingua*, Vol. 115, No. 1-2, 2005, pp. 5-89; H. Fähnrich, *Kartwelische Wortschatzstudien*, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, 2002; G. Klimov, *Etimologicheskii slovar kartvelskikh iazykov*, Moscow, 1964; Idem, *Einführung in die kaukasische Sprachwissenschaft*, Buske, Hamburg, 1994; Idem, *Etymological Dictionary of Kartvelian Languages*, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 1998.

<sup>9</sup> See: S. Pirskhalava, *Ancestors of Georgians and their Relative Tribes in Asia in 40-6 BC*, Origami, Tbilisi, 1948; G. Melikishvili, *To the Problem of the Ancient Population of Georgia, the Caucasus and the Near East*, Tbilisi, 1965 (both in Georgian).

<sup>10</sup> See: R. Topchishvili, "Ethnic History of Georgians in Historical and Ethnographic Lands," available at [[http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/div/ToFCiSvili\\_saqarT.html](http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/div/ToFCiSvili_saqarT.html)] (in Georgian).

<sup>11</sup> See: G. Gamsakhurdia, "Spiritual Mission of Georgia. The Lecture Read at the Idriat Festival in Tbilisi on 2 May, 1990," available at [<http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/zg/missia.html>] (in Georgian).

<sup>12</sup> See: G. Kikodze, "Language and National Energy," available at [<http://www.georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=41&id=793>] (in Georgian).

<sup>13</sup> See: G. Leonidze, "Georgian Messianism," available at [<http://www.georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=41&id=1450>] (in Georgian).

Georgian intellectuals propose a political triad of *mamuli* (მამული), *ena* (ენა), *sartsmunoeba* (სარწმუნოება),<sup>14</sup> perceiving it as an invented political tradition. This triad of politically imagined and constructed values has been transformed into an invented tradition of *k'art'uli messianizmi* (ქართული მესსიაზმიზმი).<sup>15</sup>

Georgian intellectuals<sup>16</sup> insist that *k'art'uli messianizmi* differs radically from other national ideologies, because it does not have aggressive and imperialistic orientations, but actualizes the ethnic Kartvelian and religious Christian foundations of the Georgian nation. Ethnocentrism,<sup>17</sup> which continues to dominate in Georgian historiography and determine the main vectors of its development, has become one of the most influential invented traditions. The ethnic aspects, the extraordinary antiquity of Georgian nation, the autochthonous nature of the Georgians, and the permanent living of their Kartvelian ancestors in the territory of modern Georgia, all in absolutized forms, have become common for Georgian ethnocentric national historiography and appeared as politically invented traditions, which actualize the instrumentalist and practical roles and functions of the historical imagination.

Nationalists invent *mamuli* as a universal and inevitable value, they seek to actualize its ancient and inevitable nature, but this actually political and social category belongs to a number of relatively new ideological products and inventions, since state narratives entered the political dictionary of Georgian language relatively late and only after the traditional Kartvelian groups and communities had been transformed into a political nation. Despite its formal antiquity and numerous ancient and medieval texts in this triad, *ena*,<sup>18</sup> the Georgian language, has also become the product of an era of political and social modernizations and radical transformations. The attempts of nationalists and intellectuals to actualize the antiquity of Georgian language were very revealing in the contexts of various tactics and strategies of the invention of political traditions. The language allowed the nationalists to simultaneously actualize the values and principles of political and ethnic nationalisms.

The linguistic imagination is the central and determining factor in the construction of images of regional Kartvelian groups<sup>19</sup> and their integration into the greater Georgian national context.

<sup>14</sup> See: G. Mamaladze, "Vertical and Horizontal Postulates of National Ideology (Homeland, Language, Faith + Nation, Name, Family)," available at [<http://www.georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=41&id=766>] (in Georgian).

<sup>15</sup> See: G. Mamaladze, "Giorgi Leonidze's 'Georgian Messianism'," available at [<http://www.georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=41&id=1450>] (in Georgian).

<sup>16</sup> See: G. Absandze, *Fundamentals of Georgian Spirituality and Statehood: Spiritual Growth, Mission, Role, Civilization*, ed. by K. Mikadze, Tbilisi, 2006, 459 pp. (in Georgian).

<sup>17</sup> See: N. Tsulukidze, *Georgian Mythos and Indian Roots*, Lampari-99, Tbilisi, 2014, 192 pp.; R. Topchishvili, *Ethnic History of Georgians and Georgian Historical-Ethnographic Parts*, ed. by D. Muskhelishvili, Memorial, Tbilisi, 2002, 127 pp.; *Ethnogenesis*, ed. by D. Muskhelishvili, Memorial, Tbilisi, 2002, 276 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>18</sup> See: D. Kiziria, op. cit.; G. Mamaladze, "Geronti Kikodze's *Language and National Energy*," available at [<http://www.georoyal.ge/?MTID=5&TID=41&id=793>] (in Georgian).

<sup>19</sup> See: A. Chikobava, *Chan Grammar: Analysis with Texts*, Tbilisi, 1936, 152 pp.; Idem, *Principles of Name and Verb Analysis in Georgian Language*, School Publishers, Tbilisi, 1998, 56 pp.; Idem, *General Description of Georgian Language*, Georgian Language, Tbilisi, 1998, 96 pp.; Idem, *What is the Morphological Object in Old Georgian?* Tbilisi, 1928; Idem, *Chan Texts*, Tbilisi, 1929; *Svan Language: Prose Texts*, Vol. 1, Tbilisi, 1939, 490 pp.; A. Oniani, *Svan Language*, Tbilisi, 1998, 284 pp.; *Svan Texts and Vocabulary in Georgian Translation*, Tbilisi, 2003, 222 pp.; A. Chikobava, *History of the Study of Ibero-Caucasian Languages*, Education, Tbilisi, 1965, 412 pp.; K. Gagaa, *Verb Conjugation in Svan Language*, Science Publishers, Tbilisi, 1976, 242 pp.; *Svan Language*, Tbilisi, 1978, 368 pp.; *Svan Language: Prose Texts*, Science Publishers, Tbilisi, 1979, 293 pp.; M. Nikolaishvili, *Structural Analysis of Vowel Reducing*, Tbilisi, 1984, 122 pp.; *Svan Language: Grammar Reviews, Texts, Dictionaries*, ed. by G. Chumburidze, Petit, Tbilisi, 2007, 388 pp.; T. Mibuchani, *The Secret of Bichila. Sumerian Georgian (Svan) Parallels. Discovery of the Language of Mankind*, Sumer, Tbilisi, 2008, 120 pp.; V. Topuria, *Svan Language: Textbook*, Tbilisi, 2008, 240 pp.; M. Nikolaishvili, *Phonology and Morphology Issues in Svan Language*, Tbilisi, 2009, 200 pp.; S. Margiani-Subari, *Some Aspects of Morphosystem Analysis of Elite Dialects*, Mtsghbari, Tbilisi, 2008, 252 pp. (all in Georgian).

The place of *sartsmunoeba* in this triad of nationalist traditions is the most controversial and debatable, because the most modern European nationalisms develop in a secular system of political coordinates and their theorists and ideologists prefer to ignore religious values and principles, which they perceive as too archaic. The *sartsmunoeba* exists in the contexts of Georgian invented political traditions in two forms, including Orthodoxy and ethnic paganism.<sup>20</sup> While Christianity actualizes political European choices, the invented traditions of paganism (*qvanasmts'emlobismts'emloba*) in the main develop and exist as an academic construct, which actualizes Kartvelian dimensions and forms of modern Georgian identity. Kartvelian myth as a political tradition, represented in this cultural situation by *mamuli*, *ena*, and *sartsmunoeba*, has a predominantly compromise character, since intellectuals tend to integrate both archaic traditions and the postmodern cultural practices and strategies of imagination and invention of traditions into modern collective concepts and meanings of political imagination.

## Visualization of Kartvelian Ethnicity

Visualization of ethnicity has different forms and dimensions, it plays a special role in the development of Georgian Kartvelism as an invented tradition. Georgian folklore groups and ensembles, including Sionioni, Paloni, Khaobioba, Vavi, Kika and Amblambli Arara, simultaneously promote visualization and popularization of Kartvelian ethnicity. The activity of folk music groups is a form of the invention of traditions and museumification of Kartvelian ethnicity, an attempt to integrate it into the modern contexts. Folklore groups are active in the invention of folk songs, dance and costumes as ethnic expressions and elements of archaic ethnicity.

Folklore musical groups participate in the invention of traditions, because they nationalize dimensions of traditional Kartvelian ethnic song, music and dance culture, and integrate them into modern cultural strategies. Folklore ensembles fix various forms of folk, traditional and archaic cultures, charting them on maps of new modern identities. The activities of these groups and choirs help transform local forms of folk culture. The invention of traditions takes the archaic cultural forms out of the contexts of cultural and social periphery. Intellectuals and nationalists invent and imagine these local forms as ancient ethnic and modern national traditions, despite the fact that the invention of political traditions as national ones can be conscious practices and strategies of political imagination. Actually, classical choreography and academic vocals, dressed in ethnic, folklore and traditional Kartvelian robes and vestments, have become the invented traditions. The activity of these groups is important in the contexts of the invention of traditions, since the attempts to integrate traditional culture into modern cultural contexts, on the one hand, promote the preservation of traditions in their archaic and cultural understandings. On the other hand, folklore ensembles have become generators of new meanings of invented traditions because they participate in modernizations and nationalizations of archaic ethnicities.

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<sup>20</sup> See: V. Bardavidze, *From the History of Ancient Georgians*, Caucasian House, Tbilisi, 2006, 160 pp.; S. Kutateladze, *Myth Cult in Georgia*, ed. by N. Khazaradze, Tbilisi, 2006, 106 pp.; S. Makalatia, *Jege-Miron's Cult in Old Georgia*, Tbilisi, 1938, 47 pp.; J. Lomashvili, *Ilia Chavchavadze and Pagan Religions of Georgians*, ed. by A. Bendinshvili, Tbilisi, 2007, 54 pp.; M. Mikeladze, *The Ethnic Name of the Georgians in the Light of Archaic Faith Representations*, ed. by H. Kurdovanidze, Tbilisi, 2014, 358 pp. (all in Georgian).

## Instrumentalization of the Invented Traditions

National intellectuals have become the creators and founding fathers of Georgian invented and imagined political traditions. The representatives of the political classes, who form the ruling elites, strive to instrumentalize the invented traditions and use them to strengthen and develop the national identity. The mechanisms and tactics of practical realization of the invented traditions are various and heterogeneous. The attempts and aspirations of intellectuals to preserve, study and develop the Georgian language have regular and stable character. The numerous linguistic studies<sup>21</sup> promote the institutionalization of Georgian language as the imagined political tradition.

The Kartvelian ethnicity of Georgian language, as the basis of Georgian political nation and imagined cultural and ethnic kinship in this intellectual situation, gradually fall into several politically contrived traditions of imagination and invention of ethnic groups, including the Ajarians (ačarlebī),<sup>22</sup> Lazians (lazebi),<sup>23</sup> Megrelians (megrelebi),<sup>24</sup> Svans (svanebi),<sup>25</sup> Khevsurians (hevsurebi)<sup>26</sup> and their integration into modern Georgian context as parts of the imagined united spatial body of Georgian political nation.

The studies of Georgian intellectuals assist to the institutionalization of the language as a political tradition and its mental migration from a pure academic sphere to collective political representations, political manipulations and national imagination. Mother Tongue Day, traditionally celebrated on 14 April,<sup>27</sup> has become an attempt to instrumentalize the Georgian language as one of the foundations of Kartvelian ethnicity, as well as the principles of the political nation.

<sup>21</sup> See: I. Megreliдзе, *Iakob Gogebashvili and a New Georgian Language*, Education, Tbilisi, 1988, 234 pp.; S. Zhgenti, *Georgian Language Phonetics*, Education, Tbilisi, 1965, 333 pp.; A. Oniani, *Comparative Grammar of Kartvelian Languages (Morphology of Names)*, Education, Tbilisi, 1989, 319 pp.; G. Beridze, *Javakheti and Georgian Language*, Soviet Georgia, Science Publishers, Tbilisi, 1988, 264 pp.; K. Gogolashvili, *Georgian Verb Converting System*, Science Publishers, Tbilisi, 1988, 174 pp.; A. Chikobava, *What are the Peculiarities of the Georgian Language Structure?* School Publishers, Tbilisi, 1998, 124 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>22</sup> See: J. Nogaideli, *Ethnographic Essence of Ajarian Life*, Tbilisi, 1935, 88 pp.; Idem, *Ajarian Oral Tradition and Theories of Ethnography*, Science Publishers, Tbilisi, 1967, 91 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>23</sup> See: B. Sofia, *The History of Our Lazian Migrants*, ed. by J. Shonia, Egrisi, Tbilisi, 2006, 446 pp.; E. Chanturia, *Essays on Reading in Lazian (Chanian) Education History*, Tbilisi, 2006, 454 pp.; A. Shonia, *Lazika: The Great Georgian Pain: Letter to the Brothers!* Tbilisi, 2005, 112 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>24</sup> See: G. Eliava, *Ethnographic Samegrelo: An Album*, ed. by P. Kirtadze, Martvili, Tbilisi, 1989, 134 pp.; Idem, *Samegrelo: Kolkheti, Odishi. Archeology, Linguistics, History, Architecture and Ethnology*, ed. by F. Antelava, Intellect, Tbilisi, Zugdidi, 1999, 376 pp.; Idem, *Samegrelo: My Viewpoint*, Tbilisi, 1996, 140 pp.; S. Makalatia, *History and Ethnography of Samegrelo*, Uplistsikhe, Tbilisi, 1992, 168 pp.; Kh. Gogia, *Christian Cosmology in Georgian Agriology and Megrelian Traditions*, ed. by A. Alibegashvili, Tbilisi, 2005, 62 pp.; S. Makalatia, *History and Ethnography of Samegrelo: Works of the Society of Local Public Relations*, Tbilisi, 1941, 384 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>25</sup> See: *Scientific-Practical Conference "Svaneti. Cultural-Historical Heritage and Its Survival Problems" (Mestia, 1995). Program and Reports*, Tbilisi, 1996, 32 pp.; G. Avaliani, *Svaneti Curve in the Mirror: Critical Essay*, Kartli, Gori, 1998, 44 pp.; I. Argviliანი, *Ethnological Searches: Svaneti*, Tbilisi, 2003, 52 pp.; R. Kharadze, *Svaneti Village in Ancient Times*, Tbilisi, 1964, 129 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>26</sup> See: B. Gamkrelidze, *Khevsureti Village and its Traditions*, Science Publishers, Tbilisi, 1989, 104 pp.; G. Davitashvili, *The Judiciary Court or the "Law" in Khevsureti*, ed. F. Metreveli, Tbilisi, 2001, 100 pp.; S. Makalatia, *Khevsureti*, Tiflis, 1935, 280 pp.; A. Kamarauli, *Khevsureti: The Essence*, Tiflis, 1932, 152 pp.; T. Ochauri, *Khevsureti: Ethnographic Essence*, Tbilisi, 1964, 48 pp.; Idem, *Khevsureti and Khevsurians: The Essence*, Tbilisi, 1977, 135 pp.; M. Chincharauli, *Shatili and Shalilians*, Artuji, Tbilisi, 2008, 166 pp.; S. Makalatia, *Khevsureti: Ethnographic Footprint*, ed. by A. Chincharauli, Nakaduli, Tbilisi, 1984, 263 pp.; T. Ochauri, *Sermon in Khevsureti*, Ethnographic Heritage Protection Fund, Tbilisi, 2010, 150 pp. (all in Georgian).

<sup>27</sup> See: J. Rekhviashvili, "14 April is Mother Tongue Day," *Radio Liberty*, 14 April, 2011; "14 April is Mother Tongue Day," available at [<http://www1.accent.com.ge/en/news/details/13106>]; "14 April is the Day of Georgian Language," available

Mother Tongue Day has become the invented tradition, the attempt to fix the events of 14 April, 1978, and keep them in historical and political memories. The range of events that traditionally take place on 14 April is too diverse. 14 April has been imagined as a collective attempt to actualize Kartvelian ethnicity, language identity and historical memory in the social and cultural spaces of contemporary Georgia. The citizens and residents of Georgia, from children to public politicians, actualize their identity and symbolic connections and ties with the Kartvelian world in general and Georgian ancestors in particular. The public recitations of poems and texts of Georgian classics has become a common practice of cultural communication between the world of Kartvelian ancestors and the modern Georgian political nation. These cultural and intellectual practices and strategies assist to the actualization of invented traditions in their linguistic forms and dimensions. The language has become the powerful factor that stimulates the integration of various Kartvelian ethnic groups, which are historically and linguistically related to modern Georgian nation.

### *Conclusions*

The Kartvelian nature of Georgian political nation is beyond doubt and the Georgians got a reputation of the ancient nation with its unique features. The present author, in his turn, presumes that Kartvelian ethnicity has become a political and ideological construct, which is late from the social and cultural viewpoint. Kartvelism as an invented tradition has become the social and cultural institution of modern Georgian society. The invented traditions have obvious social, ideological, cultural, and political functions. Kartvelism has become the politically invented and ideologically motivated symbol of Georgian society; it supports and stimulates national and ethnic consolidations. The invented traditions as institutions generate political and cultural meanings and also reproduce, invent, imagine and revise ethnic elements in contemporary Georgian political and historical memories.

Georgian intellectuals are aware of the mobilization potential of ethnic Kartvelism and therefore they actively use it. Modern Kartvelism as an invented tradition is extremely heterogeneous, however it has mainly instrumentalist functions. The development of Kartvelism as an invented tradition has become a process of its ritualization and formalization, while constant socially motivated repetitions have contributed to the deep integration of Kartvelian myth into the tissues and dimensions of the national historical and cultural memories. Kartvelism as an invented tradition is heterogeneous, and therefore Georgian intellectuals provide Kartvelian myth with ritually necessary and symbolically meaningful attributes of sacrifice. Kartvelism as a politically invented tradition has become politically motivated and ideologically stimulated social and cultural practices of actualization of the collective sacrifices of Georgian nation and its political and state spatial continuities. The invented tradition of Kartvelism manifests itself in the Georgian language, which actualizes both Kartvelian character of the nation and its unique place among other nations of the region, since Georgia belongs to the few modern nations that use their unique alphabet.

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at [<http://ick.ge/rubrics/society/17908-i.html>]; "14 April is the Mother Tongue Day in Georgia," available at [[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEab8RcDH\\_Q](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEab8RcDH_Q)]; "14 April is Mother Tongue Day," available at [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dCVXV-IsafY>]; "14 April is Mother Tongue Day," available at [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IELev-z26kI>]; "Mother Tongue Day: What did Happen on 14 April, 1978," available at [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ERtSUw6QEg>]; "14 April is Mother Tongue Day—36 Years Ago Protests against the Soviet System Took Place," available at [[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D\\_HIWmJAw1U](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_HIWmJAw1U)]; "14 April is Mother Tongue Day," available at [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxNHhJbACCY>] (all in Georgian).

Socialization begins with the language, and ethnic Kartvelian specificity has become the determinative factor in developments of Georgian society, since Kartvelian motifs, as invented traditions, invisibly present in all spheres of life of modern Georgian society. The language and linguistic identity are among the important intellectual bases of Georgian Kartvelism as an invented tradition. Linguistic studies, the popularization of Georgian language, studies of ethnic and ethnographic history, the search for ethnic ancestors in Europe, and attempts to prove the autochthonous nature of Georgians and their wider territorial presence some centuries earlier have become forms of social reproduction of Kartvelism as an invented tradition. Secondary schools and universities in Georgia have come to be social landscapes, where Kartvelian myth is developing, because the education system is one of the ethnocentric social institutions. The ethnic components of Kartvelian myth are inevitably actualized in the academic studies of Georgian language and history.

The system and organization of teaching and learning of Georgian language, history and literature have developed into an institutionalized invented tradition. Georgian intellectuals, engaged in the studies and teaching of Georgian history and literature, instrumentalize the invented traditions, actualize their applied character, and provide political classes with opportunities to reproduce them during socialization and nationalization of new generations while in secondary and higher school. The political, cultural and social histories of Georgia, written in the Kartvelian coordinate system, have also become important invented traditions, which reproduce collective ideas about history and guarantee its reproduction in the ethnocentric Kartvelian system of coordinates.

Kartvelian myth has turned into one of the most successful and effective invented traditions, since it is so deeply rooted in ethnocentric forms of Georgian identity that ethnocentric practices have prevailed finally in the national history's writing. Modern Georgian ethnicity is the result of the development of Kartvelian myth as a Georgian form and a version of romantic ethnic nationalism. In these intellectual situations, Kartvelian ethnicity of Georgian political nation has emerged as the result of social constructivism. The Kartvelian idea has become one of the numerous invented traditions that use ancient and medieval ethnic heritages, transform them into the political attributes of the modern nation, and imagine them as invented traditions.

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## DIASPORAS AS INFORMAL TOOLS FOR REGULATING MIGRATION IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

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### ABSTRACT

**T**he article examines the problems of diasporization and defines the concept of “modern diaspora.” The formation of large diasporas from Central Asian countries is the result of prolonged and large-scale migration from that region to Russia. Migration acts as a kind of catalyst for change in the ethnic composition of the population.

Social networks are an additional “pull” factor for those who want to leave their country in search of work. Diasporas have significant socioeconomic resources and can influence decision-making in the area of government regulation, as well as socioeconomic processes. There is a direct relationship between the scale of migration and the size of

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the diaspora, that is, the choice of destination for emigrants is largely determined by the development level and size of the diaspora. On the one hand, diasporas are actors that help migrants to adapt to the new conditions and integrate into the host society, serving as a buffer between the migrants and the local population, and on the other hand, they help to form ethnic enclaves with an eth-

nic economy in areas with a high concentration of migrants. The article also notes that for the successful integration of migrants in Russia, it is necessary to harmonize industrial relations by improving working conditions and remuneration, to improve the system for the legal protection of migrants, simplify the procedure for acquiring citizenship and make it more transparent.

**KEYWORDS:** labor migration, informal regulation tools, diaspora, ethnic economy, adaptation and integration of migrants.

## Introduction

Global migration flows have led to the formation of large diasporas and to the “diasporization” of the economy in many countries. The current century can be called an “age of diasporas,” whose size has increased significantly in the last few decades. For the population of Central Asian countries, labor migration is the only way to fight poverty. The number of migrants from Central Asia living outside the home country is estimated at between 2.6 million and 4 million people.<sup>1</sup>

Considering the joint historical development of the post-Soviet states and their population, it should be noted that they are largely oriented toward the collective behavior model in matters of labor migration. Since the 1990s, Russia has been one of the major receiving (host) countries, and this, of course, has a logical explanation related to the country’s socioeconomic and geopolitical position. The largest migration flows to Russia come from the CIS countries, and Russia is the most attractive state in Eurasia for migrants from the countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

## Methods and Materials

*Factors in the formation of diasporas in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).* Labor migration is currently the most massive and dynamic form of migration in the post-Soviet space. The main factor behind the rapid increase in labor migration is the economic crisis that has affected virtually all CIS countries and has led to a decline in the living standards of the majority of the population, to unemployment and mass poverty in emigration countries. Russia is the most attractive destination for migrants among the EAEU countries. This is evident from the massive annual inflows of migrant workers, both official and undocumented. Within the EAEU, the main countries of origin (donors of labor) are Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, and the Kyrgyz and Armenian diasporas are among the largest and most developed ones in the territory of the Russian Federation.<sup>2</sup> Thus, one can assume that, along

<sup>1</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, I. Bogdanov, V. Dobrokhleb, A. Lukyanets, “Migration from Central Asian Countries to Russia and Kazakhstan in the Context of Integration Processes in the Eurasian Economic Union Format,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 39-49; S. Ryazantsev, N. Khoriye, *Modelirovanie potokov trudovoi migratsii iz stran Tsentralnoi Azii v Rossii. Ekonomiko-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie*, Nauchnyi Mir, Moscow, 2011, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, V. Bozhenko, “New Approaches to Managing Labor Migration under Integration in EurAsEC,” *Asian Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, No. 20, 2014, pp. 195-200.

with the Russian Federation's deep-rooted historical ties with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, there is a direct relationship between the scale of migration and the size of the diaspora.

Based on the theory of "three stages of the migration process" of L.L. Rybakovskiy and T.I. Zaslavskaya,<sup>3</sup> as well as on a number of surveys conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), we can draw the conclusion that, during the formation of migratory mobility, potential migrants have a certain network of connections in the place where they plan to go in search of work or, if they have no such network, they plan to seek initial assistance from the diaspora.

According to an EDB survey, most migrant workers have decided to come to Russia with the assistance of relatives and friends. Thus, there exists an additional factor: social networks are an additional "pull" factor for those wishing to leave the home country in order to find work. Social factors are gradually maturing and becoming independent of economic factors. Migrant communities and social networks have emerged in Russia. The large-scale meetings of Kyrgyz diasporas, Zamandash and Mekendeshter, held in Kyrgyzstan in 2012 with the participation of the country's leadership marked the beginning of a process of institutionalization and showed the growing political and economic role of these associations.<sup>4</sup>

The formation of ethnic diasporas is a result of long-term and sustained migration flows. However, changes in the ethnic composition of the population in big cities and countries are a result not only of global migration, but also of population reproduction patterns. Migration is a kind of catalyst for change in the ethnic composition of the population.

