Совет экономического планирования Южной Кореи как ключевой орган планирования и проведения экономических реформ: особенности организации и деятельностистатья
Аннотация:В статье проанализированы особенности организации и деятельности Совета экономического планирования Южной Кореи (далее - Совет) как органа, определившего успех экономического развития страны в период 1961-1994 гг. Обозначены миссия и особое положение Совета. Определены его основные характеристики Совета: институциональная целостность, институциональная преемственность, институциональная автономия, равноудаленность от групп влияния, когерентность организационной структуры и функций, организационная целостность, эффективность процесса отбора и найма сотрудников. Указаны основные способы институционализации особого статуса Совета в системе органов власти и управления.Равноудаленность от групп влияния обозначена как характеристика, определившая особое положение Совета. Указана корреляция между институциональной автономией и высоким уровнем экспертизы Совета. Обозначена специфика подхода к отбору сотрудников Совета, определившая высокий уровень его экспертизы
Abstract: The article analyses the organizational and functional peculiarities of South Korea’s Economic Planning Board (hereinafter: the Board), which has been the authority to take credit for the success of the nation’s economic development between 1961 and 1994. The Board’s core mission and special role has been identified. The following distinctive properties of the Board have been presented: institutional integrity, institutional continuity, institutional autonomy, equidistance from power groups, coherence of the Board’s organisational structure and functions, organizational integrity, effectiveness of employees’ recruitment and selection process. The main tools whereby the Board’s special status amongst the nation’s authorities was institutionalised have been indicated. The ways in which the Board’s role within the system of the country’s supreme authorities was augmented and its powers expanded have been listed. It is noted that the introduction of the Vice Prime Minister’s office and the Board Chairman’s appointment to that position to a large extent accounted for the growth of the Board’s influence and contributed to augmenting its role within the system of the country’s supreme authorities. The Board’s equidistance from power groups is named the property that enabled the Board to achieve its special status. The article points to a correlation between the Board’s institutional autonomy and its high level of expertise. A specific recruitment approach has been described which enabled the Board to have top-level expertise. The institutes which were used to resolve domestic political problems that arose in the industrialisation process have been identified, and the bodies which provided the most efficient contribution to resolving various kinds of tensions have been named: the Economic Minister’s Consultation Meeting, the Industrial Policy Deliberation Council, the Economic Vice Ministers’ Meeting, and the Monthly Economic Trend Report Meeting.