Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressureстатья
Информация о цитировании статьи получена из
Web of Science,
Scopus
Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 27 октября 2021 г.
-
Авторы:
Cecchin A.,
Kolokoltsov V.N.
-
Сборник:
International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications
-
Том:
15
-
Год издания:
2017
-
Первая страница:
71
-
Последняя страница:
106
-
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-70619-1_4
-
Аннотация:
We study the fragmentation-coagulation, or merging and splitting, model as introduced in Kolokoltsov (Math Oper Res, 2016, in press, doi:10.1287/moor.2016.0838), where N small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is a Markov chain in continuous time, and the players have a common reward to optimize. We study the behavior as N grows and show that the problem converges to a (one player) deterministic optimization problem in continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space l1. We apply the method developed in Gast et al. (IEEE Trans Autom Control 57:2266–2280, 2012), adapting it to our different framework. We use tools involving dynamics in l1, generators of Markov processes, martingale problems, and coupling of Markov chains. © Springer International Publishing AG 2017.
-
Добавил в систему:
Колокольцов Василий Никитич