"Diaspora" is taken to mean an ethnic community of people united by a common interest. In other words, it is a permanent and structured social community aware of its common identity. At the early stages of its development, such a social community may consist mainly of temporary migrants. The main thing here is the sustained existence and functioning of the ethnic group, when the constant rotation of its members, their arrivals and departures do not disrupt the continuity and stability of connections, relationships, structures and networks. A diaspora is a stable network of diverse communications between communities.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, diaspora is not a given, and its emergence and development are not an automatic process. Diasporas can emerge and develop as a situational response to the challenges of time, place and circumstance. Researchers Zh.T. Toshchenko and T.I. Chapytkova identify three main attributes of a "modern diaspora."<sup>6</sup>

- First, it is an ethnic community outside its historical homeland. This is the key attribute, without which it is impossible to explore the essence of the phenomenon of diaspora.
- Second, diaspora is seen as an ethnic community with the main characteristics of its people's cultural identity. If an ethnic group chooses the strategy of assimilation, it cannot be called a diaspora.
- Organizational form is the third attribute of diasporas, which function, for example, in the form of associations of fellow countrymen (compatriots), public or political movements. Thus, if an ethnic group has no organizational functions, this means there is no diaspora. For example, the term "diaspora" cannot be applied to Russians living abroad.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See: L.L. Rybakovskiy, "Migratsia naselenia: stadii migratsionnogo protsessa," *Migratsia v Rossii*, No. 5, 2001, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> See: Official website of the Eurasian Development Bank. EDB Report *Posledstvia vstuplenia Kyrgyzstana v Tamozhennyi soiuz i YeEP dlia rynka truda i chelovecheskogo kapitala strany*, available at [[http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/CII%20-%20izdania/Proekti%20i%20dokladi/Kyrgyzstan%20%20CU/EDB\\_Centre\\_Report\\_13\\_Presentation\\_Rus\\_1.pdf](http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/CII%20-%20izdania/Proekti%20i%20dokladi/Kyrgyzstan%20%20CU/EDB_Centre_Report_13_Presentation_Rus_1.pdf)], 18 November, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> See: V. Popkov, *Fenomen etnicheskikh diaspor*, Moscow, 2003, p. 74.

<sup>6</sup> Zh.T. Toshchenko, T.I. Chapytkova, "Diaspora kak ob'ekt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, No. 3, 2004, pp. 16-19.

<sup>7</sup> See: S.V. Ryazantsev, "Emigranty iz Rossii: russkaia diaspora ili russkogovoriashchie soobshchestva?" *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, No. 12, 2016, pp. 93-104.

Here is how S.V. Ryazantsev put it: “In a situation of global migration, diaspora should be viewed not only as a part of the people living outside the home country, having common spiritual, cultural and historical roots with that country, and seeking to maintain diverse contacts with the historical homeland (i.e., from a traditional perspective), but also as a transnational network that is at a formative stage but has socioeconomic, cultural and sociopolitical potential.”<sup>8</sup>

*Diasporas as agents of economic processes in the EAEU.* Diasporas play a significant socioeconomic role and are a certain resource. They have always been agents of economic processes. Members of diasporas remit significant amounts of money to their home country, investing them in its economy, and project an image of the country of origin; sometimes, diasporas are actually controlled by the country of origin and lobby its interests. Diasporas also perform an important economic function with the result that some economic activities have become (or are gradually becoming) “specific” to members of a particular diaspora.

In the view of S.V. Strelchenko, diaspora members can have specific work skills that the people around them possess to a lesser degree or do not possess at all. In the period from the late 18th century to 1917, for example, Armenian diasporas in the Volga region took an active part in the development of trade and industry, while the Ukrainian minority in the region practically monopolized the local salt works.<sup>9</sup> Specific work skills and type of economic activity can be associated with the ethnocultural peculiarities of diaspora members. According to S.V. Strelchenko, the reason here is that “ethnoses (ethnic groups) are associated with certain economic-cultural types (ECTs) characteristic of them, which are formed under the impact of geographical, climatic and social conditions and are reflected in work skills and, consequently, in the socioeconomic role of the diaspora.”<sup>10</sup> In addition, diasporas often have at their disposal disproportionately large amounts of capital and property, which strengthens their position in various branches of the economy, even to the point of their complete monopolization. Diasporas are a magnet for migrants since they have some autonomy and are characterized by a collective system of economic activity.

Thus, diasporas act, on the one hand, as a mechanism for reallocating labor because there is a direct relationship between the development level of the diaspora, its size and labor migration flows. In other words, the choice of destination for migrant workers largely depends on the development level and size of the diaspora. On the other hand, given proper control of the diaspora’s powers, it can act as an effective mechanism for the adaptation of migrants and their integration into the host society.

*Diasporas as a tool for migrant adaptation and integration into the host society.* Considering the difficulties associated with cross-cultural interaction and the crisis of cultural dialog, the lack of a single mechanism for migrant adaptation and integration into the host society is a very important problem. Ethnic diversity today takes on new shades of meaning. The levels and forms of ethnic relations have become much more complicated. Incorrect, distorted perception and interpretation of the “other,” lack of tolerance toward “other” cultural values, and ethnic intolerance in the current conditions are an increasingly important global problem that is here to stay. Against the background of profound social transformations in the creation of a free and open society and a market economy in post-Soviet Russia, there is a crisis of Russian civic identity, ethnic intolerance, ethnoterritorial separatism and armed terrorism, which carry the threat of social disintegration, including a possible breakup of the country.

Society as a group of people regards representatives of other cultures as aliens, thus triggering a wave of social tension. Different “others” increasingly come into contact, with a resulting clash between one’s own and alien, incomprehensible and thus “bad” values and practices.

<sup>8</sup> *Megatrendy: Osnovnye traektorii evoliutsii mirovogo poriadka v XXI veke*, ed. by T.A. Shakleina, A.A. Baikov, 2nd edition (revised and enlarged), Aspekt Press Publishers, Moscow, 2014, p. 136.

<sup>9</sup> S.V. Strelchenko, “Diaspora kak sub’iekt sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh protsessov (Sotsialno-filosofski analiz naiboleie obshchikh tendentsi v proshlom i nastoiashchem),” *Energia*, No. 7, 2006, pp. 65-66.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

In the opinion of S.K. Bondyрева, ethnic conflicts arise already at the level of the school classroom, since migrant children, for example, differ from other students. They have an accent, look differently, sometimes wear elements of national dress, etc. These children and their parents live in a new environment, in a difficult and tense situation. This generates an internal and external conflict that is latent or open in varying degrees, as well as suspicion, anxiety, distrust, sometimes aggressiveness and bitterness, which are caused by various reasons rooted in difference, diversity and inadequate assessment.

Spontaneous integration leads to a number of problems, which are clearly evident, for example, in Europe and the United States. To a certain extent, the mistakes of foreign countries are being repeated in Russia. Many countries have encountered the problem of enclaves formed in their territory by particular ethnic groups of immigrants. As a rule, such areas experience problems related to migrant adaptation and integration, potential risk of separatism and spread of crime. In the absence of effective integration models, migrants prefer isolated, "compact" accommodation. According to various surveys conducted by specialized Russian agencies, diasporas are effective tools for adapting migrants and integrating them into the host society.

Migration involves value disorientation. When migrants change their place of residence, especially when they move to a region with a different level of socioeconomic development, they lose their previous values, on the one hand, and do not know how to live in a big city, on the other. Migrants are a very vulnerable and, at the same time, inconvenient social group. Their own community no longer exercises social control over them, while they have no understanding of the cultural and social norms that govern the behavior of local residents living in a particular city, especially in another country.

Today, the development of diasporas is inseparable from the process of migrants' adaptation and their integration into the host society. Diasporas act as a guide that steers migrants into the host society. The main property of a diaspora is its "resistance to assimilation," while integration, in the view of M.A. Khrustalev, "is when two independent, mature ethnic groups move toward each other and develop similar characteristics without merging into a single whole."<sup>11</sup> Academician V.A. Tishkov takes an essentially similar view.<sup>12</sup> Thus, integration is interpreted not as assimilation, but as a kind of convergence that is not in conflict with the main property of the diaspora.

Academician Yu.V. Bromley, a member of the primordialist school, noted that "at the stage of transformation of a nationality into a nation, there is a striving for self-contained existence, for territorial, economic and political insularity, which is expressed in the formation of a domestic market with a self-sufficient national economic complex, a ramified transport infrastructure, and a single political leadership. At that stage, members of the ethnos develop a sense of national consciousness (ideology), identifying themselves within its framework mainly on political grounds."<sup>13</sup> The system of ethnic interactions, interstate relations and migration flows and the formation of transnational communities determine the development of ethnic diasporas.

*Effective practices in migrant adaptation and integration into the host society.* The formation of "ethnic enclaves" should be countered not only by methods involving the deportation of illegal (undocumented) migrant workers, but also by methods such as cultural integration of members of ethnic minorities into the host society. Cultural integration tools include a study of the receiving country's language and culture, organized settlement of migrants throughout the country, school education of migrant children together with local children, and popularization of national cultural festivals and "national living rooms." The "national living room" project acts as an educational technology, which is recommended for use in all educational institutions. Acquaintance with other cultures and ethnic groups is now a task of key importance.

<sup>11</sup> M.A. Khrustalev, *Metodologia prikladnogo politicheskogo analiza*, Moscow, 2010.

<sup>12</sup> See: V.A. Tishkov, *Rekviem po etnosu: Issledovaniya po sotsialno-kulturnoi antropologii*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> Yu.V. Bromley, *Etnos i etnografia*, Moscow, 1973.

For women, for example, it is possible to hold a series of cooking workshops, while men and children could be involved in sports games. Playing together in one team is a powerful incentive to integration. Sports games are an effective tool for adapting and integrating migrants because it promotes healthy competition, brings people together, and strengthens the will to win. Government social programs of this kind being implemented in other countries provide successful examples of such activities.

In Germany, for example, such a government social program is being implemented on the basis of the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BIM) at the Humboldt University of Berlin, where a group of researchers has been studying issues related to adaptation and integration through sport. This includes a large-scale project called "Integration, Sport and Football," whose purpose is to popularize football among migrants, provide coverage of the latest football events, and give them sociopolitical meaning. The Institute has also studied problems of interaction between government and public sports organizations, migrants' participation and interest in sporting events, etc.

In addition, it is necessary to improve social policy, namely, to develop the ideas of community building. Russia is very much in need of this today. In Soviet times, it was customary for people to interact at the level of their district, yard and apartment block. Districts were a kind of mechanism for integrating newcomers.

## Results

One of the priority tasks of integration efforts in the EAEU is to build and develop cyberspace capability. In order to control the activities of diasporas and simplify migrant integration procedures, it would make sense to create an official social network of EAEU migrant workers on the web. This social web could include information blocks for different countries, with each block containing several sections:

- (1) the country's history and cultural specificity;
- (2) legal and regulatory framework;
- (3) electronic labor exchange;
- (4) maps, travel directions, key organizations, profiles of diasporas and departments in charge of migrant affairs; and
- (5) people search (by age, gender, education, native city, etc.).

Such a resource can help potential migrants to obtain all the necessary information as they make the decision to migrate, enabling them to draw up a plan of action. Each registered user will be able to create their own account and will have an opportunity to communicate with employers, who will also have access to the social network. Thus, the creation of such a powerful digital resource will make it possible to solve numerous problems related to the migration process and migrant integration, as well as to coordinate the activities of working migrants in receiving countries. For example, in October 2014, at a meeting with the heads of 20 Tajik diasporas and associations in Russia, President Emomali Rakhmon of the Republic of Tajikistan supported the proposal to establish an all-Russia organization of Tajiks to coordinate their activities in the Russian Federation.

The task here is not only to foster tolerance as a necessary attitude in the civilized world, as a condition and principle allowing people to maintain their relations and their very existence. It is equally important to develop a new way of thinking that accepts diversity as something valuable and positive.<sup>14</sup>

Cross-cultural communication implies an infinite set of diversities, but ethnic diversity is pivotal in this context. The erasure of diversities and "peculiarities" is inadmissible. The answer here is a cultural dialog based on a desire to know more about the "other." We should also talk about social

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<sup>14</sup> See: A.S. Akhiezer, "Mezhdru Ya i drugim," *Mir psikhologii*, No. 3, 2001, pp. 12-15.

solidarity as a special case of social interaction rooted in the moral necessity of helping one's own "kith and kin" instead of choosing between them and "aliens."

Russia differs significantly from its Western neighbors in both the nature of immigration and the society's attitude toward it.<sup>15</sup> There are various problems that stand in the way of migrant integration: large numbers of undocumented migrants, exploitation of labor, negative media image of migrants, absence of a "pro-immigrant lobby," lack of institutions responsible for migrant integration, high level of corruption, low level of tolerance among the local population, etc. But the only practice we can borrow in this case from the EU countries is that of creating the conditions for funding integration programs at the supranational level. We should establish a Eurasian Integration Fund for several years as a pilot project that allows the EAEU countries to share the costs involved depending on the level of their economic development and the magnitude of the migrant integration problem. The transfer of competencies in the area of migrant integration to a single specially established organization would be a big mistake. The integration of new arrivals should take place at all levels, from the municipal to the supranational. In Russia, matters related to diasporas are within the competence of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, among others. The Agency has a department for liaison with diasporas, associations of compatriots and NGOs. In addition, programs for the sociocultural adaptation and integration of migrant children ("Russian language schools") have been running in Moscow and other large cities. NGOs engaged in human rights protection and in cultural, psychological and educational activities have also been working actively. But their insufficient financial and infrastructure capacity, especially after the adoption of new laws on NGOs, prevent their effective operation in implementing integration programs. Thus, one can speak of the inadequate development of institutions responsible for migrant integration.

Over the years, migration flows from post-Soviet states have included more and more young people socialized in different conditions than the older generation. Many of them have a poor command of Russian or cannot speak the language at all. It should be noted that the problems of migrant integration in Russia mainly lie in the socioeconomic sphere and can be solved by creating the conditions for high-quality education and preventing the exploitation of migrant workers. Now that the EAEU countries have created a single labor market, many undocumented migrants have come out of the shadows and have gone through the legalization procedure. One can only hope that Tajikistan, as a potential candidate for accession to the EAEU, is aware of the importance of the problem of migrants' illegal presence and work in RF territory and that it will fulfill all the requirements and formally join the single labor market.

Thus, integration of immigrants into the host society is becoming an important area of migration policy. The effectiveness of the integration process and migration policy in general will depend on the extent to which our integration policy takes into account the specific features of the country and ethnic groups of immigrants. As regards the mechanisms for the socioeconomic integration of immigrants into the host society, integration policy should be based on the creation of informal networks, the development of ethnic business, and the emergence of other socioeconomic institutions.

## Discussion

The migration policy of economically developed countries can hardly be called effective. On the one hand, it is designed to limit migration flows from developing and poor countries based on various criteria (educational, social, geographic, ethnic), and on the other, it aims to reduce the ethnocultural diversity of immigrants to a common denominator (the "melting pot," or assimilation, theory). But the "melting pot" theory has fallen short of expectations. "Melting pots" cannot melt the whole ethnic diversity together into a totally homogeneous mass, with ever more frequent racial and

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<sup>15</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, "Russia Needs a New Migration Policy," *Russian Politics and Law*, No. 1(3), 2013, pp. 80-88.

ethnic conflicts breaking out in these countries. As Abram L. Sachar noted in his *Melting Pot or Symphony* (1976), America was once called a melting pot for all immigrants arriving in the country in search of a better life. In this huge pot, they acquired a new quality, turning into Americans. This model of ethnic interaction is no longer adequate to reality. Today, he continued, America is more like the score of a symphony created by the talent of many peoples, and the melody of each of them can be heard in this symphony. The American theory of segmented assimilation shows that migrants have three options: to go through the process of adaptation and integration, assimilate into the poorer segments of the urban population or become part of their own ethnic community. Each of these paths has certain consequences for the host society. Let us note that Russia currently ranks third behind the United States and Germany in the number of migrants. But the U.S. is implementing a different migration policy designed to attract highly skilled migrants, and this is something to be taken into account. Diasporas perform important sociopolitical and economic functions, but their rapid development may lead to global ethnic migration and thus to an even greater inflow of unskilled labor.

It can be assumed that ethnicity as a resource for adaptation and integration in the new place now plays a key role in the life strategy of migrants. But migrants who have once lost their homeland will never again be fully accepted back into the home society and, at the same time, they will never be free of the feeling of being “aliens” in the host country. That is why they are obliged to create their own world “between” the two societies, a world based on dual identity.

### *Conclusion*

The formation and development of diasporas promotes both ethnic and economic integration. Diasporas have significant socioeconomic resources and can influence decision-making in the area of government regulation, as well as socioeconomic processes.

On the one hand, diasporas play an important role as “assistants” and “supervisors,” and on the other, they may help newly arrived migrants to take part in the informal economy, thus increasing undocumented migration. That is why it is so important for the competent authorities to control the activities of diasporas.

Diasporas have a significant influence on the labor reallocation process. By strengthening the position of certain ethnic diasporas, it is possible to regulate migrant flows in the EAEU countries.

While acting as agents of migrant adaptation and integration into the host society, as a kind of buffer between the migrant community and the local population, diasporas also help to form ethnic enclaves with an ethnic economy in areas with a high concentration of migrants.

The model for integrating migrants in Russia should be specific to the conditions and realities of the country. But this does not mean that we should ignore foreign experience, especially that of the European Union. The successful integration of migrants in Russia requires certain conditions: harmonization of industrial relations through improvements in working conditions and remuneration; a desire to legalize migrants, especially those from third countries that are not members of the EAEU, through their accession to the single labor market; improvements in the system for the legal protection of migrants (migrants outside the legal framework cannot be regarded as integrated); simplification of the procedure for acquiring citizenship with an increase in its transparency; and transformation of the education system, particularly through the development of specialized professional education and emphasis on the study of Russian. Given the existence of a single labor market, we should give serious thought to creating a single educational space in the EAEU and to establishing a Eurasian People’s Friendship University with a network of branches in all EAEU countries, because it is necessary to train personnel with a common understanding and common terminology.

## SCENARIOS OF MIGRATION WITHIN THE EAEU IN CONDITIONS OF ENHANCING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

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### ABSTRACT

**T**he article presents two scenarios for the development of the migration situation in the Eurasian Economic Union: extensive and intensive. In the extensive scenario of the development of the migration situation in the EAEU, the prospects for the

geographical expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union are considered, and the impact of expansion on labor migration flows and socioeconomic consequences for the countries entering the Union is estimated. The prospects and effects are evaluated for

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*the Republic of Tajikistan joining the EAEU. The authors indicate that further expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union must be based on close cooperation with other countries and integration associations. In the intensive scenario, the prospects for widening the economic integration of the participating countries are considered, as well as the prospects for creating a single labor market for highly skilled specialists in the EAEU on the basis of a unified innovation infrastructure and a single educational environment. The transition of integration projects in the post-Soviet space to its broader forms is limited by national and economic interests of the active and potential members of integration associations. Stabilization of the single labor market of the EAEU can occur, given the increasing quality, rather than quantity, of the workforce, the growth of its professional qualifications, and the increase in the transparency of migration flows. The low*

*level of professional training not only narrows the job opportunities of labor migrants in external labor markets, but also leads to the aggravation of socioeconomic problems. It is important to create the necessary comfortable conditions for the immigration of highly qualified specialists within the framework of the EAEU.*

*There is a need to stimulate the development of innovative infrastructure and create a single educational environment, which will result in the formation of a single labor market of highly qualified specialists. The creative economy raises the level of requirements for the qualification of workers in the labor market and, thereby, stimulates the migration of qualified employees. It is important not to allow a "brain drain" from the EAEU member states to third countries. The formation of a knowledge economy in the EAEU is able to solve a number of socioeconomic problems.*

**KEYWORDS:** *labor migration, development scenarios, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).*

## *Introduction*

The development of migration scenarios is an important component of managing the migration and demographic processes. The main problems of forecasting are caused by the fact that in any country the growth of a population due to migration is formed as a result of interaction of immigration and emigration, which in turn are caused by various factors. And in the case of integration associations, which the EAEU represents, the forecasting of migration is complicated by the heterogeneity of the socioeconomic and political developments of the states that enter it.

The Russian migration policy has focused more on regulating immigration, as well as on problems, concerning immigrants. Despite the existence of two migration regulatory concepts (2003 and 2012), they do not contain explicit projections of migratory estimates. In the second concept (the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025), the creation of conditions and incentives for the resettlement of former citizens, residing abroad, emigrants and certain categories of foreign citizens to the Russian Federation, development of differentiated mechanisms for attracting, selecting and using foreign labor, promoting educational migration and supporting academic mobility, etc., are proposed. However, this document contains no specific predictive parameters of the migration inflow of the population. Only in the Concept of the Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025, which was approved in 2007, it is noted that a migration increase of more than 300 thousand people annually is necessary. The Federal State

Statistics Service (Rosstat), in the demographic projection until 2030, offers three options for forecasting migration growth: low (about 200-230 thousand), medium (300-340 thousand), high (400-500 thousand people).<sup>1</sup>

The Republic of Belarus, which is similar to Russia as far as its demographic and migration policy is concerned, also considers migration as a component of demographic development. Kazakhstan also actively accepts immigrants, including the criteria, based on ethnic affinity (the program for the return of ethnic Kazakhs [oralmans]), to maintain the ethnocultural balance, as well as labor migrants, to compensate for the shortage of labor resources. At the same time, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are more focused on encouraging emigration, developing ties with the diaspora, and attracting its resources for the development of the national economy.

## Methods and Materials

*“Extensive” scenario for the development of migration processes in the context of the expansion of the EAEU.* It seems that competition for labor resources, as well as the development of a single labor market, contribute to the demographic and territorial expansion of international integration associations to achieve sustainable social and economic development. In this regard, the desire of most integration associations to attract members and the adoption of new countries are seen as an absolutely logical and economically justified solution.<sup>2</sup> The EAEU is not an exception, the accession of new member states can improve the socioeconomic and demographic situation within the Union. This can also lead to the more close interaction among the existing integration associations.

As the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, has stated: “The Eurasian Economic Union does not seek to unite only the post-Soviet states; the emerging Eurasian space will have wider boundaries. The Eurasian Economic Union becomes the bridge between Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region. The relations between the EAEU and the EU have great prospects for joint development, despite some tension of the last period, and satisfaction of mutual economic interests in the 21st century can lead to the formation of a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The EAEU will become a part of both the European and Asian economic space; create a large platform for economic cooperation and a ‘harmonious cooperation of the economies’.”<sup>3</sup> Also, the President of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, introduced the notion of “integration of integrations,”<sup>4</sup> implying close interaction between the two integration structures—the EU and EAEU.

The EAEU continues to be a real and promising form of integration development within the framework of the former U.S.S.R., despite the financial and economic crisis of 2014-2015, a significant depreciation of the Russian ruble, and some disagreements at the political level. Compared with other examples of integration and regionalism in the post-Soviet space, the advantage of the EAEU is that mutual benefits are consistently observed and the sovereignties of the member states of the Union are respected.

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<sup>1</sup> See: S.V. Ryazantsev, I.Ya. Bogdanov, M.N. Khramova, “Prognozirovanie migratsii v kontekste formirovaniya vneshnei migratsionnoi politiki Rossii,” *Nauchnoe obozrenie: ekonomika i pravo*, No. 1, 2017, pp. 12-15.

<sup>2</sup> See: V.A. Bezverbnii, “Demograficheskie i migratsionnye aspekty regionalnoi integratsii,” in: *Migratsionnye mosty v Evrazii: Materialy VII mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii “Rol trudovoi migratsii v sotsialno-ekonomicheskom i demograficheskom razvitiu posylaiushchikh i priniimaiushchikh stran” (Moskva-Stavropol, 13-18 oktiabria 2015 g.)*, ed. by S.V. Ryazantsev, Ekon-Inform, Moscow, 2015, p. 338.

<sup>3</sup> V.V. Putin, “Noviy integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii—budushchee, kotoroe rozhdetsia segodnia,” *Izvestia*, 5 October, 2011, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> A.G. Lukashenko, “O sudbakh nashei integratsii,” *Izvestia*, 19 October, 2011, p. 5.

The study shows that many states have shown a desire to integrate with the EAEU to various degrees. For example, in 2015, an agreement was reached to establish a free trade area of EAEU with Vietnam. The leaders of Israel, Egypt, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Mongolia, Albania, etc. have expressed their viewpoints on this subject as well.<sup>5</sup> About 30 appeals were submitted to the Eurasian Economic Commission. A significant development could be the implementation of agreements between the leaders of Russia and China (May 2015) on the merger of two projects—the EAEU and the New Silk Road. In addition, the most relevant mechanism for creating and developing this form of integration can be a free trade area.

