On the structural stability of phase-coded quantum cryptography against detector-blinding attacksстатья
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Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 22 декабря 2021 г.
Аннотация:Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are open systems. Thus, an eavesdropper can activelyinfluence the elements of the system through the communication line, altering their regularoperation. One known attack is an attack with detector blinding. With such an attack, theeavesdropper can obtain the entire key and remain undetectable. The paper proposes afundamentally new method of detecting and protecting quantum cryptography systems withphase coding against the attack with avalanche detector blinding. The proposed method is basedon diverting a part of the input signal in the receiving terminal to bypass the interferometer anddeliver it to the same avalanche detectors. Measuring the detector response in different timewindows, both for the bypassed signal and the normal operation range, one can effectivelyidentify the ongoing detector blinding attack. The method does not require radical changes inexisting quantum cryptography systems and is quite universal, since it can be used for anyphase-coded quantum key distribution protocol. The method provides a fundamental strategy ofdetecting and protecting against the attack at the level of the quantum key distribution protocol,and not at the level of technical ‘patches’.