Categorization in Intentional Theory of Conceptsстатья
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Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 3 октября 2016 г.
Аннотация:Abstract. The recent rapid growth of empirical results in neuroscience
has widened a proverbial explanatory gap between a first-person introspective
experience and objective third-person data. Given different competing
approaches, phenomenological framework proved an adequate
methodological tool to bridge this gap. The present paper aims at a phenomenological
representation of categorization by means of a modified
functional theory of concept, termed Intentional Theory of Concept. The
1st section hereof serves as an introduction into the subject matter. In the
2nd section, we will focus on key phenomenological ideas of intentionality
and analogous apperception (appresentation) and briefly describe our
approach. The 3rd section contains a short summary of the modern version
of the classical theory of concepts and its functional variant. Integrating
the substance of the previous sections, the 4th one will offer an interpretation
of categorization by means of a functional theory of concepts formally
presented by typed lambda calculus. The final section provides a summary
of findings and prospects for a follow-up study.