The countries of Central Asia, in particular Tajikistan, are also considering the integration with the EAEU. The President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, said in 2014 that it is necessary to study the economic base and legal documents of the Eurasian Economic Union “with a view to possibly joining this new integration association.”<sup>6</sup> One of the reasons for Tajikistan’s accession to the EAEC can be an active and large-scale labor emigration to Russia and Kazakhstan. For Tajikistan, emigration has now become a real mechanism to reduce unemployment and the balance of payments deficit by way of the incoming remittances. The labor migration has become not only a means of survival for the population and an instrument for reducing demographic tension, but also a mechanism for economic integration within the post-Soviet space from its grass roots.<sup>7</sup> According to the World Bank, labor migration and remittances have been essential to the development of Tajikistan since 2000.<sup>8</sup>

The population of Tajikistan is growing, while the number of jobs in the country is not increasing fast enough. According to the National Agency for Statistics, the population growth in Tajikistan for 2005-2013 amounted to 2 million people: its number increased from 6.1 million to 8.1 million people.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, agriculture is one of the few sectors of the economy in which there is an increase in the number of jobs. It should be noted that agriculture accumulates about 66% of the employed in Tajikistan. The employment of the population in other sectors of the economy is practically not growing or increasing very slowly. Only about 18% of the population is engaged in the non-material sphere of the national economy. According to the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), more than 36% of Tajikistan’s working-age population in 2010, were not employed in the economy.<sup>10</sup> According to the World Bank’s Survey of Living Standards in 2007, labor migration is concentrated among members of poor households: in 60% of households, with low levels of consumption, at least one family member works abroad.<sup>11</sup> There is a significant difference in the income of labor migrants

<sup>5</sup> See: “Tunis predlozhit sozdat zonu svobodnoi torgovli s TS i EAES,” *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 14 January, 2015, available at [<http://rg.ru/2015/01/14/tunis-anons.html>], 18 April, 2017; “Zimbabwe zakhotelet zakliuchit soglashenie o zone svobodnoi torgovli s EAES,” *Interfax*, 17 July, 2015, available at [<http://www.interfax.ru/business/454338>], 19 April, 2017; “Egipet i EAES dogovorilis o sozdanii zony svobodnoi torgovli,” *Gazeta.ru*, 10 February, 2015, available at [[http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/02/10/n\\_6911237.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/02/10/n_6911237.shtml)], 26 April, 2017.

<sup>6</sup> The National Information Agency of Tajikistan “Khowar,” available at [<http://khowar.tj/rus/economic/43089-tadzhikistanu-i-evraziyskiy-ekonomicheskii-soyuz.html>], 25 April, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> See: Z.A. Dadabaeva, “Potentsial i perspektivy vstuplenia Respubliki Tadzhikistan v Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskii soiuz,” in: *Ekonomicheskoe vzaimodeistvie stran-chlenov SNG v kontekste Evraziyskogo integratsionnogo proekta: Sbornik nauchnykh statei*, ed. by L.B. Vardomskiy, A.G. Pylin, Institute of Economics, RAS, Moscow, 2015, pp. 253-269.

<sup>8</sup> See: *Tajikistan: Slowing Growth, Rising Uncertainties.*, Latest Issue: Biannual Economic Update, Spring 2015, Official site of the World Bank (see: [<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/publication/tajikistan-economic-update-spring-2015>], 5 April, 2017).

<sup>9</sup> See: Official site of the National Agency for Statistics under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan (see: [[http://www.stat.tj/ru/img/b417f44e3113e555ffff3cd143d5b3fe\\_1404816557.pdf](http://www.stat.tj/ru/img/b417f44e3113e555ffff3cd143d5b3fe_1404816557.pdf)], 12 April, 2016).

<sup>10</sup> See: *Otsenka ekonomicheskogo effekta prisoedinenia Respubliki Tadzhikistan k Tamozhennomu soiuzu i Edinomu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu*, Official site of the EDB (see: [[http://www.eabr.org/t/research/centre/projectsCII/Tajikistan\\_CU\\_SES/](http://www.eabr.org/t/research/centre/projectsCII/Tajikistan_CU_SES/)], 22 April, 2016).

<sup>11</sup> See: *Tajikistan— Living Standards Survey 2007*, The World Bank (see: [<http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/72>], 17 April, 2017).

working in Russia and those working in Tajikistan. According to the EDB estimates, immigrants earn 3.8 times more than the workers in Tajikistan who have similar socioeconomic characteristics. According to a survey of migrants who returned to Tajikistan, conducted by the EDB in 2009, about 98% of respondents named the job search as the main reason for emigrating. More than 60% of migrants were unemployed in Tajikistan. About 27% worked in Tajikistan, but preferred to move to another country in order to find a new job and a more attractive salary.<sup>12</sup>

It is necessary to note the high level of dependence of Tajikistan's national economy on remittances from labor migrants. More than 90% of remittances, coming to the country, come from Russia.

Based on the information of the Central Bank of Russia, in 2014, \$3.83 billion was transferred from Russia to Tajikistan through money transfer systems (Anelik, BLIZKO, Contact, InterExpress, UNISStream, Western Union, Kolibri, LEADER, Russian Post, and Golden Crown).<sup>13</sup> However, this figure cannot be considered absolutely reliable, since it does not take into account the funds, taken out in cash and transferred through informal channels. According to the National Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan, labor migrants sent about \$4 billion in 2014, which amounts to 45% of the country's GDP,<sup>14</sup> which made Tajikistan the most dependent country on remittances in the world.

Moreover, the larger the share of income from labor migrants in the GDP of the donor country, the more the national economy of the donor country depends on the economic situation in the country employing the labor force. The economic decline in the Russian Federation has revealed a high degree of dependence of the Republic of Tajikistan on emigration. According to the World Bank, as a result of the sharp devaluation of the Russian ruble, the cost of remittances in dollar terms decreased by 8.3% in 2014. In early 2015, the cost of remittances continued to fall: in January-April 2015, individuals transferred 615.6 million dollars, which is 318.6 million (34.1%) less than the same period of the last year.<sup>15</sup>

Remittances contribute to poverty reduction in Tajikistan, which declined from 41% in 2012 to 34% in 2014.<sup>16</sup> It must be noted that if there were no remittances from Russia and Kazakhstan, the level of poverty in Tajikistan would increase from 34% to 55%. The poverty level among the households that receive remittances is significantly lower than the national average (19% vs. 34%). Remittances reduce poverty in rural areas.

At present, it is still possible to observe a large-scale labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia. According to the FMS of Russia, in May 2015, there were 990,000 Tajik citizens in the country, including young able-bodied men, aged from 18 to 29 years, who amounted to about 412 thousand people.<sup>17</sup> The actual number of labor immigrants from Tajikistan in Russia could be significantly higher, since the official statistics do not cover all of the immigrants.<sup>18</sup> The economic crisis, falling incomes of immigrants, and the tightening of the Russian migration legislation in 2014-2015, con-

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<sup>12</sup> See: *Otsenka ekonomicheskogo efekta prisoedinenia Respubliki Tadjikistan k Tamozhennomu soiuзу I Edinomu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu.*

<sup>13</sup> See: *Transgranichnye perevody, osushchestvlennye cherez sistemy denezhnykh perevodov po osnovnym stranam-kontragentam za 2014 god*, Official site of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (see: [[http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.aspx?file=CrossBorder/Rem\\_countries\\_14.htm](http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.aspx?file=CrossBorder/Rem_countries_14.htm)], 10 April, 2017).

<sup>14</sup> See: Official site of the National Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan (see: [[http://www.nbt.tj/files/monetary\\_policy\\_2012\\_tj.pdf.pdf](http://www.nbt.tj/files/monetary_policy_2012_tj.pdf.pdf)], 17 April, 2017).

<sup>15</sup> See: *Tadjikistan: zamedliaushchiisia rost, rastushchaia neopredelennost. Doklad ob ekonomicheskom razvitiu Tadjikistana No. 1. Vesna 2015 g.*


<sup>16</sup> Calculated on the basis of the global poverty line set at \$2.5 a day measured in purchasing power parity.

<sup>17</sup> See: Official site of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (see: [<http://www.fms.gov.ru/document/5832>], 3 April, 2016).

<sup>18</sup> See: *Ibidem.*

Figure 1

## Remittances as a Share of GDP of Tajikistan for the Period of 2001-2014, %



tributed to the reduction of the total number of labor migrants from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation.<sup>19</sup>

The membership of Tajikistan in the EAEU will allow its citizens to gain access to a single labor market. Moreover, Russia, as the main host of the Tajik labor migrants, is interested not only in increasing its labor resources, but also in legalizing migrants from Tajikistan, and in maintaining and strengthening integrational ties with the republics of the former U.S.S.R. In the case of Tajikistan joining the EAEU, the following effects can be enumerated in the context of labor migration.

For the host countries (Russia and Kazakhstan), the potential benefit will be in the growth of the revenues of the budgets, due to the payment of the income tax by the legalized migrants (the Russian budget experiences a loss of 10-40 billion rubles annually from the non-payment of personal income taxes); optimization of the distribution of labor within the EAEU; reduction of costs to contain undocumented migration (legalization of labor migrants through the mechanism of a single labor market).<sup>20</sup>

For the Republic of Tajikistan, as the source country, joining a single labor market will lead to a greater degree of legalization of those migrant workers, who work in the EAEU countries without proper documentation, rather than increasing the flow of labor migration from Tajikistan. It may be assumed that after Tajikistan joins the EAEU, its labor migration will increase insignificantly, by

<sup>19</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, I. Bogdanov, V. Dobrokhleb, A. Lukyanets, "Migration from Central Asian Countries to Russia and Kazakhstan in the Context of Integration Processes in the Eurasian Economic Format," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 39-42.

<sup>20</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, "The Lingual Integration of Migrants in Russia: Declaration and Realities," *Life Science Journal*, No. 11 (8s), 2014, pp. 139-143.

about 10-15%, given the seasonal nature of labor emigration from Tajikistan. The volume of remittances depends on the number of labor emigrants, the average wage and the share of income that is transferred home. Given the accession of Tajikistan to the single labor market, the level of wages of migrants will approach the national standard; estimates of the growth of remittances will be in the range of 15-25% of the current level, and the share of transfers will reach up to 49-53% of the GDP, if and when the economic situation in Russia improves.

*The “intensive” scenario for the development of the migration situation in the EAEU.* The transition of integration in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. to its more extensive forms is limited to the national interests of the acting and potential members of integration associations.<sup>21</sup> “These interests are formed as a result of linking the developmental goals of countries with national, global and regional factors (resources) for their achievement, cultural and historical traditions and the nature of external threats.”<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the problems of the development of Eurasian integration projects (CIS and EAEU) are primarily related to the answer of the question, whether these projects have real opportunities for effective development of reciprocal relations. It is about the strategy of economic unification and about geopolitical, military, intellectual, and sociocultural integration. At the center of the agenda are the creation of a stable and predictably developing regional political and economic system in Eurasia, as well as the formation on its basis of a global center for world development and stability.<sup>23</sup>

## Results

We believe that the stabilization of the single labor market of the EAEU can occur, given not only the growth of the quantity, but also the increase in the quality of the workforce, especially its professional qualification. The low level of professional training significantly reduces the opportunities for migrants of finding employment in external labor markets, and also leads to the aggravation of socioeconomic problems in the host countries. The domination of low-skilled labor in migration reinforces the problems of sociocultural adaptation of migrants in the host countries, and intensifies the situation with medical care, housing, transportation and social infrastructure.

The priority direction for the development of the EAEU is the creation of an innovative economy that requires skilled workers and highly qualified specialists. There exists an objective need to develop an innovative infrastructure and create a single educational environment. In this regard, it seems that it is important to design favorable conditions for stimulating the migration of highly qualified specialists. The goal is establishing a single labor market for highly qualified specialists by evolving mechanisms of innovation and educational infrastructure. At the same time, it is important to prevent the “brain drain” from the EAEU states to third countries.

It is possible to create a Eurasian innovation center and a venture fund that will promote the development of R&D and spread of innovations, as well as the Fund for Support of Export-oriented Production. The activity of these structures will allow increasing the share of the EAEU goods in the world commodity market, and will also promote the export-oriented high technology products. In addition, the development of innovative infrastructure will create many jobs for qualified professionals.

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<sup>21</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, V. Bozhenko, “New Approaches to Managing Labor Migration under Integration in EurAsEC,” *Asian Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, No. 20, 2014, pp. 195-200.

<sup>22</sup> L.B. Vardomskiy, “Voprosy evraziiskoi integratsii,” in: *Vneshneekonomicheskie svyazi postsovetkikh stran v kontekste evraziiskoi integratsii*, ed. by L.B. Vardomskiy, A.G. Pylin, Institute of Economics, RAS, Moscow, 2014, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> See: Z.A. Dadabaeva, op. cit.

## Discussion

The nascent conditions for the formation of innovative economies in the EAEU states are significantly inferior to the economically developed countries. The Global Innovation Index indicates that, according to the French research institute, INSEAD, Russia occupies the 49th position in the list of 143 countries, the Republic of Belarus—58th place, Armenia—65th, Kazakhstan—79th, Kyrgyzstan—112th. The Russian Federation, which possesses all the main elements of innovative infrastructure, can be considered the leader in the field of innovative technologies in the EAEU. However, these elements are poorly coordinated and sometimes ineffective. In Kazakhstan, the innovative infrastructure has a more mature form, but there are problems in the commercialization of scientific developments and the lack of interaction between research and production, which leads to a low level of engineering and technical support. In Belarus, there is a system of information support for the State Innovation Program, as well as a system for monitoring the innovative development of industries and regions. In Armenia, although there has been a trend toward innovative development, the scientific and technical component continues to develop in isolation from the idea of the full use of human capital. There is still no concept for the development of innovative infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has a number of organizational and legislative problems that create obstacles to the legal provision of innovative development. All the EAAU member countries are characterized by a low level of R&D funding and lack of an institution for financing commercialization. To achieve an effective functioning of the Eurasian innovation system, a coordinated targeted policy of all EAEU member countries is needed, in particular, coherence in the implementation of licensing and patent policy.

## Conclusion

The scenarios for the development of the migration situation in the EAEU (“extensive” and “intensive”) can generally correspond to the state of the socioeconomic situation in the post-Soviet space, but may be implemented in various combinations, depending on internal and external factors. But generally, the development of the migration situation in both scenarios will lead to positive consequences for both national economies of the EAEU countries and for the single labor market.

In accordance with the concepts of economic theory, labor migration will not lead to the convergence of the development of the economies of countries, as long as there is a serious differentiation in technological development. In countries with a low level of innovation and technological development, wages will be lower than in the more technologically advanced partner countries. A coordinated innovation and educational policy requires participation of all of the EAEU member countries. It is necessary to create “the drivers” for innovative and educational development (for example, the Eurasian Innovation Center and the Eurasian Peoples’ Friendship University with a network of affiliates), which should be formed using foreign experience in developing similar projects and attracting international scientific and expert cooperation. The foundation of innovative and educational development in the EAEU should also be accompanied by the simultaneous implementation of legislative norms and institutional rules.

Education can be regarded as an important and basic socioeconomic instrument for deepening integration of the EAEU. The single labor market requires common approaches to the training of personnel, but at the moment there is no single educational system in the EAEU. Within the framework of a single labor market, there is a system for the recognition of educational achievements, certifications and diplomas (with the exception of medical, pedagogical and legal education). The formation of a unified economic policy in the EAEU requires the creation of a single educational

environment, taking into account that all the EAEU countries are members of the Bologna Process, with the exception of the Kyrgyz Republic, which will make it possible to use the experience of the European Union in the formation of a single educational environment.

The labor migration of highly qualified specialists is an important factor that will positively affect the national labor markets of all the EAEU states. Graduates of the Network University can work in any country of the EAEU and compete with each other in both national and general labor markets. It is also worth noting the importance of studying the Russian language within the EAEU. In many republics of the former U.S.S.R., the Russian language still plays an important role. The Russian language is the working language of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the CIS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In addition, taking into account large flows of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan to Russia, the study of the Russian language by labor migrants is the key to obtaining a higher-paid level of employment.

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## ENERGY AND RESOURCE POLICY

### ENERGY FLOWS IN CENTRAL ASIA: ISSUES AND OUTLOOK

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#### ABSTRACT

**T**he development of new hydrocarbon reservoir fields in the countries of Central Asia in 2015-2016 and the changing approaches to cooperation with the Central Asian countries in the energy sector advocated by Russia, Iran and China

*intensified the interest in discussing and implementing pipeline projects, which were developed in the 1990s. Given their geopolitical importance, they lead to the intensification of competition between the countries in the region and nonregional states. The new pipelines may not only create additional opportunities for the delivery of oil and natural gas from Central Asia to external markets, but also fundamentally change the balance of power in the region. This explains the increase of the role of the hydrocarbon resources in the external policy of the Central Asian countries and their closer attention to the pipeline method of transportation.*

*In the last twenty-five years, the countries of Central Asia have made considerable progress in the establishment of a new system of pipelines. The implementation of pipeline projects in the region was closely linked to the production of hydrocarbon raw materials, since the emergence of additional volumes of oil and gas in the Central Asian countries had raised the issue of delivery to external markets. This has become a key task of foreign policy of the countries of Central Asia rich in hydrocarbon resources.*

*As a result, the energy policy of the countries of the region have demonstrated that, despite the construction of new pipelines, which negated the monopoly of Russia's export of hydrocarbons to external markets, the Central Asian states were unable to reduce their dependence on the policy of the neighboring states, which act as transit countries or consumers of crude oil and natural gas. Moreover, the countries of Central Asia have been closely tied to the energy interests of China, Iran and Russia, which were able to exert their influence on the states of the region by pricing mechanisms and volumes of purchases of hydrocarbon resources.*

*The policies of the countries of Central Asia to diversify the pipeline routes have*

*come to depend on the rates of extracting crude oil and natural gas reserves. The current situation with filling the pipelines with the required volumes of energy resources, designated for export, has demonstrated that the ability of the countries of Central Asia to significantly expand volumes of extraction of hydrocarbon resources in the shortest possible time turned out to be limited. Numerous enthusiastic projections of oil and gas production, made in the 1990s, have subsequently been lowered. As a result, a large part of the Central Asian pipelines does not operate at full capacity. On the one hand, the reasons for this were caused by the decline in production of the old oil fields, while the development of the new fields required considerable investment and the application of new technologies, which the country did not have.*

*As a result, the lack of financial resources and equipment required a much longer time for construction of oil and gas exporting pipelines. On the other hand, the countries of Central Asia have become increasingly susceptible to geopolitical changes, fluctuations of prices in the world markets and changes in the policies of the neighboring states. Lifting sanctions on Iran and Iran's revision of its policy in the sphere of production and export of hydrocarbons, the unstable situation in Afghanistan, the reduction of interest on the part of Russia and China in obtaining additional volumes of hydrocarbon resources—all this had influenced the energy sector of the Central Asian countries.*

*In spite of the difficulties, the countries of the region have not abandoned the implementation of their projects for the construction of new pipelines, considering them to be additional opportunities for the export of hydrocarbon resources and the strengthening of their geopolitical positions.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Central Asia, pipelines, crude oil, natural gas, energy policy, Russia, the U.S., EU, China.*

## *Introduction*

The history of modern pipeline projects in Central Asia is the story of the search by the countries of the region for ways to lessen the dominance of transportation and communication infrastructure of Russia. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., Russia, because of its favorable geographical location, maintained the influence in the region, in fact, determining volumes of crude oil and natural gas exports from the former Soviet republics. This situation reflected the historically evolved system of pipelines, which, in the period of the Soviet Union, ran from Central Asia to Russia. For this reason, overcoming such dependence and diversifying pipeline routes have become an important task for the countries, located in the vast expanses of Central Asia. Oil and gas became commodities to be regarded, through the prism of approval by the Western states, as measures of independence and opportunities for expanding cooperation with the Western states, which paid increased attention to alternative export crude oil and natural gas routes.

The presence of significant oil and gas reserves has led to many projections. Most of the estimates of potential oil and gas reserves and production levels were excessive. The skepticism, regarding the fantastic stocks of hydrocarbon reserves in the countries of Central Asia and the rates of production, was disregarded in the calculations. The exaggerated data on hydrocarbon stocks were used by the countries of the region to attract additional attention of the Western states and oil and gas companies. Such a policy had its results, since the states of Central Asia have been able to attract investment of foreign oil and gas companies and to increase production of hydrocarbons, as well as to implement some of the projects, involving the exporting pipelines. Increasing oil and gas exports provided the means to make possible stabilizing the situation in the socioeconomic sphere and strengthening governmental institutions. Meantime, the countries of the region did not reach the forecasted production of hydrocarbon resources. There was no steady demand for additional volumes of oil and gas, which the countries of the region planned to extract, exacerbated by the lack of the infrastructure necessary for their exports. This explains the fact that although many of the projects for the exporting pipelines for hydrocarbons from Central Asia appeared in the 1990s, they were not put to use until the beginning of the 2000s. This was induced by the changes in the prices in the world gas market. The increased needs for hydrocarbon resources in China were also a factor.

Of the greatest interest were projects for delivering oil and gas from the Central Asian countries to Europe (the western direction) and China and Japan (the eastern direction). The discussions of the feasibility studies of many of the projects were initiated by the Western countries. The implementation of pipeline projects, bypassing Russian territory, was considered instrumental in the lessening of Russia's influence in Central Asia. In turn, the new pipelines projects were of a great interest to the Central Asian countries, which saw in them a way to improve their autonomy in the energy sphere in order to access external markets. In the end, the "friendship" of the Central Asian countries with Russia was replaced with cooperation with the West and China.

The implementation of projects on production and export of hydrocarbon resources was helped by investments of the leading oil and gas companies that have played a key role in the development of the oil and gas reserves of the countries of Central Asia. Mainly, this concerned Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose oil and gas deposits have been the focus of attention of many countries of the world.

In the change of exporting direction of oil and gas from the region the key role was played by China, consistently increasing its influence in the region. The Chinese had not only commercial but also geopolitical objectives as well, in order to prevent foreign policies reorientation of Astana and Ashgabat toward the West. In addition, China pursued a strategic task—that of reducing its energy

dependence on the Middle East suppliers of energy resources.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Beijing followed closely the dialog of the Central Asian countries with the EU and the U.S., which, in turn, intended, through the pipeline projects, to limit the impact of China in the region and to reorient future flows of the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia.

Overall, the Chinese policy to promote sustainable gas routes from the region was *positively perceived by the Central Asian states, since Beijing represented the main source of funding for their infrastructure projects*. In addition, the countries of Central Asia strove to reduce their dependence on Russia and regarded diversifying supplies of hydrocarbons to external markets as the steps, designed to strengthen their sovereignty.

The increased attention of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan was given to the development of relations with Iran, through whose territory the oil and gas of Central Asian countries could be transported in the southern direction. The Iranian direction was viewed by Ashgabat as the first step on the path of supplying the European gas market, bypassing Russia. Turkmenistan hatched ambitious plans for the construction of the super pipeline Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe. However, the implementation of the project required considerable resources. In addition, an obstacle to the implementation of the plans for the delivery of the Turkmen gas to Europe was a complex relationship of Iran with the Western countries, as well as the absence of consumers for the Turkmen gas. These factors, ultimately, prevented the Turkmen gas from entering the European market. Nevertheless, Iran has played an important role in the diversification of natural gas and crude oil deliveries from the region. In 1997, Turkmenistan and Iran have expanded the energy cooperation by constructing the pipeline Korpheje (Turkmenistan)-Kurt Kui (Iran).

Iran was of great interest for Kazakhstan, which hoped to construct a pipeline to export its oil through Iranian territory. Their discussion centered on the establishment of the maritime transportation of Kazakh oil and gas from Tengiz, Kalamkas and Kumkol oil fields, with subsequent unloading of equivalent volumes of Iranian oil from the southern terminals. In addition, an option was considered for laying the pipeline from the Western Kazakhstan to Iran and connecting it to the pipeline NEKA-Tehran. However, these ambitious projects were not realized. Kazakhstan, like Turkmenistan, did not wish to exacerbate relations with the West, which imposed sanctions on Iran, and oriented itself toward Russia and China.

The heightened interest of the Central Asian countries was focused on projects of deliveries of hydrocarbons going east and south, namely to China, India and Japan, which implied constructing extensive pipelines. But, at the end of the 1990s, in a period of low prices for the hydrocarbon resources, these projects were not realized either. The policies of the Western countries, concerned to reorient additional volumes of crude oil and natural gas toward Europe and to influence the relations between Kazakhstan and China and between Turkmenistan and China, which began to progress at the turn of the century, began to be offered to be utilized.

However, a part of the proposed projects was completed. In addition to the gas pipelines Turkmenistan-Iran (1997, 2010), the pipelines Turkmenistan-China (2009) and Kazakhstan-China (2009) were built. Thus, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan initiated the establishment of the new pipeline infrastructure that would allow them to diversify supplies of oil and gas to the external markets. The energy corridor was also made for supplying oil tankers going from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. Although the volumes of oil did not exceed an average of 2 to 3 million tons a year, the ability for export to the west was highly regarded by the countries of Central Asia. In 2015, in Turkmenistan, the construction of the East-West pipeline was completed, which signified the first stage of the formation of the new pipeline architecture in Central Asia.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Z.A. Dadabaeva, E.M. Kuzmina, *Protsessy regionalizatsii v Tsentralnoi Azii: problemy i protivorechia*, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2014, p. 33.

## New Balance of Power

Despite the positive results that have been reached by the countries of Central Asia in the implementation of pipeline construction projects, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the situation in Central Asia began to change rapidly. One of the reasons for this was the revision by Russia, Iran and China of the nature of cooperation with the countries of Central Asia in the energy sphere that was associated with the decline in the requirements for hydrocarbon resources.

