Evolutionary inspection and corruption gamesстатья
Статья опубликована в журнале из списка Web of Science и/или Scopus
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Авторы:
Katsikas S.,
Kolokoltsov V.,
Yang W.
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Журнал:
Games
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Том:
7
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Номер:
4
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Год издания:
2016
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Издательство:
MDPI
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Местоположение издательства:
Basel, Switzerland
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DOI:
10.3390/g7040031
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Аннотация:
We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game. © 2016 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
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Добавил в систему:
Колокольцов Василий Никитич