The relations between Turkmenistan and Russia were fraught with difficulties in the 1990s and after, although up to the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Turkmen gas was steadily conveyed through Russian territory. In 2008, Turkmenistan delivered to Russia up to 40 bcm of gas. But the world economic crisis and the change in the demand for gas in the European countries have influenced the Russian-Turkmenistan relations and, above all, in the energy sphere. In the end, Russia and Turkmenistan have not been able to reach an agreement on the price and volume of export of Turkmen gas. The lessening interest of Ashgabat in finding mechanisms of cooperation with Russia is explained by its reorientation toward China, which was rapidly increasing its presence in the fuel and energy sector of Turkmenistan. At that time, the pipeline Turkmenistan-China was being quickly built, to be finished and put in operation in 2009. For Ashgabat, this has opened new opportunities for the export of gas. Then the construction of the second and third threads of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline began (completed in 2015), which allowed China to get, potentially, the imported amount of gas of up to a maximum of 55 bcm a year. Of that volume, 10 bcm was to come from Uzbekistan and 10 bcm from Kazakhstan, through whose territories the pipeline Turkmenistan-China is run.

The Chinese affiliation enabled Turkmenistan to lighten its dependence on the Russian market as far as exports of hydrocarbon resources were concerned. Finally, beginning in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the delivery of gas from Turkmenistan to Russia dropped steadily, and as of January 2016, the exporting of gas through Russian territory was discontinued.

In recent years, the relations of Turkmenistan with the European countries have been undergoing some changes. The negotiations on the construction of the Transcaspian pipeline, designed to provide the means for transporting the Turkmen gas to the European market, yielded no results. The lack of a solution to the question of the status of the Caspian Sea in the five-sided negotiations has certainly played its role. Construction of the gas pipeline has been impeded by the vague forecasts on the production levels of gas in Turkmenistan, as well as the differences between the interests of Ashgabat and Baku, the latter's interests being to supply Europe with its own hydrocarbon resources.

The relations between Turkmenistan and Iran were also uneasy. For many years, Turkmenistan delivered its gas to Iran, which bought it for the northeastern areas, remote from the main Iranian gas fields. For Iran, which, since the mid-1990s, was placed under sanctions by the Western countries, the construction of the gas pipelines from Turkmenistan addressed current economic challenges, related to the supply of gas to the northeastern areas of the country, and afforded the creation of alternate sources of gas. As a result, Turkmen gas could be exported to Iran by the two pipelines built in 1997 and in 2010. The maximum amount of supplies could have been brought up to 20 bcm. However, the optimal volume of so much gas had never been needed. Turkmenistan annually exported to Iran an average of about 8 bcm. In turn, the Iranian route was viewed by Ashgabat as a promising venue for exporting its hydrocarbon resources. Turkmenistan had expected to increase the supply of up to 14 bcm, and then build a gas pipeline to Europe.

At the end of 2016, the relations of the two countries deteriorated. Turkmenistan demanded that Iran pays its debt, amounting to \$1.8 billion, which resulted from the 2007 and 2008 imports of Turkmen gas. The Iranian side refused to comply with the requirement of Turkmenistan, which responded

by ceasing to supply gas to the northeastern areas of Iran in January 2017. However, this measure by Ashgabat did not change the position of Iran. In recent years, Iran has been exploring the field deposits of South Pars and creating the infrastructure for the supply of the northeastern area of the country with its own gas. For this purpose a pipeline was built and road and rail transport engaged. As a result, after the 2016, Iran was able to provide for its own needs that significantly reduced its interest in acquiring the Turkmen gas.

By terminating the gas deliveries to Iran and thereby worsening the bilateral relations, Turkmenistan negated its efforts of the past 20 years. In the end, the sole buyer of the Turkmen gas turned out to be China, relations with which also have their own peculiarities. After the installation of the gas pipeline Turkmenistan-China, Beijing expressed interest in expanding its throughput capacity. It was expected that by the year 2020, China will be able to obtain from Central Asia up to 65 bcm of gas.<sup>2</sup> The share of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was to constitute 10 bcm each. But by the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century Beijing adjusted plans to increase the capacity of the pipe, because the existing three “threads” were not operating at full capacity.

Reduction of interest on the part of China to increase the procurement of Turkmen gas has led to the postponement of the construction of the fourth thread of the gas pipeline with the capacity of 30 bcm. The pipeline with the length of 210 km and the cost estimated at \$800 million was to connect the existing system in the territory of Uzbekistan with the Tajikistan gas pipeline section, which is under construction. In March 2017, the company Uzbekneftegaz and the Chinese National Oil and Gas Corporation postponed the implementation of the project for an indefinite period. The change in plans for increasing the throughput capacity of the pipeline is indicative of China adjusting its energy policy, as well as Beijing’s diminishing interests in importing gas from Turkmenistan.

## The Pipeline Architecture: A New Stage

In 2015-2016, the countries of Central Asia and the neighboring states—China, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India returned to the discussion of the plans for the pipelines, which have been proposed in the 1990s. The increased interest in their realization was determined by the interest of the Central Asian states in the diversification of supply of hydrocarbon resources, as well as a change in the relations of Turkmenistan with Iran and Russia in the energy sphere.

The greatest attention in recent years has been focused on the pipeline project Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI), which “got old,” i.e. was not built, but not forgotten entirely. The history of this project goes back to the beginning of the 1990s, when the production of hydrocarbon resources was the focus of many countries and energy companies. Because of a diverse number of reasons, it was not completed.

Then, in 2015, Turkmenistan intensified the negotiating process by attempting to attract participants for this project. This direction of exports was viewed by Turkmenistan as a supplement for the Iranian and Chinese routes of supplying hydrocarbon resources that developed over the past two decades. In addition, Turkmenistan counted on the establishment of an alternative route for supplying its natural gas to China, the more so that India, which is regarded as the end customer, was interested in receiving additional volumes of natural gas. Thus, by construction of the gas pipeline, Turkmenistan was planning to diversify the supply of natural gas to external markets.

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<sup>2</sup> See: Yu. Barsukov, M. Korostikov, “Kitai perekhodit na gaz,” *Kommersant*, 19 January, 2017, p. 7.

Following the elaboration of a feasibility study of the project, Ashgabat began the engineering works on the path of the future pipeline. The exploration was conducted from the oil and gas fields of Galkynysh extending to the border with Afghanistan. The capacity of the pipeline, whose length is 1,800 km, would be 33 bcm. At the end of 2015, Turkmenistan solemnly celebrated the beginning of construction of the TAPI pipeline, whose worth was estimated at \$10 billion. In the created consortium of the project, the shares are distributed as follows: 51% belongs to Turkmenistan, with the rest belonging to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and foreign investors. In the beginning of the construction, Turkmenistan was faced with the shortage of financial resources. Ashgabat, in addition to funding the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline, required additional funds for the development of the gas pipeline Galkynysh. The bulk of the gas from Galkynysh is regarded as the source of financing for the TAPI gas pipeline.

The pipeline has the potential to change the balance of power in the region. Its implementation is fraught with difficulties, however. The problems, associated with the security of the future pipeline, are yet to be resolved. A part of its route passes through an unstable territory of Afghanistan. In addition, the pipeline is in direct competition with the pipeline Central Asia-China. Especially, since Beijing is maintaining the course of diversifying the routes for the exporters of energy resources.<sup>3</sup> China, by influencing the price of imported natural gas, has levers to influence the policy of Turkmenistan. As a result, the ambivalence of many of the issues has already had an impact on the pace of implementation of the project, which may not be completed before 2020.

The TAPI project is not in the interests of Iran, which is interested in the construction of its own pipeline, coming to India. The pipeline must pass the territory of Pakistan, bypassing the unstable Afghanistan. The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline is, therefore, a competitor to the TAPI project.

The lifting of sanctions, imposed on Iran by the Western countries in the 1990s, has led to adjustments in its energy policy, including the one concerning Central Asia. Iran intends to become a top supplier of natural gas to the West (Europe) and East (China). Its plans may affect the discussion and construction of new export routes.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, by the year 2021, Iran intends to export up to 80 bcm of gas that will increase the competition with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Especially, since Ashgabat is limited in the possibilities to increase the volumes of natural gas to Russia and Iran, and can focus only on the Chinese market.

In case of Iran's plans coming to fruition, the likelihood of the TAPI gas pipeline construction will become doubtful. Iran's geographical location is yet another benefit in its planned projects. Additionally, the proposed gas projects provide a secure venue for the export of hydrocarbon resources.

Along with the progress of the TAPI project, Ashgabat, until recently, has not refused negotiating with the EU, discussing the prospects for the export of its gas to the European market. In June 2015, based on the results of negotiations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the EU, the decision was adopted on establishing a permanent working group, which was to consider various options for the delivery of Turkmen gas to Europe. One of them was the construction of a Transcaspian pipeline on the seabed of the Caspian Sea.

The supply of gas to Europe was planned by the pipeline named "East-West". At the end of 2015, Turkmenistan concluded its construction, laying the pipe, with a length of 800 km and the ca-

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<sup>3</sup> See: *Strany SNG i Baltii v globalnoi politike Kitaa*, ed. by T.S. Guzenkova, T.M. Karpov, D.A. Alexandrov, Ya.A. Amelina, I.V. Ippolitov, V.B. Kashirin, A.I. Kucherenkov, D.S. Popov, A.N. Sytin, K.I. Tasits, S.V. Tikhonova, RISI, Moscow, 2013, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> At the end of July 2011, Iran, Iraq, and Syria signed a memorandum on construction of gas pipeline, going from the largest Iranian South Pars natural gas deposit to Europe. The pipeline was dubbed the "Islamic Pipeline," with the intended capacity of about 40 bcm of gas per year and the cost estimated at \$10 billion. The pipeline, with the length of 5,000 km, was designed to supply the Iranian natural gas to European countries across the Mediterranean Sea.

capacity of 30 bcm a year. Turkmenistan has been able to ensure the delivery of its gas, located in the eastern regions of the country, to the coast of the Caspian Sea and to link together its major deposit fields. Thus, Turkmenistan has created opportunities for the export of hydrocarbon resources to any location. However, the plans of Turkmenistan to export its natural gas to Europe in the coming years are unlikely to be realized. Iran is interested in exporting its own resources and will not consent for the Turkmen gas to be conveyed across its territory. The construction of the Transcaspian pipeline, which project is opposed by Russia and Iran, will also not be implemented.

## The Countries of Central Asia are Competing for Volumes of Production

One of the key factors affecting the promotion of pipeline projects by the Central Asian countries is the extracted and projected volumes of oil and natural gas. The efforts of the countries of the region, mainly Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are being directed to finding a solution to this issue.

For Kazakhstan, which has significant stocks of oil reserves, for a long time, the main task was the launch of the oil field Kashagan. The increased interest in the development of this project was determined by the absence of conditions to increase production from the existing fields, many of which have peaked their volumes of production. In recent years, the oil production in Kazakhstan has stabilized at 81-82 million tons of oil. In 2013, Kazakhstan has extracted 81.8 million tons, in 2014—80.1 million tons, in 2015, 79.5 million tons, in 2016—78 million tons.

The constant delays in oil production at this promising facility were caused by the lack of the necessary technology that would enable the crude oil extraction in the region of the Caspian Sea against the background of a high plate tectonic pressure and amid poor climatic conditions. The difficulties experienced by Kazakhstan in developing the Kashagan oil field have led to the revision of the forecast indicators on the production and export of hydrocarbon resources. Obviously, this fact obviated the need for the construction of new export pipelines for the supply of Kazakhstan hydrocarbons to external markets.

At the end of 2016, Kazakhstan began to extract crude oil from the Kashagan oil field on an industrial scale. The expected volume of production, in the year 2017, will reach from 6 to 7 million tons,<sup>5</sup> and in subsequent years, the volume of production will increase to up to 13 million tons of crude oil per year and up to 9 bcm of natural gas. This will allow Kazakhstan to build up its exports through the Western Kazakhstan-China pipeline.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, the total production may remain at the previous level, since the crude oil from Kashagan will compensate for the drop in the volumes from the older oil fields.

Simultaneously, with the growth of its oil production, Kazakhstan expects to increase its production and exports of natural gas. For the realization of this task, Kazakhstan built the gas pipeline Beineu-Bozoy-Shymkent with the length of 1,475 km. In 2016, the exported volume to China reached 2 bcm. In 2017, Kazakhstan will obtain 48.1 bcm, of which around 10 bcm will be sent to China.

<sup>5</sup> See: S. Bimanov, "Nevygodny Kashagan," *Kursiv* (Kazakhstan), 1 December, 2016.

<sup>6</sup> See: D. Bolekbaeva, I.F. Selivanova, "Osnovnye napravleniia vneshnei politiki Kazakhstana (1991-2015)," in: *Vneshniaia politika novykh nezavisimykh gosudarstv*, A collection, ed. by B.A. Shmelev, IE RAS, Moscow, 2015, p. 230.

A more stable situation seems to be with the extraction of gas in Turkmenistan. However, there are difficulties, which may impede the pace of its development. Despite the availability of the huge stocks of natural gas, the Galkynysh oil field is behind schedule in its exploration and production. The oil field was put into operation in 2013, and by 2020, it should have produced only 20 bcm. Therefore, the dramatic increase in the gas production in Turkmenistan is not about to happen. In addition, Turkmenistan will be obliged to take into account the difficulties with the export of gas to China, as well as the changes in the energy policy of Iran, which is becoming an Ashgabat's competitor in the gas market.

Limited opportunities to increase the volumes of gas supplies to China and the cessation of exports to Iran have increased the interest of Turkmenistan in resuming cooperation with Russia. At the end of 2016, Ashgabat proposed to revert to the project of the Caspian gas pipeline, which should have transported the Turkmen natural gas via Kazakhstan to Russia. However, Russia did not support the proposal of Turkmenistan, since the draft was previously linked to the participation of Russia in the construction of the East-West pipeline, while obtaining access to the Turkmenistan's gas deposits. Besides, Russia is not interested in the Turkmenistan's natural gas reserves.

### *Conclusion*

The hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia continue to remain in the center of attention of the states of the region. It is with their development and exporting to external markets that the Central Asian countries identify further development of their economies and the strengthening of political institutions. The ongoing efforts and the significant financial investment on the part of the Western oil and gas companies have enabled the countries of the region to increase the production of oil and gas. At the same time, the infusion of the Central Asian hydrocarbon resources into the external market has not happened. This was affected by technological difficulties, faced by the countries of Central Asia in the development of promising new fields, as well as the geographical remoteness of the countries of the region from the external markets. In spite of this, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which possess the largest stockpiles of hydrocarbons in Central Asia, continue to give high priority to this issue, not leaving the attempts to expand the scope of export routes.

In recent years the influence of neighboring states on the countries of Central Asia has increased. The policy of Russia, Iran, and China affected the pace of production of oil and gas, as well as the volume of export of hydrocarbon resources. The key role in this matter belongs to China, for which the transportation of hydrocarbon resources from the region remains one of the priorities.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, China views energy cooperation with the countries of the region through the prism of its own economic development and the long-term interests in the Eurasian space. So, in 2016, Turkmenistan exported to China about 30 bcm of gas, and this volume suits the Chinese side, which actually became a monopoly consumer of the Turkmen hydrocarbons. Accordingly, Beijing is not interested in increasing the volume of Turkmen gas imports, while export growth is of key importance for Ashgabat.

Laying the pipeline from Turkmenistan, China had violated the monopoly of Russia on the export of natural gas. It took a key position, acting as one of the major sources of investment, the service provider and the major buyer of hydrocarbon resources. In addition to establishing new infra-

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<sup>7</sup> See: *Transportnye koridory Evrazii: novye puti sotrudnichestva*, Documents of the International Conference (20 April, 2015), ed. by E.T. Karin, KISI under the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, 2015, p. 95.

structure of pipelines, China secured its geopolitical status in Central Asia by limiting the influence of Russia and the Western countries.

In the meantime, the projected gas pipelines, going from Turkmenistan and Iran can be considered only conditionally, since many problems remain. Turkmenistan may face the issue of the depletion of its major gas fields, which in the last decade provide the bulk of its natural gas. In addition, Turkmenistan will be forced to compete with Iran, which developed plans to increase exports of gas to Europe and China. Finally, in the coming years, Kazakhstan expects to increase gas deliveries to China.<sup>8</sup> In the end, it can be expected that the countries of Central Asia will pursue the competition for the right to deliver their hydrocarbons, needed by China and India.

The first phase of the geopolitical rivalry for the access to the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia and the choice of transportation routes for providing additional volumes of crude oil and natural gas, obtained by the countries of the region, has been completed. The choice was made in favor of the East—in the direction of China, while the European and American pipeline projects have not been completed.

In 2017-2018, the interest in the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia will continue and the countries of the region and their neighbors will be involved in the discussion of new projects to export hydrocarbon resources. So far, a final decision on many of the projects has not been reached, since the last word has not yet been said on their financing. In addition, there is no clarity with regard to the reliability and security for the supply of hydrocarbon resources from the Central Asian countries, and moreover, the Western states play a major role in the region. Finally, the projections of the volume of oil and gas, which are planned to be obtained by the countries of Central Asia, are still politicized. On the basis of the dynamics of the production of the crude oil and natural gas in the countries of the region in the last decade and bearing in mind the objective difficulties, faced by the countries of the region, it is expected that most of the planned pipelines may not be constructed before 2020. By then, the volume of hydrocarbon resources extracted by the countries of Central Asia will become apparent and it will be clear whether these volumes will be sufficient for filling the existing and planned export pipelines.

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<sup>8</sup> See: M. Elmesov, "Kazakhstan s 2017 goda planiruet eksportirovat gaz v Kitai," *Liter* (Kazakhstan), 20 February, 2017.

## POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENERGY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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### ABSTRACT

The global nature of international energy problems, their increasing politicization, as well as the objectively developed position of the Russian fuel and energy complex within the sphere of the world energy, have made the energy factor one of the key considerations of the Russian foreign policy. In the context of the deterioration of relations with the West, Russia needs other political and, more importantly, economic allies for further development of the State itself. For this very reason, the development of

the Russo-Chinese energy interaction is perceived as one of the dominant tasks of the foreign economic priorities for Russia and, incidentally, determines the relevance for this work. In this context, the paper intends to study the current conditions and constructive prospects of the energy dialog between Russia and China. In addition, the article considers the main directions and problems of the interaction between the Russian Federation and the PRC, by examining the key aspect in their relations—energy. The article notes

that recently, the parties have reached a number of large-scale and long-term agreements in the energy sector. This allows for considering the evolution of the energy coop-

eration between the Russian Federation and the PRC to become an opportunity for reaching a qualitatively new level and achieving strategic significance.

**KEYWORDS:** *Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, energy security, geopolitics, energy cooperation.*

## *Introduction*

The energy cooperation between Russia and China is one of the priorities of Russia's foreign energy policy. This is due to a number of factors, related to foreign economic activity of Russia in diversifying the energy transportation infrastructure, as well as strengthening China's role in the world energy market. Admittedly, China is one of the world's largest economies and an important strategic partner of Russia. The energy factor plays a significant role in cooperation between China and Russia. This is not only owing to the reciprocal volume of trade, but also the issue of energy security of both countries. China is one of the largest consumers of energy resources in the world, and Russia is one of the world's largest exporters.

Despite the development of the energy cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation, the problems with pricing and terms of agreements are often not quite clear, which elicit disputes in the energy sector. Such disputes are an integral part of the energy cooperation between China and Russia, and, in most cases, they arise because of political and economic issues. In the context of the globalization of the energy market, there are many opportunities inherent in the cooperation between China and Russia in the energy sector.

Between China and Russia, the largest importer and largest exporter of energy, there exists a certain reciprocity in many spheres of activity, which strengthens the energy security of both parties. China and Russia have a large and promising potential in the area of energy cooperation, and it has reached a new plateau after Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in 2013.

For example, in 2013, China became the largest trade partner of Russia, with a trade turnover, which rose by 1.7% to \$88.8 billion. Coupled with the achievements of previous years, it allows us to state unequivocally that energy cooperation has reached a completely new level. Indeed, the topic of energy involved at least eight signed documents during the visit. However, it is not only the quantitative indicators that are important. The parties also reached a number of landmark decisions<sup>1</sup>.

Then, on 22 March, 2013, in Moscow, a treaty was signed between the President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, and the RF President, Vladimir Putin, entitled the Joint Statement by the PRC and Russian Federation on Mutually Advantageous Cooperation and Deepening the Relationship of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction.<sup>2</sup> The joint statement stressed the revitalization of the energy cooperation between Russia and China, including the petroleum and natural gas sectors, as well as those of electricity, coal industry and the alternative sources of energy; the formation of strong relations within the strategic energy cooperation between Russia and China; joint efforts in fomenting the energy security for both parties, the region and the world as a whole.

<sup>1</sup> See: S.V. Uianaev, "Rossiisko-kitaiskoe energeticheskoe sotrudnichestvo: priznaki novogo 'urovnia'," *Kitai v mirovoi i regionalnoi politike. Istoria i sovremennost*, No. 18, 2013, p. 278.

<sup>2</sup> See: V.Ya. Portiakov, "Rossiisko-kitaiskie otnoshenia: sovremennoe sostoianie i perspektivy razvitiia," *Kitai v mirovoi i regionalnoi politike. Istoria i sovremennost*, No. 18, 2013, p. 7.

The head of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, emphasized that “the volume of exports of the natural gas will constitute 38 bcm of fuel per year; the agreement allows for the possibility of increasing the volume to 60 bcm.” For the transportation of said supply, an outlet extension will be built from the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. Rosneft and the CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) signed an agreement on the basic conditions of supplies to the PRC of crude oil on prepayment basis for a period of 25 years, as well as the contract on energy cooperation in the area of construction and operation of the refinery, Tianjin Company LTD. The two sides also signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of geological exploration, production and sale of hydrocarbons. The CNPC will cooperate with Rosneft on eight projects in Eastern Siberia, as well as on the shelf of the Barents Sea and in the Pechora basin.<sup>3</sup>

Commenting on the conclusion of the agreements, the President of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, confirmed the potential and magnitude of the transactions. The agreement on supplying China with petroleum will have a huge impact on the strengthening of the long-term strategic relations between China and Russia in the sphere of energy and will attract additional funding for exploration and mining. It will contribute to the development of the design and construction of the necessary energy infrastructure and will assist in the smooth distribution of crude oil of Rosneft in the long term, and also provide the company Rosneft with guaranteed sales of petroleum at market prices.

After the events in Ukraine in 2014, there began a period of Western sanctions that had both political and economic determinants, which further deepened the conflict between Russia and the West. China did not support the idea of imposing sanctions against Russia, which became another important factor in strengthening the Russo-Chinese economic cooperation.

In May 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Shanghai on an official visit, during which 46 agreements were signed on various areas of cooperation with China, including energy interaction. Among the first agreements concluded was the one concerning renewable sources of energy, i.e., on the issue of hydropower, between the OJSC RusHydro and Powerchina.<sup>4</sup>

In 2014-2015, a number of major joint projects were launched, including a 30-year contract for the supply of Russian natural gas to China between the Russian company, Gazprom, and the CNPC. The total supply, stipulated by this contract, is approximately 1.14 tcm, costing \$456 billion. The construction of the pipeline system, named the Power of Siberia, began in 2014, and is estimated at 800 billion rubles.<sup>5</sup>

In November 2014, at the APEC summit, held in Beijing, Vladimir Putin conducted negotiations with the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. During the talks, the parties arrived at a decision to construct an additional gas pipeline, the Power of Siberia-2, through which China, for the period of the next 30 years, will be receiving 30 bcm of natural gas per year from the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District.<sup>6</sup> Immediately after the Russian President's visit to Shanghai in 2014, Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation signed one of the biggest contracts among those concluded for the entire period of the Russo-Chinese energy cooperation. A contract, worth \$400 billion, involves the export of the Russian natural gas via the Eastern route, beginning in 2018. The contract is planned to be in force until the year 2044. According to this contract, the total amount of gas that needs to be delivered to China will reach 1,032 tcm.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See: “Rosneft’ zakliuchila riad soglashenii s kompaniiami Kitaia,” available at [<https://www.rosneft.ru/press/news/item/177461/>], 22 March, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> See: I.Yu. Frolova, “Vizit Putina v Shankhai otkryvaet novyi etap ukreplenia strategicheskogo partnerstva RF i KNR,” RISI, available at [<https://riss.ru/analytics/5688/>], 22 May, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> See: “Energeticheskaia strategiya Rossii na period do 2035,” available at [[http://www.energystrategy.ru/ab\\_ins/source/ES-2035\\_09\\_2015.pdf](http://www.energystrategy.ru/ab_ins/source/ES-2035_09_2015.pdf)], 2015.

<sup>6</sup> See: A.K. Izhbuldin, L.A. Platonov, “Analiz marshrutov postavok rosiiskogo truboprovodnogo gaza v Kitaim,” in: *Sbornik mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii “Energetika Rossii v XXI veke. Innovatsionnoe razvitie i upravlenie,”* Irkutsk, 2015, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> See: H. Zhang, Q. Penlyan, “Russian-Chinese Cooperation in the Energy Sector: Gaming Political and Geo-economic Influence,” *Journal of Shanghai University (Social Sciences)*, No. 1, 2015, p. 39.

Energy cooperation is one of the most important aspects in bilateral relations. The development of energy cooperation between China and Russia exerts a considerable influence on the world's energy security, since China has now become one of the largest consumers of energy resources in the world, with Russia as the largest exporter.

## Political Aspects

Considering the interest of Russia and China in the bilateral energy cooperation in the political aspect, it should be noted that the long-term strategic partnership of China and the Russian Federation is built on the basis of the Russo-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, adopted in Moscow on 23 April, 1997, which, in 2005, served as the catalyst for the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Order in the 21st Century.<sup>8</sup> The reason for the signing of the Declaration was rooted in the dissatisfaction of Moscow and Beijing with the domination of the U.S. in the global economic, financial, informational, cultural and military affairs.

After the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 and the Western sanctions, the Russian foreign policy shifted toward Asia. The so-called "turn to Asia" had three main objectives: (1) ensuring the energy security of Russia; (2) the development of the Far East and Siberia; (3) the strengthening of the role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, the recurring deterioration in the relations between Russia and the EU are likely to become the incentive for the signing of a contract between Russia and China on large shipments of the Russian natural gas to Beijing. This economic transaction, concluded during the visit of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, to Shanghai, has become a major issue in Big Politics. The signing of the contract had a wide resonance. There are at least three levels that can be ascribed to the impact of this deal on further developments. On a global level, the closer relations between Russia and China may have serious geopolitical consequences for the West. On the regional, Eurasian level, there could be a reduction of the dependence of the Russian Federation on Western customers, providing insurance from sanctions in the long run. On the country level, this is a mutually beneficial contract for Russia and China. The signing of the contract was very timely: Russia "saved face" politically, while China reiterated its "friendly neutrality" in relation to the Russian Federation. In the course of the visit to the PRC of the Russian President in May 2014, the foundation for the Eurasian prospects was laid, which cannot be now imagined without the close cooperation of Moscow and Beijing on the entire range of relationship issues between the states.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, after 2014, the relations between Russia and China began to progress at a rapid pace. As a result, a common understanding has been reached at the highest political level, which has increased the access of Chinese companies to Russian energy assets, allowed the People's Liberation Army of China to gain access to Russian military technologies, and expanded the use of Russian territories for infrastructure projects linking China to Europe. For its part, China has expanded credit for Russian energy corporations that supply it with petroleum and natural gas. China remains the main consumer of the Russian defense industry, helps Russia in the development and modernization of its infrastruc-

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<sup>8</sup> See: E.A. Karelina, "Perspektivnye napravleniia v razvitiu vneshnetorgovykh sviazei Rossii i Kitaia," *Kazanskaia nauka*, No. 4, 2011, p. 59.

<sup>9</sup> See: D. Trenin, "Aziatskaia politika Rossii: ot dvustoronnego podkhoda k globalnoi strategii," *Russie. Nei. Visions*, No. 94, 2016, p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> See: "Rossiisko-kitaiskii dialog: model 2016 goda," *Rossiiskii sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam, Doklad No. 25*, available at [[http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id\\_4=7733#top-content](http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=7733#top-content)], 30 May, 2016.

tures and shares some of its technologies. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing continue to coordinate their foreign policy on critical global issues, including at the level of the U.N. Security Council. It is also worth noting that in 2015, Beijing and Moscow agreed on correlating the project One Belt One Way with the strategy, concerning the Eurasian Economic Union.<sup>11</sup>

At the political level, it should be noted that energy cooperation is an important part of the practical cooperation of the two countries, as well as an important embodiment of the high-level segment in the comprehensive strategic interaction and partnership between China and Russia. For China, the completion of construction of oil and gas pipelines and the commencement of major energy supplies from Russia to the PRC play an important role in ensuring the energy security of China. For Russia, in the context of the crisis in Ukraine, the signing of a number of major intergovernmental agreements with China in the gas sector implies a high level of mutual trust. Energy cooperation between China and Russia has a solid legal base and corresponds to strategic interests of the energy security of the two countries.

## Economic Considerations

At the economic level, attention should be drawn to the fact that Russia is an important energy exporting country in the Far East, and China is a key economic partner with a fairly rapid economic growth.

Over the past 20 years, the energy sector of China has become one of the most important aspects of its economic development. The energy factor is important for the economy of China, which is at a crucial stage in the development of urbanization and industrialization, and for Russia, striving to make it a driver in its innovative economic development. The strategic partnership between China and Russia, in the sphere of energy, is combined with the foreign policy of China in the diversification of the sources of energy supplies. In that sense, the strengthening of the energy cooperation with Russia not only contributes to the creation of a system of energy security in the APR region, but also contributes to the global energy security.<sup>12</sup>

Energy cooperation between Russia and China is included in the prioritized considerations of foreign energy policies of the two countries and, to a considerable extent, determines the positive development of relations between Russia and China in the early twenty-first century, especially in the last decade. According to Stanislav Zhiznin, “it is linked to a number of political and economic factors and, primarily, to the linkage of strategic interests in many problems of the modern world’s economy and policy.”<sup>13</sup> It is important to note a substantial strengthening of interaction of the energy cooperation between Russia and China that may become a precursor to a strategic partnership.

Despite the fact that the trend toward active strategic cooperation is developing successfully, the issues of pricing and conditions of the agreement are often not clear and explicit, which raises problems. And such problems are an integral part of the strategic cooperation in the sphere of energy, which, in most cases is predicated on unstable political and vague commercial guidelines. It is important to note that the resulting energy disputes will not change the basic model for energy cooperation between China and the Russian Federation.

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<sup>11</sup> See: L. Han, “Perspektiva stykovki strategii ‘Odin poias—odin put’ i Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza,” *Upravlencheskoe konsultirovanie*, No. 11, 2015, p. 83.

<sup>12</sup> See: J. Rautava, “Russia’s Economic Policy and Russia-China Economic Relations,” in: *Russia-China Relations. Current State, Alternative Futures, and Implications for the West*, ed. by A. Moshes, M. Nojomen, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 2011, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> S.Z. Zhiznin, “Rossia i Kitai: problemy i perspektivy,” *Energoopolis*, No. 4, 2012, p. 56, available at [<http://uptek.ru/articles/1009-rossiya-i-kitay-problemy-i-perspektivy.html>].

In general, China's external energy strategy is based on two principles:


- (1) preventing conflicts between China and the exporting country; the relationship must be based entirely on conditions of mutual benefits and
- (2) a multipronged approach.<sup>14</sup>

The long and short of this approach is that the diversification of supply and transportation of energy implies simultaneous development of marine and continental transport, as well as running oil and gas pipelines from different countries and regions. These important principles are the basis of foreign concept of China to "go beyond," involving the implementation of an active regional energy policy, which has a diverse range of objectives.

In order to ensure the security of import deliveries, the Chinese Government has taken proactive measures to diversify its sources of energy. Today, China imports energy from more than 30 countries. Nevertheless, the key suppliers of oil remain the countries of the Middle East and Africa (see Fig. 1). In particular, in recent years, Angola has started cooperating with China in the energy sector. In the framework of the energy security of China, the Government is trying to diversify their sources of supply through foreign investment and the signing of long-term contracts. In 2013, the share of Middle East oil in the total volume of imported China petroleum constituted about 2,900,000 b/d (barrels per day). Oil supply from Africa to China was about 1,300,000 barrels per day, from North and South America—about 562,000 barrels, from the Asia-Pacific Region—about 129,000 barrels, and 736,000 barrels from other countries. The share of aggregate imports from the two countries that were the largest suppliers—Saudi Arabia and Angola—amounted to 33% of all oil imports to China. The import of petroleum from Russia amounted to 9% of all oil imports to China.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 1

China's Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2013



<sup>14</sup> See: J.Y.S. Cheng, "A Chinese View of China's Energy Security," *Journal of Contemporary China*, No. 17, 2008, p. 297.

<sup>15</sup> See: "China—Overview," EIA, available at [<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH>], 4 February, 2014.

According to an independent agency, EIA (see Table 1), since the 2014, the imports of Russian oil to China have increased significantly—by 36%. In 2014, the total amount of petroleum imports of China from Russia amounted to 30 million tons. As a result, the increase in the imported volumes of petroleum from Russia to the Chinese market makes it third largest supplier, after such traditional suppliers as Saudi Arabia and Angola.

Table 1

## Crude Oil Imports into China, 2014

Country	Share in China Imports, %
Saudi Arabia	16
Angola	13
Russia	11
Oman	10
Iraq	9
Iran	9
Venezuela	4
United Arab Emirates	4
Kuwait	3
Colombia	3
Congo	2
Brazil	2
Sudan (North+South)	2
Kazakhstan	2
Others	9

*Source:* *Crude Oil Imports into China, 2014*, available at [<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN>], 14 May, 2015.

According to the World's Top Exports (see Table 2), in 2015, the imports by China of the Russian crude oil increased by 5.7%. As a result, the revenue of Russia from the sale of oil to China in the year 2015, amounted to 17.2 billion dollars. This increase in the exported oil made Russia the second largest supplier of oil to the Chinese market after Saudi Arabia. The analysis of statistical data shows that there has been a gradual increase in the export of Russian oil to China. Concurrently, there has been a decline in oil imports from the countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

According to Stanislav Zhiznin: "...this concerns the diversification of the sources of energy supply and reduction in the growing dependence on the region of the Persian Gulf."<sup>16</sup> China proceeds from the need to actively develop the energy dialog with Russia. The delivery of energy resources from Russia, the strategic partner, may prove to be more reliable, in comparison with the supply of energy resources from other countries.

<sup>16</sup> S.Z. Zhiznin, op. cit.

Thus, ensuring energy security is an important aspect of the foreign policy interaction between China and Russia in the twenty-first century. After the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Government has been working on the Balanced Energy Strategic Policy. The essence of the energy policy of China is not to become too dependent on anyone's political or geopolitical influence.

Table 2

## Crude Oil Imports into China, 2015

Country	Worth (in billion U.S. Dollars)	Percentage Change in Value for Each Supplier since 2011, %
Saudi Arabia	20.8	-46.7
Russia	17.2	5.7
Angola	15.9	-35.9
Oman	14	1.1
Iraq	12.7	21.4
Iran	10.7	-50.8
Kuwait	5.7	-22.3
Brazil	5.3	8.6
United Arab Emirates	5.1	-7
Venezuela	5.1	-30.3
Colombia	3.1	92.2
Sudan (North+South)	2.9	-69.4
Congo	2.3	-46.9
Kazakhstan	1.9	-78.7
Australia	1	-69.4

*Source:* *Crude Oil Imports into China, 2015*, available at [<http://www.worldstopexports.com/crude-oil-imports-by-country/>], 14 March, 2017.

### Conclusion

Despite the controversy, the energy cooperation between Russia and China is developing vigorously. In that way, new contracts are signed; the joint Russo-Chinese work is conducted on finding new oil and natural gas fields in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. This cooperation is very beneficial to both China and Russia, since the Chinese side needs a stable supply of resources with the prospect of ever-increasing volumes, while the Russian side gets the new, highly promising market, which also helps to develop the eastern territories of the country. The prospects for bilateral cooperation in the energy sphere are generally favorable. This is the result of the congruent strategic interests of Russia and China in many foreign policy issues. From the economic point of view, one should be aware of the fact that the energy policy of Russia provides for the active development of the eastern vector and

a significant increase in the share of the APR countries in the export of energy resources. In this sense, China is the key partner. Its national economy, by many forecasts, in the next decade will continue to develop rather quickly. China enjoys political stability. According to last state five-year plan for stable progress of the Chinese economy, it is necessary to increase the imports of natural gas and oil, not jeopardizing the national fuel and energy security. In this context, Russia is the natural partner.

What is important is not only the stimulation of the energy trade, but also a mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of energy technologies and equipment. It is of a preeminent relevance in the view of the Russian leadership's strategy on modernization of the Russian economy and the improvement of its energy efficiency. An important part in that strategy may be that of encouraging the interpenetration of financial and economic groups of both countries, including in the field of fuel and energy.

The energy cooperation between Russia and China, despite some difficulties and problems, is developing successfully, which will contribute to the further development of the strategic partnership between the two countries in the economic and political spheres. For the implementation of this partnership, the mechanisms of energy cooperation are being formed and improved. The improvement and stimulation of the effectiveness of that cooperation may be achieved by broadening the constituency of the business communities of the two countries, including the framework of the energy dialog. This format should include participants not only from public but also private corporations. With that in mind, a permanent Sino-Russian Energy Forum could play an important role, with the support and participation of governmental institutions, leading companies and experts from both countries.

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## JAPAN AND WATER RESOURCES OF TAJIKISTAN: CONTRIBUTION, CHALLENGES, AND REALITIES

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### ABSTRACT

**G**lobal population growth increases the demand in water. The rational usage of water and efficient management are vital in various regions, including Central

Asia. The Tajikistan Government also takes this matter seriously and has designated the importance of water in the National Development Strategy 2030. The progress in the wa-

ter sector may impact human life and improve the living standard of the population. In this aspect, the Government of Tajikistan proposed to pay particular attention to the water issue and contribute to raising it globally.

Japan is greatly concerned over the increasingly severe water problems in the world, including issues of water hygiene. It has been implementing water projects in Tajikistan starting from the early years of Tajikistan's independence. Japan's attention to the water crisis in the Central Asian region

has increased because of the shrinking of the Aral Sea, the melting of glaciers, and the possibility of water usage of the Sarez Lake in Tajikistan. The Japanese authorities also understand the reasons for the confrontation among the states of the region over the water issue.

This paper focuses on the impact of the water sector on the development of Tajikistan. It also discusses the contribution of Japan to the water sector of Tajikistan, while exploring the challenges faced and obstacles met by the projects being implemented.

**KEYWORDS:** *Tajikistan, Japan, water, energy.*

## *Introduction*

The water reserves in Tajikistan rank the first in Central Asia with almost six percent of country's territory covered by glaciers. Over ninety percent of the country's electricity is generated at hydropower plants. Therefore, developing the water resource sector has been considered as a significant segment of Tajikistan's development strategy. In addition, the two major rivers, Amu Darya and Syr Darya, heading from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, feed the Aral Sea basin. Therefore, the water project and policy in these countries may cause a different reaction from the other Central Asian countries. The regional countries' growing contention over the water allocation has been taken place since the early years of their independence. However, the situation around this issue has been improved since the end of 2016, when the new President was elected in Uzbekistan. These projects yet officially have been criticized or supported, while the Government of Tajikistan keeps door open for negotiation.

Despite the importance of the transboundary water issues, this paper focuses on the water sector impact on the development of Tajikistan. The Government of Tajikistan has designated the importance of the water issue in the National Development Strategy 2030. The progress in the water sector may impact human life and improve the living standard of the population. The Government of Tajikistan uses its own resources and calls for international assistance to develop these projects. Among the international partners, Japan has been invited to contribute to several water projects. Some scholars analyze the Japanese Central Asian policy, including rendering assistance,<sup>1</sup> but they have not paid enough attention to the water and sanitation sectors. Ryota Saito cleared the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)'s activity in the water sector in Uzbekistan,<sup>2</sup> but the Japanese role in water-rich Tajikistan has not been paid enough attention before.

<sup>1</sup> See, for instance: L. Christopher, T. Uyama, T. Hirose, "Japan's Silkroad Diplomacy: Paving the Road Ahead," Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silkroad Studies Program, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> See: R. Saito, "Sustainable Water Management in Central Asia and the Role of Foreign Donors: Case Study of 'Water Management Improvement Project'," *Journal of Arid Land Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2015, pp. 137-140.

Japan provided Official Development Assistance (ODA) totaling \$1.6 billion annually to the international community for developing the water and sanitation sectors from 2010 to 2014. This amount is the first in the world.<sup>3</sup> The amount of financial assistance to the Central Asian water sector is not so great in the total sum of Japan's assistance, but Japan is among leaders, if we compare it with top donor states of the region's water development. In Tajikistan, Japan has been implementing water projects starting from the first days of independence.

This paper examines challenges and an outcome of the water projects supported by Japan, and defines the benefited areas of the projects for Tajikistani society.

## Water Resources for Sustainable Development of Tajikistan

Tajikistan's water reserves with 947 rivers and 1,300 lakes and a big proportion of glaciers ensure its hydropower potential estimated at 527 billion kWh per year, which is three times more than the current consumption of the regional states.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the country's hydropower potential, accessibility to the clean fresh drinking water and water supply for irrigation has a great significance.

The Government of Tajikistan proposed that special attention be paid to the water issue and contribution to raising it globally, this leading to the United Nations General Assembly declaring 2005-2015 the International Decade for Action "Water for Life."<sup>5</sup>

This initiative was necessary because of growing world's population that increases water demand. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006), if the international community does not regulate it, then by 2025 two-thirds of the world's population may live under water-stressed conditions. About 1.6 billion people, or almost one-quarter of the world's population, face economic water shortage where countries lack the necessary infrastructure to take water from rivers and aquifers.<sup>6</sup> Water scarcity became a major problem that many societies in this century may face. Currently, more than two billion people suffer from "water stress" around the world. "Ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all" is one of the major targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations.

Tajikistan's concern and involvement in the water issue entices global attention, organizing various events to raise world's awareness. In March 2003, the Japanese Government invited President Emomali Rakhmon to share the country's view on water problems and exchange ideas at the Third World's Water Forum in Kyoto, Japan. The wider discussion of the water issue continued during the International Forum on Fresh Water in Dushanbe from 29 August to 1 September, 2003.

During ten years (2005-2015) many conferences and meetings, relating to the water issue, were held worldwide.

In June 2015, Dushanbe hosted the high-level International Conference to evaluate the achievements of the Decade for Action and to begin looking at proposals for moving forward with the De-

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<sup>3</sup> See: M. Usami, "Deepening Water Problem and Japanese Science and Technology Diplomacy: Secure the Sustainable Water Resources and the Possibilities of International Cooperation," in: *Science, Technology and Japanese Foreign Policy*, [ed. by A. Sarkuragawa], Naigaishuppan, Tokyo, 2013, pp. 161-204 (in Japanese); *Water Resources in Japan*, MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan), 2016, pp. 118-119 (in Japanese), available at [[http://www.mlit.go.jp/tochimizushigen/mizsei/water\\_resources/contents/responding\\_to\\_international.html](http://www.mlit.go.jp/tochimizushigen/mizsei/water_resources/contents/responding_to_international.html)].

<sup>4</sup> See: "National Review of 'Towards a Green Economy in Tajikistan'," available at [[http://fsci.tj/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=295%3A--q-----q-20&catid=100%3A2013-11-21-10-44-02&Itemid=130&lang=en](http://fsci.tj/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=295%3A--q-----q-20&catid=100%3A2013-11-21-10-44-02&Itemid=130&lang=en)], 2012.

<sup>5</sup> See: Resolution A/RES/58/217 of December 2003.

<sup>6</sup> See: *Water Scarcity and the MDGs*, UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), 2006.

cade's work. The Declaration of the Conference (2015) acknowledges the importance of water cooperation across sectors and at all levels, including trans-boundary, as one of the conditions to achieve water-related goals, socioeconomic growth, and prosperity and public health. The President of Tajikistan announced a new "International Decade for Action" under the motto "Water for Sustainable Development," as an important tool for promoting the implementation of sustainable development goals relating to the water issue.

Also, the Government of Tajikistan had been initiating several dialogs and meetings with participation of the international and regional experts, indicating its flexibility and cooperativeness with respect to the neighboring states for the benefit and the sake of the region's development.

## Activeness in Central Asian Policy

Central Asia does not seem as the priority region for Japanese foreign policy, but Japan has an interest in cooperation with the Central Asian region. In 1997, Hashimoto Administration declared "Eurasian Diplomacy" focusing on Central Asia and Russia, and in 2004 introduced the multilateral program "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialog. The dialog has been designed as "a new framework for cooperation" and aims at "elevating the relations between Japan and Central Asia to a new level."<sup>7</sup> Japan and five Central Asian countries regularly hold the meeting of dialog, and the European Union, South Korea and the United States established the same style multilateral mechanisms in 2007 and after.<sup>8</sup> These follow-up activities by the Western countries ensure the positiveness of Japanese engagement in the region as its cooperation is expanding accordingly.

Why has Japan been involved in Central Asia? There are two reasons why Japan's Central Asian policy aims to strengthen economic links with the energy-rich region—balancing against China and the desire to see more diversity of interest in Central Asia.<sup>9</sup> While understanding very well that importing natural resources from landlocked Central Asia is tough and reasonable, Japan would like to diversify its energy import by considering Central Asians' natural resources. In addition to gas and oil resources, there are other sectors of interest, such as water and its management in the region.

Japanese interest in the water sector has several explanations. First, according to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Japanese importing foods consumes tens of billions of cubic meters of water per year. Moreover, as Japan is dependent on import of many goods, including food, increasingly serious water problems in the world are of great concern to Japan.<sup>10</sup>

In December 2006, Japan initiated to declare the year 2008 as the International Year of Sanitation to raise people's awareness of sanitation concerning lavatories and sewage disposal, where sluggish improvement has been pointed out.<sup>11</sup> Experts and officials in Japan have agreed that it is necessary for Japan to pay more attention to and be more active in the global water issue. The Japanese

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<sup>7</sup> MOFA, "Joint Statement 'Central Asia + Japan' Dialog/Foreign Ministers' Meeting—Relations between Japan and Central Asia as They Enter a New Era," Astana, 28 August, 2004, available at [<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/dialogue/joint0408.pdf>], 2004.

<sup>8</sup> In 2007, the European Union adopted "The European Union and Central Asia: The New Partnership in Action" strategy, South Korea established the "Republic of Korea-Central Asia" Forum in 2007, and the United States created "C5 plus 1" in 2015.

<sup>9</sup> See: S. Ramani, "Japan's Strategy for Central Asia," *The Diplomat*, 30 July, 2015.

<sup>10</sup> See: "Water Resources in Japan," MLIT, 2015, available at [[http://www.mlit.go.jp/tochimizushigen/mizsei/water\\_resources/contents/responding\\_to\\_international.html](http://www.mlit.go.jp/tochimizushigen/mizsei/water_resources/contents/responding_to_international.html)], 5 March, 2016.

<sup>11</sup> See: *Ibidem*.

Government provided ODA with as much as \$2.1 billion annually for developing the water sector including hydropower, irrigation, flood control and water policy from 2010 to 2014.<sup>12</sup>

As far as Central Asia is concerned, Japan understands the importance of the water problem within this region. Japanese attention to the water crisis in the area has increased because of the shrinking of the Aral Sea, the melting of glaciers and the possibility of water usage of the Sarez Lake in Tajikistan.

The population in Central Asia increased from 20 million in 1956 to 65 million in 2013 that also raised the water demand. If the water problem is not resolved, it may cause a political and social crisis in the region. For the region, the peace, stability, and development completely depend on the availability of water resources and well-established international cooperation.<sup>13</sup>

Japan has the willingness to explore cooperation in such sectors as the stable energy supply by the hydroelectric power and its export, improvement of sanitation by securing safe water, the productivity of agriculture by improving the irrigation system, which relate to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Tajikistan.<sup>14</sup> In reality, Japan participated in sanitation and irrigation system improvement and supported the rehabilitation of transmission station. The complex situation over the water allocation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan estranges Japan from participation in the development of the hydropower plants.

## Japanese Water Projects in Tajikistan: Not Hydropower but Sanitation

In Tajikistan, about 58.5% of the population has access to the clean water, and more than 30% has the better sanitary condition; in the major cities and towns, 93% of the population has access to the safe drinking water.<sup>15</sup>

During the last five years, the Government of Tajikistan has conducted fifteen strategies and programs and spent about \$500 million, in order to improve water access within the country.<sup>16</sup> This strategy significantly improved the water sector, however the water irrigation and supply system in some regions and villages is still in need of reforms.

According to JICA (2012), in the rural areas, the centralized drinking water is available only to 20% of the population and the others fetch water from the various sources (springs, wells with hand pumps, channels, and precipitations) that do not have a sufficient level of hygiene. To improve the access to clean water in vulnerable areas, the related institutions in Tajikistan, with the support of the government and international funding institutions, develop various programs and projects.

For example, the projects in Hamadoni (Phase I & II) and Panj districts of the Khatlon Region aimed to improve a water supply system has benefited the local citizens.

The Khatlon Region and the Badakhshoni Kuhi Autonomous Region, bordering on Afghanistan, are the main targeted areas of Japanese development projects. The purpose of the water projects in rural Tajikistan is to improve clean water access, reduce the risk of any waterborne diseases in the communities, and efficiently execute the groundwater development.

<sup>12</sup> See: "Heisei 28 Nendoban Nihon no Mizushigen no Genkyo," MLIT, 2016. P. 118—119.

<sup>13</sup> See: S. Rakhimov, "Tajikistan: Turn Water into Cooperation," *The European Times*, 11 February, 2014.

<sup>14</sup> See: K. Takemi, "Statement Presented at the Dushanbe International Fresh Water Forum," Dushanbe, 30 August, 2003.

<sup>15</sup> See: *Inclusive and Dynamic Development*, JICA, 2012. JICA representative office in Tajikistan.

<sup>16</sup> See: *Jumhuriyat*, 22 August, 2013.

The project activities are to construct boreholes, establish a water supply network system (submersible pump facilities, a high-elevated water tank, a well pump control house, piping and appurtenance facilities, water distribution facilities and etc.), and enhance the capacity of operation and maintenance of water supply facilities. It also aims to train the local engineers, who can continue their specialization by acknowledging the modern techniques.

## Obstacles and Realities

There are several challenges of these projects. First of all, their cost: Japanese equipment and technologies usually brought to the projects are expensive. The sufficient part of grant is allocated for the high-cost equipment (from Japan) and experts' salaries, while instead consuming European, Russian, Korean or Iranian made technologies that are comparatively cheaper and widely available in most of the local shops may save some money. In addition, when it comes to expiration dates the parts have to be changed frequently and most of these technologies require Japanese-made parts, which are costly. Local governments cannot afford those parts to be frequently changed, which may cause project facilities to be left unused after several years.

Secondly: the time efficiency. It may need longer time to purchase equipment from Japan than to buy it in the local market. To purchase Japanese machinery, the local shops primarily receive an order from the customers and deliver the machinery within 1-3 months. It means that if a problem occurs in the water system and without immediate reaction (changing parts), it may cause greater damage.

Thirdly: the insufficient training. Not all of these projects have envisaged the long-term staff training. For most of the local engineers, the 1-2 months of training may not be enough, as Japanese technologies rarely had been used during their basic education at the local institutions.

Fourth: lack of managerial training. Most of the managers were educated in the Soviet period. They may dislike learning new technologies and will prefer that a younger generation learn and attend courses. However, when it comes to the decision-making process, the leadership/managers are rarely listening to their younger staff.

Fifth: lack of monitoring. Monitoring is a significant segment of managerial responsibility. Regular monitoring may control the activity and prolong project operation. Not all conducted projects envisage a long-lasting monitoring process carried out by the local and international experts.

## Toward the Wider International Cooperation over the Water Resources

Most of the Japanese supported water projects in Tajikistan relate to the internal improvement of the water sector. There are other projects that are in need of bigger investment, which could impact the sustainable development of both Tajikistan and the neighboring states. The projects, such as Rogun and Dashtijun hydropower plants, as well as CASA-1000, are among those projects that could stabilize electricity access in the most of Central Asians states and will be able to export the excess energy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are facing the shortage of electricity in the winter season, the citizens of the rural areas daily in the autumn-winter seasons have been receiving limited hours of electricity. It also affects hospitals and schools. In

Uzbekistan, blackouts occur for 2-6 hours a day in both small rural settlements and big cities, including the capital city of Tashkent.<sup>17</sup> Uzbekistan is not anymore able to independently provide its population with the uninterrupted and adequate supply of electricity. Therefore, it is obliged to request it from their neighbors.<sup>18</sup> In Tajikistan, the rehabilitation of Nurek Dam and operation of Sangtuda hydropower plants contributed significantly to strengthening the electricity supply. However, seasoning blackouts are still happening in the autumn-winter period, when the country has the lowest level of energy production. The constant power supply is one of the important developmental aspects of Tajikistan's industrial sector, which affects the living standard of the population. The main objectives of the National Development Strategy 2030 are to ensure energy security of the people, enlarge energy potential from 17 to 45 billion kWh per year, and increase export of electricity up to 10 billion kWh.

For Japan, participating in the giant and strategic projects, such as the Rogun Hydropower Plant, the least costly project<sup>19</sup> to produce sufficient electricity in order to solve the electricity problem in the region, could reaffirm its support for green energy policy. As a country suffered from a nuclear power station, such as Fukushima, Japan has been promoting green energy through various projects, such as solar and wind power. Backup of the project, such as Rogun, may strengthen the Japanese role in Central Asia, as well as in South Asia, contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, Japan abjures participation in the major water projects, including CASA-1000. The main reason is the dispute over the major water projects among the states of the region. As represented by the "Central Asia plus Japan" dialog, Japanese Central Asian policy aims rather to promote the regional cooperation. On the other hand, by not participating in the pivotal projects, Japan moderates its geopolitical ambition in this region. This also contradicts Japan's early statement that it prefers to see Central Asian economies diversified. For Tajikistan, increasing economic resilience and reducing reliance on the main trade partners—Russia and China depend on the diversification of the economy, primarily in such sectors as the production and export of energy.

The Japanese water projects are certainly necessary to address human security, however, they have less impact on the entire population of the country. Their features are to solve the water issue of the giving districts or villages or to set up the eco-energy of a single hospital or school building, while the projects such as Sangtuda I and II funded by the governments of Russia and Iran have been affecting a wider proportion of population.

Also, Japan's main rival in the region, China, has been extending its influence in Tajikistan. It also invested in the sector of clean energy. A Chinese company completed the construction of the first 100 MW phase of the Dushanbe-II thermal power station.<sup>20</sup> The completion of this project intends to improve electricity supply in Dushanbe. All these examples show that at this stage, only bigger and strategic investments may strengthen the Japanese role in the country.

Tajikistan currently produces 95% of its electricity through hydropower (clean energy). Japan is the main promoter of clean energy, and according to Prime Minister Abe (2015), Japan has the intention to build a high-quality electric power transportation infrastructure in the region.

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<sup>17</sup> See: A. Tchen, "Uzbekistan: The New Face of Energy Poverty in Uzbekistan," *The PULS I*, 29 September, 2014, available at [<http://pulsocentralasia.org/2014/09/29/uzbekistan-the-new-face-of-energy-poverty-in-uzbekistan-2/>].

<sup>18</sup> See: F. Aminjonov, "Vlasti Uzbekistana skoro budut vynuzhdeny peresmotret mnenie o krupnykh GES," available at [<http://www.dialog.tj/news/farkhod-aminzhonov-vlasti-uzbekistana-skorom-budut-vynuzhdeny-peresmotret-mnenie-o-krupnykh-ges>], 11 May, 2016.

<sup>19</sup> See: "Techno-Economic Assessment Study for Rogun Hydroelectric Construction," The World Bank, 2014. P. 002378 RP 64.

<sup>20</sup> See: U. Usmonzoda, "The Wordfolio," 17 May, 2016, available at [<http://www.theworldfolio.com/interviews/usmonali-uzmonzoda-ministry-of-energy-and-water-resources-of-the-republic-of-tajikistan/3327/>].

### *Conclusion*

Japan is greatly concerned over the increasingly severe water problems in the world, including the issues of water hygiene. Japan's attention to the water crisis in the Central Asian region has increased because of the disappearance of the Aral Sea, the melting of glaciers and the possibility of water usage of the Sarez Lake. Japan has been participating in the water sector development of Tajikistan. Most of the projects, aimed to develop a domestic water supply system and to improve clean water access, envisage reducing the risk of any waterborne diseases in the communities. On the one hand, not all of these projects are continuously operating after the projects handover. The challenges they face are the high cost of parts, insufficient training and lack of monitoring. There are other strategic projects (Rogun Hydropower Plant and CASA-1000) that the Government of Tajikistan would like Japan to join. These projects promise to significantly improve sustainable development of Tajikistan and stabilize the energy supply in the neighboring states. The implementation of these projects invites major contradictions among the states of the region, which averts Japanese investment. On the other hand, the participation of Japan in strategic projects that could strengthen its role in Tajikistan and the entire region depends on the future development of the relationship between the neighboring states.

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## RELIGION IN SOCIETY

### **SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS OF RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS: HOW IT EMERGED AND HOW TO OPPOSE IT**

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## ABSTRACT

**T**he authors compare and analyze the social, political and religious situation in the Central Asian countries and the predominantly Muslim regions of the Caucasus. They study the factors that contribute to the emergence of religious and political extremism in these areas; trace down the connection between religious extremism in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia and terrorism on the global scale; generalize information about terrorist organizations, operating in Central Asia and the Caucasus, obtained from open sources; identify the social, demographic, ethnic and political factors that make religious and political extremists out of local Muslims, the methods used by transnational terrorism to catch migrants

and young people into their nets. The authors specify the relevant terms, relying on what experts in religious studies and Islam have to say about extremism and terrorism, including Islamic terrorism; reveal the internal contradictions in Islam and discuss different or even contradictory understanding and interpretations of different Islamic trends.

They outline the ways and means, used to oppose religious and political extremism in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in order to identify recruiters and prevent terrorist attacks, and arrive at the conclusion that the world community should fight the threats of religious and political extremism and terrorism together.

**KEYWORDS:** *religious and political extremism, terrorism, Daesh, recruitment, Wahhabism, radical Islam, the Hanafi tradition of Sunni Islam.*

## *Introduction*

For decades, the academic community has been studying the problem of extremism and terrorism, the fact amply confirmed by an impressive number of relevant publications. The last years of the 20th and the first years of the 21st century saw a revival of religious feelings in Russia and across the post-Soviet space. The revived interest in traditional<sup>1</sup> Islam served as the background for the Islamic vector of religious and political extremism; its scope and influence on big population groups make it much more impressive than other types of extremism known today. One can agree with Paul

<sup>1</sup> The term is used mainly by Russian experts in religious studies.

Ricœur who wrote in his *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics* that misinterpreted, “any monotheistic religion may trigger violent expansion and suppression of those who think differently.”<sup>2</sup>

Political scientist Rashid Emirov is convinced that Islam, as any other religion, for that matter, comes to the fore at the turning points of history of any country or nation. In fact, history has taught us that in times of troubles religion might become radicalized or assume extremist forms.<sup>3</sup> Mukhtar Iakhiaev is of the same opinion: “Religious extremism is revived in times of transition; it is caused by the crisis of traditional religions and the emergence of new religious forms.”<sup>4</sup> Erich Soloviev has written that Islamic ideological extremism became a revolutionary ideology that not merely declared that the “Crusaders,” Jews and their retinue (the local secular rulers) should be evicted, but strives to re-divide the world in favor of the Islamic ummah.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ideology of communism and internationalism along with it, deprived the polyethnic communities, in which Islam was tacitly accepted as an identity marker, of a powerful regulatory instrument of national and confessional relationships. The ideological vacuum was filled with Islamic ideology that never distinguished people by ethnic affiliation and that, as many believed, could play a unifying role in the regions, replete with Muslims. Inspired by what was called “the parade of sovereignties” in the parlance of the 1990s, these trends intensified in the post-Soviet republics with the predominantly Muslim populations (in the republics of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, etc.).

The ideological doctrine of Islam makes Islamic extremism and terrorism, as its consequence, highly dangerous for any society. The phenomenon of international terrorism is directly related to religious globalization and its effects, the mounting internationalization of religious extremism related to Islam in particular. Erik Soloviev has written in this respect: “Terrorist organizations have more or less easily adjusted themselves to the changing world, its porous borders and diluted territorial sovereignties. They have already mastered new organizational skills and methods; have mastered the rapidly developing communication and information technologies, which allowed them to gather a lot of influence.”<sup>5</sup>

## Methods and Materials

Islamist religious and political extremism can be described as a religious and political phenomenon that opposes the state by utilizing illegal methods, based on the idea of the Caliphate.

Today, Russia, along with Western Europe and the Near East, is especially vulnerable to terrorist activities of Islamist groups. In Russia, the terrorist threat is most real in the republics of the Northern Caucasus, where an undeclared war is in full swing: the regime of counterterrorist operation is declared from time to time in the republics, where fighters are hunted down and liquidated in the course of special operations. Today, the level of terrorist threat in these republics is the same as in Iraq, Syria and Libya, yet as distinct from these countries, where the common people are the main target, in the North Caucasian republics, terrorists focus on officials of all levels, policemen, businessmen and the clergy, the common people being not an exception.

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<sup>2</sup> P. Ricœur, *Konflikt interpretatsiy*, Akademicheskii proekt, Moscow, 2008, pp. 121-186 (see also: P. Ricœur, *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974).

<sup>3</sup> See: *Prioritety natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii na Severnom Kavkaze*, Moscow, 2011, pp. 86-106.

<sup>4</sup> M.Ia. Iakhiaev, “K voprosu ob ekstremizme v Islame,” *Islamovedenie*, No. 2, 2015, pp. 64-76.

<sup>5</sup> E. Soloviev, “Setevye organizatsii transnatsionalnogo terrorizma,” *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy*, No. 2 (5), Vol. 2, May-August 2004, pp. 71-83.

On 19 April, 2017, speaking at a meeting in Astrakhan, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the RF Security Council, said: “Thousands of men from the Northern Caucasus fight today in Iraq and Syria in the terrorist ranks. Those, who cooperate with the international terrorist organizations, are especially dangerous. According to the available information, there are nearly 2.7 thousand people from the Caucasian Federal District, fighting in Syria and Iraq.” He added that this was the result of the terrorist and extremist propaganda in the Northern Caucasus, that the terrorist threat and tensions in the Northern Caucasus region were high.<sup>6</sup>

K. Khanbabaev has written that radical Islam is spreading across the region due to the social and economic crisis that negatively affected the living standards of the local people; the ideological, spiritual and moral crisis; national tension; criminalization of everyday life, caused by the widespread corruption in the corridors of power; the corrupt officials, who are not punished and remain indifferent to the highly negative context in their republics; the geopolitical transformations in the region, and the very low level of authority of the clergy and the leaders of the republics.<sup>7</sup>

In his Ph.D. thesis, Denis Voiakovskiy has pointed to a specific feature of North Caucasian extremism and terrorism: the ideology of radical Islam has become a part of religious, ethnic and criminal terrorism, supported by similar international structures, which means that the North Caucasian extremism and terrorism, tagged as “Islamic,” are, in fact, quasi-Islamic.<sup>8</sup>

Today, seen against the background of the social and political problems of the Arab states and Afghanistan, radical Islam looks like the global threat of the twenty-first century. In Central Asia, it fills the ideological and political void, adds to the regional tension and has given rise to two religious extremist groups—Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan. The roots of religious extremism were identical in both regions: corruption at all levels of power, low and dropping living standards of the common people, power abuses and incompetency of regional leaders. At all times, the political role of Islam in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan was less important than in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, closely connected geographically and mentally with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, the latter two are the main source of religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia; suicide bombers and terrorists are trained in the camps, scattered across their territories.

In the 1990s, Saudi, Turkish, Egyptian and Pakistani emissaries poured into Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, earlier separated by the “iron curtain,” to draw young men into their religious schools and universities and to plant interpretations of Islam very different from the traditional Sunni Islam, practiced in the regions for centuries. In the Northern Caucasus, these extremist teachings and their followers concentrated in Chechnia, Dagestan and Ingushetia; in Central Asia, they found fertile soil in the Ferghana Valley, with its traditionally highly religious population, numerous mosques and a great attention to religious rites. Divided between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the valley was the center of political struggle in the best of times. The majority of local people live by the Shari‘a Law and are convinced that social problems can and should be settled through Islam: there is no chance to obtain one’s political rights through democratic institutions.<sup>9</sup>

Today, the Central Asian countries are ready for Islamization. Kazakhstan, with its high level of labor migration from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in which the positions of Islamism are especially strong, has come dangerously close to radicalization of Islam. In Tajikistan, Islamic forces

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<sup>6</sup> [<https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2265169.html>], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>7</sup> See: K.M. Khanbabaev, “Religiozno-politicheskiy ekstremizm na Severnom Kavkaze: obshchee i osobennoe,” *Islamovedenie*, No. 2, 2010, p. 80.

<sup>8</sup> See: D.S. Voiakovskiy, “Politicheskie proekty islamskogo ekstremizma v sovremennoy Rossii,” Author’s abstract of Ph.D. thesis, 2009, available at [<http://www.dissercat.com/content/politicheskie-proekty-islamskogo-ekstremizma-v-sovremennoi-rossii#ixzz4fUMWNGA7>], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>9</sup> See: R. Toksonalieva, “Radikalnye techeniya islama v stranakh Tsentralnoy Azii,” available at [<http://easttime.ru/analytics/tsentralnaya-aziya/radikalnye-techeniya-islama-v-stranakh-tsentralnoi-azii/5312>], 28 April, 2017.

caused a civil war; today the religious situation is far from simple; due to the unfavorable social and political context, the radical ideas are spreading across the republic very quickly. The situation in Kyrgyzstan is similar: today, radical religious organizations have become much more active and much more attractive for Muslims and people of other faiths. Ramakant Triverdi has suggested that “today Islamization is either a geopolitical instrument or a form of anti-modernization or a result of political incompetence and economic inefficiency.”<sup>10</sup> In his opinion, in Central Asia all these negative factors are present.

Certain parties and groups in Central Asia are connected with Islam or Islamist structures, based in other countries: Islom Loshkarlari (The Warriors of Islam), Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Islamic Liberation Party), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tabligi Jamaat, and others. Sergei Krivosheev, the veteran of the security structures, has pointed to Hizb ut-Tahrir as the most active among the terrorist organizations, operating in Central Asia and in Russia. It trains its fighters in Pakistan and dispatches them to Iraq and Syria to fight in the ISIS ranks (the organization banned in the RF). The failures of the IS (banned in Russia) in Syria forced Hizb ut-Tahrir to bring home (to Russia among other places) many of its fighters, where they recruit new supporters and organize terrorist acts.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the fact that the religious extremists in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia are not closely connected, they are very negative about the traditional Islam, practiced there for centuries. They insist that it should be replaced with their own interpretation of a correct Islam, based on “pure” Islam, without later additions and deviations, and also on a political system based on the idea of Caliphate and a legal system based on the Shari‘a Law (the Islamic code of laws).

In line with the Hanafi tradition of Sunni Islam that respects personal freedoms of each and every individual, Islam in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia was a peaceful religion that respected all other religions. Wahhabism, secretly promoted in the regions since the late 1970s, gradually undermined the Hanafi principles. It is wrong to think that the radical religious teachings appeared in Central Asia in post-Soviet times. According to Evgeni Egorov,<sup>12</sup> radically minded mullahs had been spreading their non-traditional ideas through Islamist networks when the Soviet Union was still alive and acquired even better chances in the form of well-organized extremist structures and trends, fighting state structures and regimes in the newly independent states.

## Results

In 2016, a Single List of Organizations, including foreign and international structures, recognized as terrorist under the laws of the Russian Federation and engaged in clandestine activities in Russia, was published.<sup>13</sup>

The doctrines of radicalism, interpreted not merely as Islamic but as the only correct, play an important, or even central, role in the ideology of contemporary radicalism. Their very specific practice, up to and including suicide terrorist acts, is adjusted to these pseudo-Islamic concepts. The extremist wing consists of organizations, groups and leaders, who rely on armed struggle (terrorism being one of the methods) to achieve their aims. This brings us back to the catastrophic events of the summer of 2016: the terrorist acts in a mall in Munich that killed 9 and wounded 21, a suicide bombing in Ansbach (Germany), the terrorist act in Nice (France) that killed no less than 80, the terrorist

<sup>10</sup> R. Triverdi, “Netraditsionnye ugrozy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii s tochki zreniia sravnitelnoy regionalnoy perspektivy,” *Sravnitelnaia politika*, No. 4, 2011, p. 112.

<sup>11</sup> [[https://ria.ru/radio\\_brief/20170419/1492592758.html](https://ria.ru/radio_brief/20170419/1492592758.html)], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>12</sup> See: E.N Egorov, “Islamskiy radikalizm v Tsentralnoy Azii: ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’ i Islamskoe dvizhenie Uzbekistana,” *Srednerusskiy vestnik obshchestvennykh nauk*, No. 3 (33), 2014, p. 189.

<sup>13</sup> [<http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm>], 28 April, 2017.

act in the St. Petersburg underground (Russia) on 3 April, 2017 that killed 14.<sup>14</sup> The number of terrorist acts all over the world is on the rise. The so-called Islamic State (IS or Daesh, an organization banned in Russia) claims responsibility for the majority of terrorist acts. One cannot but wonder: Who are these people and how do they get involved in this and similar organizations?

Table 1

## Organizations Recognized as Terrorist in the Russian Federation

No.	Name of the Organization	The Decision to Recognize the Organization as Terrorist and its Inclusion into the Single Federal List of Organizations, Recognized as Terrorist (as of 25 October, 2016)
1	The Supreme Military Majlisul Shura of the United Forces of Mojahedin of the Caucasus	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 14.02.2003 No. GKPI 03 116, enacted on 04.03.2003
2	The Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Daghestan	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 14.02.2003 No. GKPI 03 116, enacted on 04.03.2003
3	Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ihvan al-Muslimun)	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 14.02.2003 No. GKPI 03 116, enacted on 04.03.2003
4	The Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami)	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 14.02.2003 No. GKPI 03 116, enacted on 04.03.2003
5	Lashkar-e-Taiba	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 14.02.2003 No. GKPI 03 116, enacted on 04.03.2003
6	Islamic Party of Turkestan (former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan)	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 14.02.2003 No. GKPI 03 116, enacted on 04.03.2003
7	Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasian Emirate)	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 08.02.2010 No. GKPI 09-1715, enacted on 24.02.2010
8	Islamic State (other names: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham)	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 29.12.2014 No. AKPI 14-1424C, enacted on 13.02.2015
9	Jabhat al-Nusra (Victory Front) (other names: Jabhat Fatah al-Sham or The Front of Support of Great Syria)	Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 29.12.2014 No. AKPI 14-1424C, enacted on 13.02.2015

## Discussion

In 2015, the Russian special services identified about 3 thousand people across the country, suspected of fighting in the terrorist ranks in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. This figure was quoted by

<sup>14</sup> See: G.I. Gadjimuradova, "Protivodeystvie religioznomu ekstremizmu v svete migratsionnykh protsessov (na primere migratsionnogo krizisa v Germanii)," in: *Migratsionnye protsessy: problemy adaptatsii i integratsii migrantov: Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii*, ed. by Prof. V.S. Belozarov, SKFU Press, Stavropol, 2016, pp. 74-78.

the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia, Alexander Bortnikov, at a meeting of the heads of special services and law enforcement structures from 63 countries,<sup>15</sup> held in St. Petersburg. Citizens of some 80 countries, including those which belong to the SCO and also France, the U.K., Germany, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Canada fight on the side of terrorists. Religious extremism is actively promoted. Speaking at the summit of the CSTO on 15 September, 2015, its Secretary General Nikolai Bordiuzha, noted that within Operation Proxi, the CSTO had identified over 57 thousand sites, used to lure Central Asians into the Islamic State and other extremist organizations.

In fact, terrorist organizations have created an extremely efficient transnational network; the total number of agitators and recruiters of Daesh, scattered all over the world, is about 90 thousand. Agitation is carried out in 24 languages, Russian coming third after Arabic and English. According to special services, there are from 7.5 to 10 thousand Daesh recruiters operating in Russia.<sup>16</sup> The average age of the target group (which includes Central Asian labor migrants working in Russia<sup>17</sup>) is from 14 to 28. They operate through social networks, *Telegram* with about 100 million users being the most popular of them; it is especially popular in the Arab countries and Russia, where it was invented. Jihadists use it with increasing frequency for the purposes of propaganda and agitation. According to experts in information security, it is selected because of its highly reliable system of coding.

In an interview to *Parlamentskaia gazeta*,<sup>18</sup> Sergei Goncharov, President of the International Association of the veterans of Directorate "Alpha" of the FSB Special Purpose Center (an antiterrorist structure), revealed the details. There are groups that identify through the Internet young men, who exhibited their interest in Islam: they register as their friends in open social nets (Facebook, Instagram, etc.). Another group of "experts" specializes in brainwashing boys and girls in social networks, in order to persuade them to become fully involved. Recruiters join the game at the final stage: they are past masters of individual approaches. Girls are attracted by the prospect of marrying a strong, good-looking, charismatic and non-drinking into the bargain Muslim warrior. Boys are tempted by the prospect of wealth or the chance to become a hero. Young people are attracted by sacrificial heroism, in which individual lives are not valued. Varvara Karaulova, who made two attempts to join "the fighters of Allah" and was returned to Russia through the efforts of her parents and special services, is one of the examples.

Today, special services detain more and more Central Asian migrants, suspected of recruiting young men for military actions in Syria in the ranks of Daesh or of organizing terrorist acts in Russian cities. An Internet program, Laplace's Demon, created in 2015, to monitor and analyze extremist groups on Facebook, VKontakte, Live Journal and Twitter, is actively used to identify recruiters of the IS with good results: on 15 December, 2016, in the course of a special operation on the outskirts of Samara, the FSB arrested two citizens of one of the Central Asian republics, suspected of close cooperation with the Islamic State.<sup>19</sup> On 22 December, 2016, seven members of the Tabligi Jamaat religious group were detained in the Moscow Region; searches produced extremist literature, means of communication and electronic devices that contained information about the group's activities.<sup>20</sup> The terrorist organization, the Islamic State, assumed responsibility for the attack on a policeman in Nizhny Novgorod on 26 October, 2016. According to the information supplied by the FSB for the

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<sup>15</sup> See: I. Egorov, "Smertniki na eksport," *Rossiyskaia gazeta*, No. 165, 28 July, 2016.

<sup>16</sup> See: *Parlamentskaia gazeta*, 23-29 October, 2015, p. 38.

<sup>17</sup> See: S. Ryazantsev, I. Bogdanov, V. Dobrokhleb, A. Lukyanets, "Migration from Central Asian Countries to Russia and Kazakhstan in the Context of Integration Processes in the Eurasian Economic Union Format," *Central Asia and Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 39-49.

<sup>18</sup> See: *Parlamentskaia gazeta*, 23-29 October, 2015, p. 38.

<sup>19</sup> [<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3171371>], 26 April, 2017.

<sup>20</sup> [<https://ria.ru/incidents/20161222/1484353734.html>], 28 April, 2017.

Nizhniy Novgorod Region, the attack was carried out by people from Central Asia.<sup>21</sup> According to the Central Investigatory Committee, Akbarjon Jalilov,<sup>22</sup> another citizen of Russia, born in Kyrgyzstan, was responsible for the explosion in the St. Petersburg underground on 3 April, 2017. On 27 April, 2017, in Kaliningrad, 12 people from Central Asia were detained in the course of a special operation; it turned out that they belonged to the Islamic Jihad-Jamaat of Mojahedin international terrorist organization, banned in Russia, and probably functioned as recruiters for an international terrorist organization.<sup>23</sup>

Regrettably, the strongest players on the international scene are not prepared to close ranks with Russia in the face of international terrorism. The United States and Great Britain that had their share of terrorist attacks, today support organizations of dubious reputation, seeking their own purely mercantilist aims. This was amply confirmed by 59 cruise missiles fired at the Shayrat Airbase, used by the Syrian government forces, on 7 April, 2017 on an order of President Trump. The same fully applies to the cancelled visit to Russia by U.K. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, sanctions against Russia and other unfriendly or even provocative acts. The world community should stand up to the terrorist threat together; the financial flows to terrorist groups should be stemmed. This is easier said than done because transnational monetary flows are hard to follow in the absence of coordinated efforts at the level of interstate cooperation of the members of counterterrorist coalition.

## Conclusion

The tag “Islamic” can no longer be detached from the concepts of extremism and terrorism. The so-called Islamic extremism has already planted a negative image of Islam in people’s minds. The bloodthirsty Muslim fanatics involved in terrorist acts all over the world created an image of Islam as a violent and cruel religion guilty of murders and destruction. The term “Islamic extremism” is not quite correct. “In fact, we are talking about extremism that has selected Islam as its religious ideology.” At the same time, “Islam as a homogenous religion cannot be detached from politics. It has penetrated all forms of social consciousness, which means that from this point of view extremism can be Islamic.”<sup>24</sup>

Leonid Sjukijainen, an expert in Islam and Islamic studies, has pointed out that “the positive ideological potential of Islam” should be tapped to the full in the struggle against Islamic extremism. He has recommended “to transform the Muslim legal theory from an instrument of ideological mobilization into an ally of the state and to spearhead Islam against extremists.” He has also suggested that in the Islamic regions of Russia “individual achievements of the Muslim legal culture should be used to develop law and order in Russia according to the laws of Russia and the Russian Constitution and in full accordance with the principles of acting laws to strengthen the state and make the Muslim community more responsive to its policy.”<sup>25</sup> In his article “Islamskiy ekstremizm i Rossia” (Islamic Extremism and Russia) Alexander Katz suggests that Islam should be reformed through its “pacification,” which means that Islam has certain extremist traits: “We should reform Islam by removing from the Quran the calls to liquidate the unfaithful. This should be done by peaceful Muslims at their

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<sup>21</sup> [<http://morning-news.ru/2016/10/islamskoe-gosudarstvo-proyavilos-v-nizhnem-novgorode/>], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>22</sup> [<http://tass.ru/proisshestiya/4195732>], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>23</sup> See: “V Kaliningrade zaderzhali chlenov terroristicheskoy gruppirovki,” available at [<https://rg.ru/2017/04/27/v-kaliningrade-zaderzhali-12-chlenov-terroristicheskoy-gruppirovki.html>], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>24</sup> M.A. Bagliev, “Politicheskie aspekty sovremennoogo islamskogo ekstremizma (na primere Egipta),” available at [[http://planetadisser.com/see/dis\\_154460.html](http://planetadisser.com/see/dis_154460.html)], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> L.R. Sjukijainen, “O pravovykh sredstvakh borby s islamskim ekstremizmom i osnovnykh napravleniyakh gosudarstvennoy politiki v otnoshenii islama,” available at [[http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov\\_Buks/Islam/syk/prav\\_sred.php](http://www.gumer.info/bogoslov_Buks/Islam/syk/prav_sred.php)], 28 April, 2017.

worldwide congress. If this does not happen, the boomerang will hit those of the Islamic countries that generate terrorism, trains and finance fighters.”<sup>26</sup>

Sjukijainen and Khanbabaev are convinced that extremism under Islamic slogans is still alive not only because of the multitude of political, social, economic and national problems but thanks to its ideological basis oriented to the Islamic conception. So far, in Russia, people in power have not paid enough attention to the ideological and theoretical side of Islam. “As a result the Islamist conceptions are exploited by separatists, extremists and terrorists rather than by the Russian state. It is impossible to defuse the influence of Islamic radicals without including the positive ideological potential of Islam in the arsenal of state methods of antiterrorist struggle.”<sup>27</sup> All SCO members need political stability in the region, which means that they should coordinate their actions in order to identify the channels of recruitment, funding and illegal actions of radical extremists.

<sup>26</sup> A.S. Katz, “Islamskiy ekstremizm i Rossia,” available at [[http://samlib.ru/k/kac\\_a\\_s/islam.shtml](http://samlib.ru/k/kac_a_s/islam.shtml)], 28 April, 2017.

<sup>27</sup> L.R. Sjukijainen, “Musulmanskoe pravo i borba s mezhdunarodnym terrorizmom,” *Pravo i bezopasnost*, No. 3 (16), 2005, pp. 42-51; K.M. Khanbabaev, “Ideologicheskoe protivodeistvie ekstremizmu i terrorizmu v Rossii,” *Islamovedenie*, No. 2, 2011, p. 15.

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## ETHNOCULTURAL RESOURCE VS. RADICAL ISLAMISM IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

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### ABSTRACT

The authors analyze the phenomenon of the so-called radical Islamism, its forms and characteristics in the Northern Caucasus. The paper attempts to address its theoretical foundations, the relationship between Islam and Islamism, and

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reveals the divergence of the substantive aspects between the two.

Particular attention has been paid to the potentials of the traditional ethnic cul-

ture of the North Caucasian peoples as a means of opposing radicalism and extremism camouflaged under the cover of Islamic slogans.

**KEYWORDS:** *Islam, Islamism, politics, extremism, Wahhabism, folk culture, ethnocultural resource.*

## *Introduction*

The emergence and spread of radical Islamism in the region of the Northern Caucasus is a religious and political phenomenon in its own right, with its own specifics and organizational structure, ideology and all sorts of particularities. Not infrequently, what has been written about the correlation between Islam and Islamism so far, does not point to any differences between these two concepts, and regards them as equated. This happens when Muslims rise against colonialist policies and corrupt regimes for social justice, equality, etc. The theory and practice of such concepts are entirely wrong: the contexts of these phenomena are absolutely different.

Some authors prefer the term “radical Islam” that they define as “Islamic fundamentalism,” “Islamic extremism,” ditto “Islamism.”<sup>1</sup> This approach is, likewise, fairly ambiguous, since Islam cannot and should not be divided into “radical Islam” and “non-radical Islam”: there are no such gradations in Islam. It seems that Artur Sagadeev was right, when he wrote that the term “Islamic fundamentalism is highly and regrettably inaccurate and, practically in all cases, politically biased.”<sup>2</sup> He pointed out that “extremists, radicals, terrorists can be found everywhere ... but they are defined as such without pointing to their religious affiliation”.<sup>3</sup>

It should be said that different interpretations of Islamism are extremely vague when it comes to its dogmatic, ideological and political components, responsible for the highly varied interpretation of their content. Islamism can be moderate and radical. Muslims, who obey religious injunctions, but are unrelated either to religious or political activities, are described as moderate, while the Muslims, actively involved in religious and political processes (not infrequently, in their extreme forms up to and including acts of terror), are defined as non-moderate, or radical. This interpretation of Islamism can be found in Russian and Western Oriental studies that investigate political processes unfolding in Islam.

In the Northern Caucasus, the Wahhabis who are actively involved in political separatism and oppose local Islam in an effort to drive it to the periphery of social, cultural and religious life (this is especially prevalent in Chechnia) are described as Islamists. Their political agenda includes the “Caucasian Caliphate,” to be established as soon as the Russian Federation is squeezed out of the region. In the final analysis, this agenda (that can be described as openly Islamist) is responsible for the religious and national discord in the Northern Caucasus.

But nevertheless, much is being done in the region to oppose religious radicalism (including Islamism) by using political and legal instruments and the ethnocultural resource of the local peoples.

<sup>1</sup> A.A. Ignatenko, *Islam i politika*, Institute of Religion and Politics, Moscow, 2004, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> A. Sagadeev, “Islamskiy fundamentalizm: cho zhe eto takoe?” *Azia i Afrika segodnia*, No. 6, 1994, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

## Islamism: Theoretical Foundations

Radical Islamism, as a phenomenon, has been widely discussed in Russian and foreign political and Oriental studies; their content sometimes invites objections if not contention. John Esposito, a prominent American expert on Islam, has offered his interpretation: “The term fundamentalism evokes many images... For many this term is simply equated with radicalism, religious extremism, and terrorism.”<sup>4</sup> It may be applied to a very wide range of Islamic movements: to those, who took up arms to fight for the freedom of their country; to those, determined to set up the world caliphate. Moreover, “the ranks of Islamic fundamentalists include those who provide the much-needed services to the poor, such as schools, health clinics, and social welfare agencies.”<sup>5</sup> This means that the Islamic fundamentalism is a highly voluminous and diversified phenomenon that comprises not only radical but also all sorts of charitable activities of Muslims, Islamic organizations, movements and countries.

Zalman Levin has written: “The term ‘fundamentalism’ was coined by those Protestants, who refused to accept modern ideas in Protestantism and insisted that the Holy Scriptures should be understood and interpreted literally.”<sup>6</sup> Having borrowed the term from the Protestant religious culture and specified it as “Islamic,” politicians, journalists and academics muddled the idea of fundamentalism still more: “Recently, for some reason, fundamentalism and Islam have been more and more identified with terrorism and extremism.”<sup>7</sup>

John Esposito has written: “*Political Islam* and *Islamism* are more useful terms when referring to the role of Islam in politics.”<sup>8</sup> This means that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” cannot adequately describe the religious processes unfolding among Muslims. The two terms are instrumentally accurate, yet it is equally important to establish a correlation between them. The two options are logically possible—either their contexts are equated or intersecting. Esposito believes that they are equated: “Islamic fundamentalism, or political Islam, is rooted in a contemporary religious resurgence, which began in the late 1960s and has affected both the personal and public life of Muslims.”<sup>9</sup>

Boris Kliuchnikov writes about the extreme, radical trends in Islam—Islamism and extremism—that threaten the contemporary world. Contrary to his opinion, however, there are no such trends in Islam: all purely Islamic trends have been studied in detail and described. Kliuchnikov has not offered his definition of Islamism and extremism; he merely writes that Wahhabism, as an extremist Islamic trend, is the predecessor of contemporary Islamism.<sup>10</sup> Some pages later, he writes about extremist Islamists, the most vehement enemies of the West and Christian civilization that were used to fight “godless communism.”<sup>11</sup> He has never specified the details of their ideology and practice, and limited himself to general deliberations, without going into details of their nature and specifics.

Gilles Kepel, a French political scientist and Arabist, sounds much more specific. In his *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam* he has identified Islamism as a militant trend of Islam<sup>12</sup> and wrote that

<sup>4</sup> J. Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 59.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>6</sup> Z.I. Levin, “Preface,” in: *Fundamentalizm*, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Kraft Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>8</sup> J. Esposito, op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>10</sup> See: B. Kliuchnikov, *Islamizm, SShA i Evropa: Voyna obyavlena!*, Eksmo Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>12</sup> See: G. Kepel, *Jihad: Ekspansia ili zakat islamizma*, Ladomir, Moscow, 2004, p. 8.

“Qutbe’s contribution had been vital, along with that of two other figures, Mawlana Mawdidi (1903-1979) of Pakistan and Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) of Iran... While opposing the secular nationalism that had dominated the 1960s, they also rejected the view within traditional Islam that relegated political combat to a secondary concern.”<sup>13</sup>

From a strictly scientific point of view, the term “Islamic fundamentalism,” widely accepted in the West and Russia, does not clarify the meaning of the above-mentioned terms and makes it much harder to distinguish between the two. So far, nothing has been done to arrive at its clearer interpretation.

This means that the correlation between Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism needs theoretical and practical clarification. We are convinced that the terms are not equated. The Islamic fundamentalism can be described as the roots of Islam: *Usul al-Din*, the principles of religion. As is known, there are five basic pillars of Islam:

- (a) *Shahada* or *Al-Tawhid* as the belief in the oneness and unity of God;
- (b) *namaz*—establishing of the five daily Prayers (*Salah*);
- (c) fasting from dawn to dusk in the month of Ramadan (*Sawm*);
- (d) *zakāt* or alms-giving is a tax for the benefit of the poor or needy;
- (e) the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca during the month of Dhul Hijjah.

Islamic fundamentalism mainly analyzes the principles of Islam, the Koran and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad; it is engaged in the development of the theological system in strict conformity with its foundation. On that score, Salafism is also related to Islamic fundamentalism. Ignatenko believes that reversion to the foundations of Islam is called Salafism because of its formula—*al-Salaf al-Salih*, or the righteous predecessors.<sup>14</sup> Even though the supporters of Salafism insist that Muslims should obey Islam of the times of the Prophet and the righteous Caliphs, Islamic fundamentalism does not stem from the righteous predecessors—it stems from the principles of Islam (*Usul al-Din*).

In the Russian tradition of Islamic studies, including the works dedicated to Islamic involvement in political processes, there are no publications that specify Islamism, to say nothing of its exact interpretation. Islamic fundamentalism as the core of Islam with its very specific attribute can be hardly equated to Islamism, which is neither the Islamic fundamentalism nor Islam. It is a very specific political trend, related to spiritual, cultural and social phenomena, decorated with Islamic injunctions to make them look religious.

Gilles Kepel has offered an interesting comment: “The Brothers over the years developed a model for twentieth-century Islamist thought and action based on the work of the society’s founder, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949).”<sup>15</sup> Set up in the colonial epoch, the Society of the Muslim Brothers was banned in 1954 in Egypt by Nasser, founder of the Egyptian National State. The Brothers’ ideology and practice were radical; nobody ever described them as moderate either religiously or politically: they wanted to live and act according to the Koran, which they treated as the Constitution of the Muslims that allowed them to set up a social and political order, which they needed and believed to be necessary.

The leaders of the National States, set up by Muslims in the post-colonial period, could not accept this. Some were moving toward socialism, others, toward capitalism. The third group, the unde-

<sup>13</sup> See: G. Kepel, *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*, L.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, 2006, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup> See: A.A. Ignatenko, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>15</sup> G. Kepel, *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*, p. 27.

cided, tried to flirt with either the first or second group, while maintaining their old-fashioned social positions.

## Radical Islamism: Outcrops in the Northern Caucasus

The desire of certain Muslims to insist on their right to build mosques and open religious schools, as well as the emergence of Islamic movements and parties, determined to join political processes, unfolding in Russia, to run for the State Duma, etc., stirred up a lot of controversy about the resurgence and, later, radicalization of Islam.

The All-Union Islamic Revival Party, set up in 1990, to unite Muslims for an active involvement in elections and the U.S.S.R.'s political life in general, radicalized Islam. It became directly involved in political processes; there appeared political parties, ready to run for the State Duma. The authorities and the official Muslim clergy were suspicious, while, at a grass-roots level, members of the new party were known as Wahhabis. Malashenko is convinced that it was the Soviet special services that put the term into circulation to discredit the party members and their intention to join the political processes, unfolding in the country, where perestroika and glasnost were gaining momentum.

The party disappeared together with the Soviet Union, yet its regional structures were determined to hold their positions in the religious and political life of the Muslims of Central Asia, and in Russia (in the Volga Region and the Northern Caucasus, in particular). At first, the Wahhabis of the Northern Caucasus tried "to reform the local Islam and relieve it of all sorts of fallacies." Later, they gradually radicalized and moved from the intention to revise local Islam to adopting the idea of the Caucasian Caliphate, detaching the Caucasus from Russia, getting rid of the Russians (living in the region) before moving to complete Islamization of the rest of Russia's territory.

Much has been already written about the politicization and radicalization of Islam by V. Akaev, L. Bashirov, A. Ignatenko, A. Malashenko, I. Dobaev, K. Khanbabaev, and M. Iakhiaev<sup>16</sup>, who discussed different aspects of Islamism and the specifics of its functioning. Later, they concentrated on its radicalization, as well as the extremism and terrorism, perpetrated by the Wahhabis and Salafis, and activities of certain religious extremist organizations, banned in Russia. We have written a lot about the specifics of Islam in the context of the political processes in the Northern Caucasus, especially in Chechnia and Ingushetia.<sup>17</sup>

Unlike many of his colleagues, who limit themselves to the facts and assessments of the ideology and practice of Wahhabism and Salafism in the Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia, Igor Dobaev goes to the roots of Islamic radicalism, its evolution and practice. His book, in which he has pointed out that "in the last decade the public, international journalism and certain members of the academic community have recognized political Islam and extremist shoots of militant Islamism as

<sup>16</sup> See: V. Akaev, "Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Caucasus: Myth or Reality?" *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 3, 2000; L.A. Bashirov, *Islam v kontekste etnopoliticheskikh protsessov v sovremennoy Rossii*, RAGS Publishers, Moscow, 2008; A.A. Ignatenko, op. cit.; A. Malashenko, *Islamskaia alternativa i islamskiy proekt*, Moscow Carnegie Center, Ves Mir Publishers, Moscow, 2006; I.P. Dobaev, *Radikalizatsia islama v sovremennoy Rossii*, Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znaniia, Moscow, Rostov on Don, 2014; K.M. Khanbabaev, "Etapy rasprostraneniia vahhabizma v Dagestane. Tarikaty v Dagestane," in: *Alimy i uchenye protiv vahhabizma*, GUP Dagestanian Book Publishers, Makhachkala, 2001; *Religiozno-politicheskiy ekstremizm: sushchnost, prichiny, formy proiavleniia, puti preodoleniia*, ed. by Prof. M.Ia. Iakhiaev, Parnas, Moscow, 2011.

<sup>17</sup> See: V. Akaev, "Islam and Politics in Chechnia and Ingushetia," in: *Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by G. Yemelianova, First published 2010 by Routledge; V.Kh. Akaev, *Islam v Chechne*, Logos, Moscow, 2008.

Islamic fundamentalism<sup>18</sup> was positively received by the academic community. The author used the terms “political Islam,” “militant Islamism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” as synonyms. In fact, they are not synonymous at all. The same can be said about the terms Islamism, fundamentalism and Jihadism. It seems that we need a comprehensive and strictly scholarly analysis of the entire range of political problems, related to radicalism and Islam (so far absent from academic writings) to clarify their finest points.

In some of our recent publications we have clarified some of the relevant points.<sup>19</sup>

Today, students of Islam in Russia prefer to coin new and fairly vague terms, rather than clarify the essence of Islamism, fundamentalism, let alone Jihadism. Not infrequently, while trying to clarify the difference between them, Russian and foreign authors make their specific features indistinguishable.

Some scholars have gone even further to divide Islam into “old” and “new”; Western politicians have armed themselves with recent coinages: Islamofascism and Islamic terrorism, which suggest that Islam encourages terrorism and supports terrorists, which is wrong and cannot be accepted.

In the Northern Caucasus, on the other hand, the term Wahhabism has been used for many years to define radical Islamism. Starting in the 1990s, Wahhabism, with no roots in the region, has been actively involved in the religious and political processes of Islamic revival and re-Islamization, the phenomena covered by V. Akaev, A. Yarlykapov, A. Malashenko, A. Kisriev, and G. Zaurbekova in their works. They cited facts and offered assessments of Wahhabis’ activities in the region as those, which contradict the local Islamic traditions and stir up conflicts between local Islam and its imported versions and trends.<sup>20</sup> Perestroika and the Soviet Union’s disintegration destroyed the system that had protected the region against radicalism and extremism and opened the doors to all sorts of religious organizations, each wishing to pose as the only and most correct supporter of the “genuine Islam.”

This wave crushed folk cultures and destroyed traditions, cultural values and centuries-old achievements. No wonder, extremism, including religious extremism, was outlawed in the Northern Caucasus, while the region’s political and religious elite added vehemence to their struggle against Islamism.

## Mobilizing the Ethnocultural Resource

Neither religious radicalism and extremism nor the outcrops of radical Islamism, geared at religious and political destabilization of Muslim societies, can destroy the centuries-old traditions and ethnic values of the North Caucasian peoples firmly rooted in social life as the factors of resistance

<sup>18</sup> I.P. Dobaev, *Islamskiy radikalizm: genesis, evoliutsia, praktika*, SKNTs VSh Publishers, Rostov-on-Don, 2003, p. 30.

<sup>19</sup> See: V.Kh. Akaev, “Islamskie traditsii i novatsii v sovremennoy Rossii: protivorechivye proiavleniia,” *Gumanitarnye i sotsialno-ekonomicheskie nauki*, No. 1, 2016; V.Kh. Akaev, N.M. Vagabova, “Religiozno-politicheskiy ekstremizm v obshchestve: faktory determinatsii, dinamika i mery protivodeystviia,” *Gumanitarnye i sotsialno-ekonomicheskie nauki*, No. 6, 2016.

<sup>20</sup> See: V.Kh. Akaev, *Sufizm i Vahhabizm na Severnom Kavkaze. Konfrontatsia ili kompromiss?* Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography DNTs, RAS, Makhachkala, 1999; Idem, *Sufizm i Vahhabizm na Severnom Kavkaze*, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS, Moscow, 1999; A.A. Yarlykapov, *Problema Vahhabizma na Severnom Kavkaze*, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS, Moscow, 2000; A. Malashenko, *Islamskie orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza*, Moscow Carnegie Center, Gendalf, Moscow, 2001; G.V. Zaurbekova, *Vahhabizm v Chechnye*, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS, Moscow, 2003; E.F. Kisriev, *Islam i vlast v Dagestane*, OGI, Moscow, 2004.

to alien influences: those who support ethnic traditions also side with moderate religious and political ideas, secular laws and public order.

The traditional culture of the North Caucasian peoples can be used to oppose Islamic radicalism and extremism. Neither in the past nor today, consistently developing societies with ethnic values of their own, permitted or will permit extreme forms to dominate public and religious life of Muslims; local societies are undaunted by the facts of cruelty or even violence Wahhabism has never hesitated to use, while spreading far and wide in Daghestan, Chechnia, Ingushetia and Karachaevo-Cherkessia, to replace traditional ethnic values with religious practices and ideology of Wahhabism.

For many centuries, the North Caucasian peoples have been building the culture and practice of relationships of close political and spiritual interaction, mutual assistance and support. They invariably relied on people's diplomacy and cultural cooperation to settle internal conflicts. Today, the local society stands opposed to the extreme religious enjoinders, of which jihad is one and which the Wahhabis and Islamists are promoting in their attempts to move against the traditional ethnocultural values.

At all times, Islamists tried and are trying today to impose on the Muslim youth of the Northern Caucasus their alternative ideas about the world, divided into those, who profess the practice of the "correct" faith and others; about the world, as the scene of perpetual jihad waged for the sake of the final worldwide triumph of Islam, divided into those, who support all shades of black or all shades of white, and the corresponding philosophical attitudes. This connotes a retreat from the real world's diversity, from social and spiritual pluralism, leading toward religious extremism and terrorism under the cover of Islamic slogans.

Wahhabi activities in the Northern Caucasus is a vivid example of how extreme religious ideas ignore the region's anti-extremist sentiments and its past and present contexts, in which traditional ethnic values have been preserved.

This means that the Wahhabis' determination to impose their ideas on the region should be analyzed; the same fully applies to the susceptibility on the part of local youth to their propaganda. It seems that this happened because the Soviet ideological system had been first weakened and, later, destroyed. Wahhabism and religious radicalism moved into the void to promote, among the young people, their own ideas that had nothing in common with the local religious beliefs that have been taking shape for centuries of adaptation to social and political realities.

Muslim clerics and the political elites of the Northern Caucasus spare no effort to stem the spread of religious radicalism and extremism by relying on the region's ethnic and cultural resource and its moderate and integral nature. The highly moral, humanitarian and peaceful potential of the local customs and traditions, the historical and cultural values, key provisions of the people's diplomacy and mental attitudes of the North Caucasian peoples are tapped to the full to oppose radicalism and extremism.

## *Conclusion*

In their discussion, the authors proceed from the fact that radical Islamism, that has nothing to do with Islam, whose roots are well known and are neither radical nor extremist, should receive more attention of the academic community. Islam is not a religion of violence and terror: it is a philosophy and way of life, geared at avoiding extremes, achieving harmony between people, social groups and moderate lifestyle in a society or religious community.

Moderation (*wasatiyyah* in Arabic) is one of the important characteristics of Islam; it is its golden mean that rejects violence, hostage taking, highjacking, terrorist acts, etc. Islamism is a policy

of extremes, practiced by individuals and groups in an effort to justify their acts by Islamic slogans. They are not Muslims in the true sense of the word, who profess Islam as a religion of peace, creative efforts and moderation.

Islam, as the dominant religion in the traditional North Caucasian societies, and ethnic cultures are seen as part of the traditional way of life. Mutually adjusted they share local and regional specifics that set them apart from the Islamist “novelties.” This means that this ethnic resource is deeply rooted in the Northern Caucasus and that its skillful and active use makes it possible to minimize the impacts of religious and political extremism, and radicalism.

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## TERRORIST THREAT IN RUSSIA: TRANSFORMATION OF CONFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

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## A B S T R A C T

**P**olitical dynamism and the rapidly developing informational and communicative Russian environment have pushed to the forefront the political linguo-communicative technologies, which are increasingly and actively being used to control the communicative field in society, as well as the need for continuing the study of these technologies. They strongly affect the building up, organizing and orienting of political activities of people and do impose on them certain political preferences. This means that they can be and are repeatedly used to address certain political tasks.

The fast changes underway in Russia, the economic, political and social transformations presuppose that mass consciousness and political behavior of its population should change accordingly: people should adapt themselves to new conditions; they should abandon the old and embrace new values and behavior patterns.<sup>1</sup> As part of a political process, the religious factor becomes a social "siccativ" of sorts: it may stabilize or destabilize a political situation.

<sup>1</sup> See: I. Karabulatova, I. Mkrtumova, Z. Polivara, B. Akhmetova, S. Galiullina, E. Loskutova, E. Abylkasymov, "Protest Behavior of Present-Day Russian Youth as Ethnosocial Deviation in an Ethnopolitical Conflict-Prone Situation," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 94-103.

The subject we have discussed here is fairly urgent: the mechanisms and practices, used to politicize religion, should be identified for the sake of social stability and national security. Today, national security is further threatened by terrorism, proliferation of WMD, ethnic and religious conflicts, all sorts of pandemics, international crime, drug trafficking, etc. Having developed into a complicated, multifaceted and open system, national security has already spread to domestic policies, geopolitics and the economic, military, ethnic, regional, informational and other spheres. The current religious situation in Russia—new religious movements, the growing number of followers of traditional religions, as well as the radical Islam and religious terrorism, as new factors—added urgency to the need for understanding the fast and non-normative transformations of the religious scene. Terrorist ideology and terror, as its instrument, transform legal consciousness, lead to ideological and psychological distortions of legal values and the rule of law in general, and give rise to a new subculture, based on destruction and negation of the basic human values (legal thinking and ideology, legal institutions, economic order and business), rather than on protection of rights and freedoms, while ensuring adequate living standards.

**KEYWORDS:** *transformation, inter-confessional dialog, changing identities, terrorist threats.*

## *Introduction*

Extremist feelings spread rapidly in unfavorable social and economic conditions, inefficient legal forms of political competition, the absence of social mobility and a wide and widening gap between the rich and poor.

Today, modernization, unfolding against the background of demographic problems and the rapidly aging population, deepens social differentiation, changes confessional attitudes in today's

youth and leads to a crisis of its identity with predictable results: less social stability and security. On the whole, there is a direct correlation between the spatial dimensions of terrorist ideas in any state and the degree of political stability in it.<sup>2</sup>

Transformation of confessional attitudes, as a phenomenon, becomes especially important amid the rapidly unfolding religious changes and the resultant psychological changes of personality<sup>3</sup> and the changes in the social and political context of the country as a whole.<sup>4</sup>

Terrorist activities might be pursued with different aims and satisfy different requirements. This means that in view of the far from simple definition of terrorism as a term, we will rely on the following definition: terrorism is violence, used to intimidate and to consolidate certain social and political values.

Informational upheavals, an inevitable follow-up of tragic events, caused by confessional interaction and confrontation, affect the entire communicative field and the mechanisms of social dynamics.<sup>5</sup> It has become highly important to arrive at an acceptable and scientifically substantiated conclusion, related to the discourses of terrorist acts and reconstruction of social and cultural genesis of terrorism through its representations. Studies of terrorism, in the context of its emergence and its repercussions, give us a clearer idea about the prospects of the current changes and the ways and means by which the problems can be resolved. A highly contradictory phenomenon, globalization, creates very different, or even opposing, trends of integration and differentiation that can be regarded as two civilizational trends: the trend toward unification, on the one hand, and toward preservation of cultural specifics (including religious), on the other.

This makes our study of the non-normative changes of self-awareness, under the pressure of religious conversion in the context of terrorist threats, highly important.

## Methods and Materials

Transformations, underway in Russian society, have already suggested a new field of studies that so far lacks a language of its own and a set of categories, and also requires adequate approaches and methods. We have relied on the general scientific methods, used by the humanities—factual, systemic and structural-functional analysis—as well as the provisions and an analysis of the structure of state policies, and interaction of its components, found in the scholarly studies of Russian and foreign political scientists.

It is hard to arrive at a unified definition, because, unlike the politically unbiased scholars, state statistics demonstrate much more political biases in everything they convey. Not infrequently, the

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<sup>2</sup> See: I. Mkrtumova, I. Karabulatova, A. Zinchenko, "Political Extremism of the Youth as an Ethnosocial Deviation in the Post-Soviet Electronic Information Society," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 79-86.

<sup>3</sup> See: V. Poletaev, "Opasnye sviazi. Prigovor Karaulovoy priznan zakonnyim," 22 March, 2017, available at [<https://rg.ru/2017/03/22/verhovnyj-sud-ostavil-v-sile-prigovor-varvare-karauulovoj.html>], 3 June, 2017; G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, "Matrimonialnye strategii v polittekhologiiakh IGIL," *Nauchnoe obozrenie*, Series 2: Humanitarian Sciences, No. 6, 2016, pp. 69-79.

<sup>4</sup> See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

<sup>5</sup> See: "Napadenie v Notre Dame de Paris kvalifitsirovano kak terakt," 6 June, 2017, available at [<http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2896333>], 6 June 2017.

term “terrorism” is used not only to qualify certain actions, but also to express negative attitudes or even indignation.

Foreign researchers of terrorism, P. Jenkins, W. Laquer, M. Kronnenwetter, G. Martin, and B. Hoffman, rely on definitions that suit the language of their discussions: as a rule, laws of different countries support definitions that differ from the definitions used by foreign students of terrorism.

Dutch scholars, A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, offered a pioneering, sober and well-justified definition of terror, based on 109 definitions of various scholars and official definitions, used at the state level. They analyzed all of them and identified their main components and features. The results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

**Definition of the Main Components of the Term “Terrorism”  
(according to A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman)**

Element	Frequency (in %)
<b>Violence, force</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>Political aims</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Fear, terror emphasized; intimidation</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character of victims</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims</b>	<b>18</b>

*Source:* A.P. Schmid, A.J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*, Amsterdam, 1988.

This means that “violence, used for political purposes,” as well as “violence, used for intimidation,” can be described as inalienable elements of terrorism (or of its perception). At the same time, fear has become a convertible currency in a situation, in which security is at stake. This is best illustrated by the situation around Qatar.<sup>6</sup>

An analysis of the predetermined nature of the outcrops of terrorism at the individual level has led us to social and psychological conceptions that see the roots of terrorism in the behavior of individuals, who respond in this way to their marginal places in society.<sup>7</sup> L. Butovskaia, Th. Hobbes, G. Simmel, K. Lorenz, D. Myers, S. Freud, and E. Fromm have helped us to better understand the phenomenon of aggression.

The structural and functional prospects of the analysis of terrorism point to the importance of the postulates of functionalism (B. Malinovskiy, A. Radcliffe-Brown), Robert Merton’s conception

<sup>6</sup> See: “Okhota na milliard,” 6 July, 2017, available at [https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2017/06/06\_a\_10709579.shtml#page2], 7 July, 2017.

<sup>7</sup> See: M. Abrahms, “Deterring Terrorism: A New Strategy,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2014, available at [http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/344/html], 6 July, 2017.

of manifest functions and dysfunctions and Émile Durkheim's paradigm of social facts. At the same time, albeit absolutely necessary when it comes to the studies of terrorism and its manifestation, the above cannot fully explain the phenomenon and its repercussions.<sup>8</sup>

This article is based on the authors' analysis of changed behavior, the results of the polls conducted in Moscow and Ufa (sampling 300 people), analytical works of our Russian and foreign colleagues on political science, culturology, history, economics, political psycho-linguistics, anti-terrorist laws, publications in the media, documentary video materials, interviews of members of terrorist groups and their victims, who have avoided execution.

## Results

The ideology of terrorism can be defined as a distorted picture of reality, in which reality is turned upside down and which makes violence politically legal. Organized chaos and the systemic nature of acts of violence<sup>9</sup> are the most typical features of terrorism, pushing society into the quagmire of destabilization, despondency and fear. In April 2017, the Secretary of Russia's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said that nearly 2.7 thousand Russian citizens from the Northern Caucasus are fighting in Syria and Iraq in the terrorist ranks. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in June 2017, only five people joined the ISIS.<sup>10</sup>

From the behavioral point of view, it should be said that Islamists and ethnoreligious terrorist groups use methods of harsh personality coding. After the Taliban has been defeated, most of the Islamist groups limited their activities purely to terrorism, while groups, engaged in ethnic guerrilla struggle, rely on a much wider spectrum of methods of political struggle.<sup>11</sup>

In our analysis, we relied on the results, obtained through psychometric methodology that relied on quantitative indices to reveal the degrees of changes (from +3 to -3 where 0 is the absence of measurements) in the psychological state that described the meaning of life; self-assessments were used of the psychological state of the polled that relied on the degree to which this state corresponds (or does not correspond) to some or other characteristics. The state was described by adjectives related to the degree to which life can be described as meaningful. The results were processed statistically, according to the religiosity level (RL), to define an average index for the low, average and high RL. We then arrived at average values for the believers with the low, average and high RL. The results are shown in Table 2.

We relied on the paired version of Student's *t*-test to identify the level of the value of the differences between average figures of changes for the samplings with the low, average and high level of religiosity. The results are shown in Table 3.

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<sup>8</sup> G.G. Pocheptsov, *Propaganda i kontropaganda*, Tsentr Publishers, Moscow, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulatova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Postmodernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric", *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Issue 2, Vol. 17, 2016, pp. 61-69.

<sup>10</sup> See: "V Siriu s nachala 2017 goda uekhali piat chelovek," 7 June, 2017, available at [<https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/10145261.shtml>], 7 June, 2017.

<sup>11</sup> See: I. Karabulatova, "The Islamic Factor and the Political Processes in Tajikistan," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 118-123; M. Seidina, I. Karabulatova, Z. Polivara, A. Zinchenko, "A Publicist Discourse of the Islamic Organizations of the Central Federal District of Russia and the Issue of Tolerance," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 109-117.

Table 2

## Average Values of Changes for the Low, Average and High Religiosity Levels

	No.	Minimum	Maximum	Average	Standard (acceptable) deviation
Average values of changes for the high RL	50	1.56	2.76	2.0419	0.27630
Average values of changes for the average RL	52	1.33	2.28	1.7298	0.21787
Average values of changes for the low RL	50	1.29	2.21	1.5998	0.20602

Table 3

## Results of Comparison of Average Values of the Indices of Changes

		<i>t</i> (Time Used for Analysis)	The Degree of Interconnection of the Changes of Indices of Meaningfulness of Life	Value (Two-Tailed)
Pair 1	Average for the high RL-average for the average RL	8.555	32	0.005
Pair 2	Average for the high RL-average for the low RL	15.632	32	0.000
Pair 3	Average for the average RL-average for the low RL	7.966	32	0.013

The paired version of the Student's *t*-test demonstrated that there were considerably different average values of the degree of changes in life perception for the low, average and high level of religiosity ( $p = 0.000$ ).

The poll, conducted among the citizens of Russia to establish whether they were prepared to defend their faith and nationality, revealed that the absolute majority was determined to take up arms, if need be. The results correlate with the data, obtained by other scholars. While in 2014, it was forecasted that the ethnoconfessional tension would decline,<sup>12</sup> today it is gradually growing.


In Russia, analytical studies of ethnoconfessional terrorism are spontaneous, while their theoretical and methodological problems remain unresolved. Despite the fairly wide range of studies of this phenomenon, within the interdisciplinary discourse in Russia and abroad, religious terrorism and its repercussions are still waiting for conceptualization from the positions of the integral sociological paradigm through the prism of social and political changes and global risks.

<sup>12</sup> See: G.V. Matkarimova, *Etnokonfessionalnaia napriazhennost v stolichnom megapolise: sostoianie i dinamika*, MGLU Press, Moscow, 2015.

The identified interdependence between the levels of confessional tension (expressed in relative units) and religiosity is shown in Fig. 1. Darker shades show the corresponding levels for women; lighter, for men.

Figure 1

## Results of Polls



The “Very low” level of tension corresponds to 3.81% of the polled; the “Low” level, 29% of the polled in Ufa and Moscow; the “Average” level of confessional tension is present in 42% of those living in these two cities, the “High” level, in 26.1%. We are convinced that the figures are caused by the war in Donbass and Syria and numerous Islamist terrorist acts in Europe and Asia.

Xenophobia is rising, together with protest sentiments, accompanied by a deliberate change of confessions. An analysis of interviews of those, who were subjected to psychological pressure from the ISIS recruiters, helped us identify the following categories among the victims of psychological violence.

1. *The ascetic type (29% of the believers)*

The ascetic type of change of self-awareness: the conversion is accompanied by the impoverished meaningful side in all aspects of life. The changes caused by conversion are negative. This is the smallest group.

In this case, a conversion leads to what is called ministry, confirmed by the following statements of the faithful: “My relationships with God serve as the cornerstone of my life and of everything I do in it. I serve God”; “I do not merely know there is God, I want to establish deep-rooted relationships with God, which means permanent and direct contact with Him.”

Humility and the feeling of guilt are other features of this type of believers. When talking about negative changes in the meaningful sphere, the believer perceives them as a blessing. Contradictory at first sight, this can be explained as follows: any religion elevates its ideal and points to the gap between the mortal man and the ideal. Converted, the faithful learn to assess their lives in the context of these relationships with God, their only reality.

2. *The crisis type of change (43% of the believers)*

The crisis type of change can be described as a religious conversion that is accompanied by an increase in the degree of the meaning of life in some aspects and its lowering in others. This is the dominant type with 43% of the believers.

At this stage, it has become clear that despite the small share of these people among the total number of believers, this type of change is the most complicated and highly ambiguous. This group of believers point to their changed attitude toward illnesses, in which guilt predominates. The meaningful sphere of potential proselytes is crumbling and changes, because of great everyday problems, caused by marriages, love or health. This is confirmed by a very big share of the faithful, squeezed into this category by the ISIS recruiters.

3. *The positive type (14% of the believers)*

The positive type of change of self-awareness, in the process of conversion, demonstrates comparatively low positive changes in all the components of the meaningful sphere. This is typical of the sphere of achievement (successful, hardworking, productive and self-sacrificing); the sphere of spirituality (unique, struggling and searching for answers to the eternal problems); the sphere of coping with hardships (flexible, optimistic, strong); the sphere of social relationships (straightforward, altruistic, fair).

This means that from the point of view of the effects of conversion, the ascetic and positive types can be described as two opposites. The ascetic type loses the social world and acquires spiritual transcendental world. As distinct from the ascetic type of conversion, the positive type acquires something new in the social world and increases its role and importance in social interaction.

4. *The catharsis type (55% of believers)*

The catharsis type of change of self-awareness means that the believer assesses the changes, caused by his or her conversion, as maximally meaningful in all spheres of life. This is the most frequent type of change.

The high positive assessment of the entire meaningful sphere of personality is very typical of the catharsis type: acute or protracted negative feelings, transformed into positive emotions at the highest point. Dmitri Leontiev has pointed out that "catharsis is a reflection of profound meaningful restructuring, the dialectical resolution at a new level of inner contradiction in the meaningful sphere of personality."<sup>13</sup> From this it follows that the specifics of the catharsis type of change can be described as a sudden resolution of a high emotional tension, seen in the protest behavior of contemporary youth.<sup>14</sup>

This means that religious conversion is accompanied by qualitative changes of self-awareness.<sup>15</sup> These changes may move toward a bigger or smaller meaningful context in all spheres of life. There are four types of such changes: ascetic (lowering the meaningful content of all spheres of life);

<sup>13</sup> D.A. Leontiev, *Psikhologiya smysla*, Smysl, Moscow, 1999, 487 pp.

<sup>14</sup> See: I. Mkrtumova, A. Dosanova, I. Karabulatova, V. Nifontov, "The Use of Communication Technologies to Oppose Political-Religious Terrorism as an Ethnosocial Deviation in the Contemporary Information-Digital Society," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 54-61.


<sup>15</sup> See: G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, op. cit.

crisis (changes toward increasing the meaningful content in some aspects and its lowering in others); positive (comparatively small increase in meaningful content in all spheres); catharsis (maximal increase in meaningful content in all spheres of life), the most frequent among them being positive and catharsis types of change (95%). Positive changes in the degree of the meaning of life are going on in such spheres as social self-realization (the sphere of achievements), the sphere of spirituality, that of coping with problems and challenges (survivability), and of personal and public relationships.

The catharsis and positive types differ from each other by the types of changes: the positive type is marked by very soft changes in the meaningful sphere; the catharsis type, by more radical changes.

Figure 2

Distribution of the Opinions about the Causes of Terrorist Acts



The degree of religiosity is determined by the types of changes of self-awareness caused by the growing religiosity level. The catharsis type is caused by the affective component of religiosity. Religiosity of such believers is dominated by an emotional contact with the transcendental world; permanent awareness of the presence of higher forces, direct contacts with super-natural reality. The ascetic type is connected with the irrational component of religiosity and might become a prerequisite of destructive forms of religiosity.

## Discussion

Today, those who study religiosity in the context of activity, describe it as a complex, multi-faceted psychological phenomenon, defined as a measure of realization by a subject in the real world of his transcendental theistic-religious intentions, designed to establish ties between the subject and

Teos, expressed in the faith in the supernatural, as well as specific numinous sentiments, cultic actions, deeds and behavior as a whole.<sup>16</sup>

Any act of terror creates the following risk groups: primary and secondary victims of terrorist acts and those who had suffered in counterterrorist operations. This adds urgency to a comparative analysis of the declared forms and practices of state policies in the sphere of social protection, designed to lower the social risks for these categories of citizens.<sup>17</sup> At a meeting with the speaker of the State Duma, Viacheslav Volodin, the President of the RF, Vladimir Putin, supported the idea that those, convicted of terrorism, should be deprived of the Russian citizenship or that the earlier decision to grant them Russian citizenship should be annulled.<sup>18</sup>

When talking about their aims and purposes, terrorists speak about themselves as fighters for the rights and interests of the people and their homeland, and explain that they have to use force to wage a national-liberation struggle, fight for the lofty ideas of Light, Justice and the Universal Good, against state power and Russians as a nation, guilty of xenophobia and hatred. The examined literature used is primarily based on apologetic rhetoric: the authors of such works justify terrorist actions and insult Russia in extremely derogatory terms.

In the context of terrorist threats and actions, the practices of ensuring everyday security of the people have changed quite a lot.<sup>19</sup> Madrudin Magomed-Eminov speaks of the term “extreme” as a factor that changes religious self-awareness. He writes about extreme situations as existing outside the daily experience of man and transcending the limits of everyday existence.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, the far from simple situations are created by the way an individual understands his or her life and interprets the events in full correspondence with one’s own attitudes and individual characteristics, which gets exploited by those determined to transform the inter-confessional relationships.<sup>21</sup>

Edgar Schein divides the process of manipulation into three stages: “defrosting” (at which a person is persuaded that his previous life was a mistake), change (acquiring confidence by putting one’s faith in a leader and interacting with a group), “freezing” (cementing the attitudes, planted in the mind, while the object believes that he or she has stumbled across these conclusions independently).<sup>22</sup> Information supplied by the newly converted Islamists suggests that this process, even if described in different terms, is going on in terrorist organizations of the ISIS type.<sup>23</sup>

Practically anybody might fall into the trap of recruiters, the fact amply confirmed by the sad fate of a university student, Varvara Karaulova, or actor, Vadim Dorofeev, even if recruiters and

<sup>16</sup> D.O. Smimov, *Religioznaia aktivnost v strukture integralnoy individualnosti*, Ph.D. thesis: 19.00.01. Perm, 2001, 186 pp.

<sup>17</sup> See: M.Iu. Zelenkov, *Religioznye konflikty: problemy i puti ikh reshenia v nachale XXI veka (politiko-pravovoy aspekt)*, VGU Press, Voronezh, 2007, 244 pp.

<sup>18</sup> See: “Takie grazhdane nam ne nuzhny: terroristov mogut lishat pasporta RF,” 6 June, 2017, available at [<http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2896357>], 6 June, 2017.

<sup>19</sup> See: V.I. Chizhin, *Dukhovnaia bezopasnost rossiiskogo obshchestva kak faktor voennoy bezopasnosti gosudarstva*, Author’s abstract of doctorate thesis, Moscow, 2000, 36 pp.

<sup>20</sup> See: M.Sh. Magomed-Eminov, *Deiatel’nostno-smyslovoy podkhod k psikhologicheskoy transformatsii lichnosti*, MGU Press, Moscow, 2009, 53 pp.

<sup>21</sup> See: I.N. Chuev, T.M. Panchenko, V.S. Novikov, O.A. Konnova, N.G. Iraeva, I.S. Karabulatova, “Innovation and Integrated Structures of the Innovations in Modern Russia,” *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 239-244.

<sup>22</sup> See: E.H. Schein, “Organizational Culture and Leadership,” 2004, available at [[http://www.untag-smd.ac.id/files/Perpustakaan\\_Digital\\_2/ORGANIZATIONAL%20CULTURE%20Organizational%20Culture%20and%20Leadership,%203rd%20Edition.pdf](http://www.untag-smd.ac.id/files/Perpustakaan_Digital_2/ORGANIZATIONAL%20CULTURE%20Organizational%20Culture%20and%20Leadership,%203rd%20Edition.pdf)], 7 June, 2017.

<sup>23</sup> See: A. Kabil, “Tekhnologiiia verbovki: Kak IGIL popolnaet svoi riady,” 11 October, 2014, available at [<http://islam-review.ru/v-mire/tehnologia-verbovki-kak-igil-popolnaet-svoi-rady/>], 7 June, 2017; A. Grishin, “Ostorozhno! IGIL trebuiutsia spiashtchie agenty,” 31 October, 2016, available at [<https://www.pravda.ru/society/family/pbringing/31-10-2016/1317115-grishin-0/>], 7 June, 2017.

manipulators prefer to deal with children and lonely women, rather than men. Women are more active in social nets and forums; the danger of being lured into the nets of Islamists is especially high at the sites, where women, who lost the near and dear ones or were raped, share their grief and hatred.<sup>24</sup>

Robert J. Lifton has identified several methods used in totalitarian societies to influence the psychology of a man:

- (1) milieu control;
- (2) mystical manipulation (very often, leaders declare that they have direct contacts with God);
- (3) the demand for purity (religious purity in the ISIS case);
- (4) the cult of confession;
- (5) sacred science;
- (6) loading of the language (thought-terminating clichés);
- (7) doctrine over person;
- (8) dispensing of existence [the agents “chosen”].<sup>25</sup>

Later, the theories of Lifton and Schein were criticized for their very limited samplings.<sup>26</sup> If we push certain factors aside (certain people are more predisposed to suggestion than others or are ready to accept these suggestions on their own free will), then the conclusions about the possibility of manipulating are not completely waterproof. People analyze their experience through a system of cognitive symbols, meanings, on the basis of which man correlates his aims and possibilities, arranges the events of his live according to their importance at every given moment. This means that the attempts to influence religious self-awareness can be referred to as the instruments of political application of ethnoconfessional terrorism.

## *Conclusion*

The meaning of life is a dynamic structure; the axiological and meaningful sphere, and the meaning of life, as a goal, reflect the social, economic, political and ideological changes in society. The means of interpreting the gender specifics of transformation of confessional attitudes in the context of terrorist threats are conveyed by ideology, scholarly conclusions, paradoxes of public opinion, judicial practice and mass culture. The printed media explain women’s involvement in ethnoconfessional terrorism by the very specific features of female participants in the acts of terror: they are irrational, extremely aggressive, fanatic and, therefore, more dangerous than men.<sup>27</sup> According to these representations, the gender and ethnic identity in the newly converted female terrorists malfunctioned and detracted them from confessional norms.

It should be said that the structure of the analyzed discourses is fairly flexible: there are rational explanations of what is going on in terms of war that are less emotional and emphasize the fact that terrorist acts by female shahids are no longer treated as something out of the ordinary.

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<sup>24</sup> See: “Kak terroristy iz IGIL verbuiut zhenshchin v Internete,” available at [<https://lady.mail.ru/article/488295-kak-terroristy-iz-igil-verbujut-zhenshchin-v-internete/>], 7 June, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> See: R.J. Lifton, *The Future of Immortality and Other Essays for a Nuclear Age*, Basic Books, New York, 1987, pp. 420-425.

<sup>26</sup> See: J.T. Richardson, *Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe*, Kluwer, New York, 2004.

<sup>27</sup> See: “Kak terroristy IGIL verbuiut zhenshchin v Seti?” *Cosmopolitan*, 25 November, 2015, available at [<https://www.cosmo.ru/lifestyle/society/kak-terroristy-igil-verbuyut-zhenshchin-v-seti/>], 7 June, 2017.

To conclude, it should be said that the media, which covers the informational space in the Russian regions, should furnish objective reports and supply truthful information about events; familiarize their audiences with the life-building ideas about religious faiths, honor, the norms and rules, the discursive nature of communication and life in our polyconfessional world. Ethnoconfessional harmony within the law enforcement structures and their concerted efforts, in the army and in the regions depends, on the whole, on the concentrated and united efforts of a political authority, the responsible and adequate media, professional level of journalists, military psychologists, the energy of public organizations and all other structures responsible for ethnoconfessional relations, and on responsible citizens. This will allow us to avoid new extremist acts, prevent transformation of cautious attitude toward Muslims into hatred and will lower the level of ethnic intolerance in the army and society as a whole.

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